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MARTIN HEIDEGGER AND MEDARD BOSS: DIALOGUE
BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY.

The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1974
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THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA
GRADUATE COLLEGE

MARTIN HEIDEGGER AND MEDARD BOSS:
DIALOGUE BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY

A DISSERTATION
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BY
JOHN M. MARSHALL
Norman, Oklahoma

1974

MARTIN HEIDEGGER AND MEDARD BOSS:
DIALOGUE BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY

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To those who have been closest to me throughout this endeavor, to those who have experienced the stress as well as the rewards, to my family, I dedicate this dissertation.

FOR

CAROL,

GREG, ERIN, LAURIE

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The ontological source of Dasein's Being is not 'inferior' to what springs from it, but towers above it in power from the outset; in the field of ontology, any 'springing-from' is degeneration. If we penetrate to the 'source' ontologically, we do not come to things which are ontically obvious for the 'common understanding'; but the questionable character of everything obvious opens up for us.

Martin Heidegger

PREFACE

The often turbulent but nevertheless short history of psychology as a science reveals a strange and often strained relationship with its parent, philosophy. At its inception psychology received its identification by revolting against philosophy and basing itself on a model patterned after the natural sciences. The revolt occurred in the late nineteenth century and since that time both psychology and the philosophy it so rigorously denounced have changed. But despite the change the basic antagonism has persisted. In recent years, however, there has been a movement within the broad field of psychology which has sought the establishment of a cordial and productive relationship with philosophy. This movement, initiated in Europe, has now spread to the United States.

As we look back from the vantage point of contemporary thought, various forces involved within the movement can be discerned. There were sporadic voices calling for a detente on both sides but the major impetus for dialogue came primarily as a result of a "new" philosophy which seemed to be speaking directly to those psychologists involved in confronting the multi-faceted problems, pains

and sufferings of fellow human beings. This new philosophy was identified as existentialism.

At this point our historical vision begins to narrow down the general relationship between psychology and philosophy to a specific identification of psychotherapy and philosophical anthropology. This is not to negate experimental psychology or philosophy of science in the form of logical positivism or empiricism, but merely to emphasize the former relationship.

In the United States, existentialism began to titillate various psychologists because of its identification with humanistic perspectives. Many psychologists, Gordon Allport, Carl Rogers, Abraham Maslow, Rollo May to mention a few, were already predisposed to a humanistic orientation so that the arrival of existentialism as a philosophy seemed to open up avenues of communication.

The burgeoning interest within psychology over the new philosophical orientation appears to have become explicitly formulated with the publication in 1958 of Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology, edited by Rollo May, Ernest Angel and Henri Ellenberger.¹ This publication stimulated a wide-spread interest within psychology so much so that a lasting detente between psychology and philosophy was established.

¹Rollo May (ed.), Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958).

The "New Dimension" referred to in the subtitle of Existence relied heavily on existential philosophy, a philosophy which surprisingly had a longer heritage than initially realized and came replete with names and theories of various philosophers. It was also discovered that some European psychotherapists had been operating with existential themes for several years. The most notable of these therapists was Ludwig Binswanger. It was Binswanger who had taken the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and utilized it as the basis for a viable psychotherapeutic model. As far as psychologists--and philosophers--in this country were concerned the name Martin Heidegger played a prominent part in the dialogue between philosophy and psychology. As such, he was identified as a principal contributor to the philosophy of existentialism.²

When Heidegger's major work, Sein und Zeit became available in English in 1962 it seems to have been met, for the most part, with a predisposition towards seeing it as an existential document. Since that time, however, subsequent re-evaluations of Heidegger's philosophy, following his own protest at being identified with existential philosophy and philosophical anthropology, has revealed that

²The history behind this identification, complex as it is, will not be pursued at this point except to mention that for psychologists the acquaintance with Heidegger came primarily from Paul Tillich and Ludwig Binswanger. See May's two introductory essays in Existence, pp. 3-91.

there is a different Heidegger. It is becoming more obvious that to identify Heidegger exclusively with existentialist ideas and themes is, in a way, to miss that which he is trying to say. It is now believed by some that Heidegger's philosophical works, inclusive of Being and Time, are not necessarily existential pronouncements concerning the "nature" of man. Robert Scharff, for instance, has commented that if division one of Being and Time is seen in context with division two there is less of a tendency to see Heidegger as an existentialist. If this is the case, Scharff continues, there appears to be less of a discrepancy between the so-called earlier and later Heidegger. Scharff observes, "the stated intentions and the plan of the whole of Being and Time deserve serious reconsideration."³

What if Scharff's observations are correct, that the Heidegger initially seen as existentialist is not that at all? What does this do to the position of those philosophers and psychologists who initially saw Heidegger as an existentialist? Does this negate Heidegger's contribution to the detente between philosophy and psychology? The issue here is compounded by the fact that Ludwig Binswanger, the principal figure involved with using the

³Robert C. Scharff, "On 'Existentialist' Readings of Heidegger," Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, II, Nos. 1 & 2, p. 7.

philosophy of Heidegger for a psychotherapeutic paradigm, stated a few years before his death that he had misunderstood Heidegger.⁴ How is all of this to be assessed?

The position taken in this dissertation is that Heidegger's philosophy, inclusive of both later and earlier phases, is not to be seen as basically existential but as a concern with "Beingness as such"; i.e., Heidegger attempts to discern the way things are in that they are. He is not seeking properties or substances that reside within things but the fundamental characteristics "things" reveal in their Beingness--in their "that they are." This is referred to by Heidegger as the ontological difference.⁵ As I hope to demonstrate in this dissertation, seeing Heidegger this way will not only retain the detente established between psychology and philosophy but, indeed, put it on a firmer foundation.

In order to accomplish our task of revealing a non-existential Heidegger and one who has important contributions to make to psychology, an exposition of his thought will be undertaken. This exposition will be aided in its development by using primarily the published works of, and information gathered from my personal conversations with, Medard Boss.

⁴See p. 13 below.

⁵See pp. 51-53 above, also Chapter III, especially p. 133.

Medard Boss and Martin Heidegger have been personal friends for over thirty years. Having studied in person with Heidegger and having developed a psychotherapy out of Heideggerian philosophy puts Boss in the unique position of participating in the dialogue between philosophy and psychology first hand. Boss, a Swiss psychotherapist, has called into question Binswanger's interpretation of Heidegger; he has also attempted to show that the Heidegger who asks the question of the meaning of Beingness as such, does have something to say to and for psychotherapy and, by implication, for science itself.

Whereas some of the works of Boss have been available in English as early as 1949 critical evaluations have been lacking.⁶ Perhaps this is due to Binswanger's large influence in this country and the general belief that since Binswanger and Boss are both "Heideggerian" and both call their psychotherapies Daseinsanalysis, their positions are fundamentally the same. It will be demonstrated that this is not the case.

In 1971 Boss published his major work Grundriss der Medizin.⁷ A review of this work by John Glenn Gray brought this comment. Grundriss, "provides a new perspective on

⁶To my knowledge, as of 1973, not one doctoral dissertation, either in philosophy or psychology has been written directly concerning the thought of Medard Boss.

⁷Medard Boss, Grundriss Der Medizin (Bern: Hans Huber Verlag, 1971).

psychiatric theory and practice and one that Americans ought to be exposed to as soon as possible."⁸ The perspective has been here for several years, perhaps the philosophy of our time as well as the psychology is just now catching up to it.

* * * * *

In the introduction (Chapter I) of this dissertation I attempt to demonstrate how the labels "existentialist" and "philosophical anthropologist" were given to Heidegger. In this chapter I also deal with the change that takes place in Heidegger's language after the publication of Sein und Zeit. Why did this change come about? How does it effect Heidegger's initial questions as found in Sein und Zeit? I also introduce Boss and clarify his identification with Heidegger's thought via his various publications. As well, a demonstration, without explanation, is given of how Boss uses Heidegger's thought in his psychotherapy.

In the second chapter I am primarily concerned with elucidating the phenomenological method as used both by Heidegger and Boss. A distinction is made between the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger including an exposition of Heidegger's phenomenology as "laying-bare" that which

⁸Personal letter June 26, 1974. Gray was acting in his capacity as review editor for the Heidegger series of Harper and Row Publishers. At this date, Grundriss will be published in English, at least in part.

has been covered. As well, Boss' use of phenomenology is presented along with three examples.

In Chapter III I am concerned with developing the meaning of Da-sein especially as seen with its identification with the German term Lichtung. What is the relation of Da-sein and Beingness as such? What is Er-eignis? What are the existentialia? How do they function in respect to Da-sein? Is the identification of existentialia with matrices, world-designs and so forth justified? How does Boss see the existentialia especially in light of his psychotherapy?

Whereas in Chapter III I am primarily interested in revealing the equiprimordial characteristics of Da-sein, in Chapter IV I am interested in revealing Da-sein as Being-in-the-world. This chapter begins with the issue of "Care" as an a priori. What does Heidegger mean by a priori? The question of non-immanence is pursued with its important epistemological implications. When Da-sein knows something, is this knowing a "representational idea"? As Being-in-the-world, Da-sein is "with" things as well as other Da-seins. This notion of "other" is referred to by Heidegger as Being-with. What does Being-with entail? Many of the basic criticisms of Heidegger revolve around this element of his thought. An attempt will be made to reveal the weaknesses--misunderstandings--involved in these criticisms by looking at three examples. Also in this

chapter is a discussion concerning the effect of Heidegger's Being-with on psychotherapy.

In the fifth and concluding chapter I develop a philosophy of science gleaned from the Heideggerian corpus. I also attempt to show how this philosophy of science has led to the development of Daseinsanalysis. Heidegger says that science is in a fog as to its essence. What does this mean? When science works exclusively with abstractions does it not distort the phenomena? Can a science operate along the guidelines of Heidegger's thought? Have the existential, humanistic psychologists, in restoring "dignity" and "personhood" to their science, overcome the problems found by accepting a reductionistic paradigm based on the natural sciences? Whereas in the previous chapter criticisms of Heidegger are reviewed, in this chapter (five) I will look specifically at some of the criticisms of Boss' Daseinsanalysis.

In summary, there are basically two problems dealt with in this dissertation. First, Heidegger has been primarily identified as an existentialist and as doing philosophical anthropology. As I will demonstrate, Heidegger's own protest at being identified an existentialist is justified. This necessitates an exposition of his thought, one which will reveal the similarities in content between the so-called earlier and later Heidegger. Secondly, Heidegger's philosophy was instrumental in the development

of existential psychology in this country primarily because it was identified as existential. I will demonstrate that seeing a different Heidegger, i.e. a non-existential Heidegger, reveals a relevance for psychology that is more important, even more revolutionary, than when he was seen as an existentialist. This relevance will be revealed through Daseinsanalysis. To accomplish both an exposition of his thought, justifying his protest, and his relevance for psychology I will use the works, my personal conversations with, and the psychotherapy of Medard Boss.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. Martin Heidegger

The history of philosophy appears to get its sense of mobility from what might be referred to as revolutions of thought. The common element characteristic of these revolutions is the abandonment of one orientation and the framing of another. Yet the abandonment can never be fully complete for that which has been abandoned pervades that which has been framed or adopted as being the "from which" that initiates the spring into the "towards which" that represents the goal--the new orientation itself. Expressed differently, the one who revolutionizes does so by revolting from within the "from which." It provides the impetus to move on, or toward the "toward which." Thus, he who introduces a revolution is to a certain degree caught within the milieu "from which" he makes his revolutionary pronouncements. The dialectical relationship involving what is called the "from which" and the "toward which" is seemingly inseparable.

Two examples of the binding quality of revolutionary thought can be discerned in the pronouncements of Copernicus

and Descartes. Whereas the former was bold, even courageous, enough to state the opposite of the existing Weltanschauung, he nevertheless retained various notions about the fixed stars and celestial spheres. Descartes' daring attempt to rest philosophy on solid ground with the revelation of the Cogito nevertheless capitulated to a scholastic argument for proving God's existence.

It thus would appear that however bold and revolutionary a thinker might be he is tied with apparent necessity to that "from which" he revolutionizes.

Our century is far from being without revolutionary thinkers; indeed, one of the boldest made his philosophic debut in 1927. Yet if the above thesis holds, then even he is a product of that "from which" he has revolted and perhaps in subtle ways that are just now being realized.

In our time, Martin Heidegger is a thoroughly revolutionary thinker.¹ He has called into question a subtle "world attitude" (metaphysics) that has lasted for some 2,000 years. In essence, the revolution of Heidegger rests in his bringing into relief and hence questioning

¹J. L. Mehta, paraphrasing the words of Otto Pöggler, has stated concerning Heidegger: "To label him as an existentialist, the propounder of a heroic nihilism, as a myth-maker, as a metaphysician in the traditional sense or a phenomenologist, or as a pseudo-theologian or a mystic, is to overlook him as a thinker and to miss completely the originality and the profoundly revolutionary character of his thinking." (emphasis mine) J. L. Mehta, The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1971), p. 6.

the legitimacy of a thinking which grounds itself in the objectification of a self and/or a subject--the establishment, in other words, of substantiality.

Yet the difficulties in fathoming his thinking are legendary and battles over interpretation legion. He has been called an atheist, an existentialist, a nihilist, a Nazi, and subversive. Some early followers have deserted his banner, saying they had misunderstood him. Yet his influence on theology, even though charged an atheist, has been overwhelming and his influence on psychotherapy has been revolutionary in and of itself. However, some still say, "There is nothing new in Heidegger."²

Could it be that the difficulty Heidegger himself has had in pursuing the question of Beingness as well as that of interpreting and understanding him lies on this side of his revolution, the "from which" that he revolted? And to make the issue even more perplexing, could it be that Heidegger's thinking is revolutionary in not just a single sense but possibly two? After all, his basic work, Being and Time³ was claimed to be the initial revolutionary statement of existentialism. This is a claim that Heidegger

²Personal conversation with Charles Hartshorne, Arlington, Texas, 1970.

³Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962); henceforth referred to as B & T, the first page number referring to the English translation, and the page number preceded by "H" referring to the original German.

himself disclaims. Yet the influence Heidegger has had on psychotherapy, as well as on other disciplines, has come mainly through seeing him as an existentialist. If this is the case then the Heidegger who rejects the label existentialist would seemingly have nothing to say about, to, or for psychotherapy. Rudolf Allers, in his book Existentialism and Psychiatry, has stated that as far as a philosopher having an impact on psychiatry, "Only one, namely Heidegger, has gained influence. . . ." ⁴ In that same work, Allers states that although he agrees that Heidegger had great influence on psychiatry up to 1929, "The later speculations of this philosopher seem to have had nothing to say to psychiatry and an immediate bearing on psychiatry is, indeed, difficult to imagine." ⁵

Does this latter charge by Allers stand? The answer is a resounding No! If it does not stand then what could possibly have led to such a charge? A provisional answer is the failure to adhere to the cardinal rule for understanding Being and Time; it is a work in ontology, and to render any part of it ontically is to push it into an anthropology. To do so not only distorts the original intent of Being and Time but further increases the likelihood

⁴Rudolf Allers, Existentialism and Psychiatry (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1961), p. 33. In reference to Sartre Allers states ". . . only one, Sartre, has made explicit statements on psychiatric, especially psychoanalytic, questions," p. 33.

⁵Ibid., p. 92.

of seeing the early Heidegger as distinctly different from the later. Specifically why does this failure seem to occur over and over again, not only with psychotherapists but philosophers as well? This question reveals one of the fundamental problems of Being and Time, not only for the reader of that work but for its author as well. In his attempt to state the revolutionary question of the meaning of Being, Heidegger's vehicle for stating the question was a language permeated by metaphysical structure--structure which the question of the meaning of Being was attempting to clarify (ground). Heidegger's difficulty with Being and Time was that experienced by all revolutionary thinkers: he was forced to communicate with and from within the framework that was the impetus for his revolutionary thinking; i.e., he was "speaking" from within the "from which."⁶ Even though he specifically took

⁶Heidegger himself says in the Preface to Richardson's Through Phenomenology to Thought that the process of Being and Time, ". . . remained captive to contemporary modes of (re)presentation and language. . . .," p. xiv. He has also said in "Letter on Humanism," referring to the terms found in Being and Time, "I have come to be convinced that even these terms must immediately and inevitably lead astray. For the terms and their corresponding conceptual language were not rethought by the readers from the thing which had-to-be-thought-first; instead, this thing was imagined through terms maintained in their usual signification." "Letter on Humanism" in William Barrett and Henry Aiken, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, Vol. III (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 220. J. L. Mehta's work, reflecting on the basic failure to understand the issue raised in Being and Time, says that the failure was due in part, ". . . to the ineradicable and deep-seated habituation to the modern way of thinking. Man is conceived as a subject and all reflection on man is taken as anthropology," p. 38.

measures to avoid this through the adoption of various neologisms, he nevertheless was not able fully to disengage himself from this hold. The disengaging occurred only later and accounts for the seeming disparity between the earlier and later Heidegger. The difference lies in the expression, not the content. As Heidegger states in a recent publication of a work originally written in 1936,

The difficulty, however, still remains that one's own ownness (essential character) must be talked about. Concerning this matter, self-deceptions are unavoidable even where an interval of time has occurred between what was formerly given (said). This does not mean that "Sein und Zeit" has become something in the past for me. I have not "advanced" even today, for this is due to the fact that I am not allowed to "advance"; but perhaps I have come even closer to that which I attempted in "Sein und Zeit."⁷

But the problems of understanding the content of Heidegger's Being and Time do not all rest with Heidegger. After introducing the initial problems, Heidegger explicitly apologizes for the "awkwardness and inelegance" of the expression used and takes specific note of the fact that what is being done is not reporting about entities but

⁷Martin Heidegger, Schelling's Abhandlung über das Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1971), p. 229. (my translation) In his Nietzsche book, Heidegger has said, "If there is such a thing as a catastrophe in the creative activity of great thinkers, it lies not in the fact that they suffer shipwreck and make no advance but rather that they 'move on,' i.e., let themselves be influenced by immediate appeal, which is always the result of a misunderstanding of their thoughts. What is fatal is always the mere advancing 'further,' instead of staying behind at the source where one starts." Nietzsche, Vol. I, pp. 337-338, quoted in J. L. Mehta's The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 36-37.

attempting to group entities in their Being. "For the latter task we lack not only most of the words but, above all, the 'grammar'."⁸

Throughout Being and Time Heidegger explicitly warns the reader to be careful in understanding particular points or phrases, a warning that has apparently often gone unheeded. The following represents only a sampling of such warnings.

The Existential Analytic is designated by Heidegger as an attempt to disclose the ontological structure of Da-sein. One of these structures, the Understanding (Verstehen), is said by Heidegger to be not a knowledge derived from an acquaintance with something but is a primordial kind of being (ontological) which makes knowledge--and understanding--possible.⁹ And further, he states that the Understanding is not to be thought of in the sense of cognition that grasps something thematically.¹⁰

Projection (Entwurf), a fundamental structure of the understanding, is often confused with a thematically conceived project; yet Heidegger warns, "Projection has nothing to do with comporting oneself towards a plan that has been thought out. . . ."¹¹

⁸ B & T, p. 63; H, 39.

⁹ Ibid., p. 161; H, 124.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 385; H, 336.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 185; H, 145.

A specific development of the understanding is called by Heidegger "Interpretation" (Auslegung). Through interpretation the understanding develops as understanding. Yet understanding and interpretation, which are the same things, are, for Heidegger, still seen ontologically. Thus, Heidegger warns that "in interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a 'signification' over some naked thing which is present-at-hand; we do not stick a value on it. . . ." ¹² All things encountered within-the-world already have an involvement and it is through interpretation that these involvements get disclosed.

The Existential-Analytic is in itself an "Interpretation." Heidegger states, ". . . it may not be superfluous to remark that our own interpretation is purely ontological in its aims, and is far removed from any moralizing critique of everyday Dasein, and from the operations of a 'philosophy of culture'." ¹³

The structural whole of Da-sein as ontological is called "Care" (Sorge). Yet Heidegger warns that "Care cannot stand for some special attitude towards the self. . . ." ¹⁴ It is purely an existential-ontological designation and is not to be confused with worry or

¹² Ibid., p. 190; H, 149.

¹³ Ibid., p. 211; H, 167.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 237; H, 193.

carefreeness, or even love.¹⁵ And further on, referring again to the existential-ontological Interpretation of Care, he says, "What it has in view is not a set of ontical properties which constantly keep emerging, but a state of Being which is already underlying in every case and which makes it ontologically possible for this entity to be addressed as 'Cura'." (Emphasis mine.)¹⁶

One of the most difficult and hence confusing elements of the Heideggerian analytic is the meaning behind the term Entschlossenheit or, as translated by Macquarrie and Robinson, "Resolution." This term does not mean what the translation suggests. Heidegger states, "One would completely misunderstand the phenomenon of resoluteness if one should want to suppose that this consists simply in taking up possibilities which have been proposed and recommended, and seizing hold of them."¹⁷ Further on, in Being and Time, Heidegger states that the existential analysis "cannot, in principle, take into consideration what Dasein factually resolves, only the question of ontological "resolution itself."¹⁸ And still further, he states, "Resoluteness would be misunderstood ontologically if one were to suppose

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 244; H, 200.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 345; H, 298.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 434; H, 383.

that it would be actual as 'Experience' only as long as the 'act' of resolving 'lasts'."¹⁹

These few examples reflect a style within Being and Time which is definitely intended by the author to be a warning to the reader not to be led astray.²⁰ But this "style," if it can be called that, is not used specifically with reference to the important concepts of authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) and inauthenticity (Uneigentlichkeit). Nevertheless, Heidegger does attempt a clarification and distinction which can easily be overlooked. For instance, Heidegger states that the "inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any 'less' Being or any 'lower' degree of Being." In fact, as he explains, even a Dasein in the "fullest concretion . . . can be characterized by inauthenticity--when busy, when excited, when interested, when

¹⁹Ibid., p. 443; H, 391.

²⁰There are several more places in Being and Time where Heidegger specifically warns the reader; for instance: He warns against accepting the ontological structure of what is given as obvious, without need of further investigation. P. 152; H, 116. Mood or "state-of-mind" is present in any cognitive determination but this should not be seen as a surrendering of science ontically to 'feeling.' P. 177; H, 138. The term "fallen-ness" is not to be understood in an ontical sense of being bad or deplorable. P. 220; H, 176. Nor is it to be seen as a "corruption of human nature." P. 224; H, 179. We must not confuse "ontico-existential characterization with ontological-existential Interpretation." P. 229; H, 184. Do not assume too much from the term "uncanniness." P. 253; H, 189. "World-hood" does not signify the adding up of a "world" of objects and welding it together with a subject. P. 236; H, 192.

ready for enjoyment."²¹ There is a significant difference between an authentic man as seen by existentialism and an authentic Da-sein as seen by Heidegger.

Despite these attempts at clarification, the thinking of Being and Time has been revolutionary in its impact and equally revolutionary in its being misunderstood. One of the basic theses found in this dissertation is that the thinking of Heidegger is revolutionary on two accounts. First, Heidegger has attempted a critical analysis of the objectification of self, or what amounts to the same thing, grounding man in transcendental subjectivity. This is a manifestation of a substantival metaphysics. Yet this general metaphysical atmosphere was (and is) so prevalent, even in the structure of language, that Heidegger himself was seen to perpetrate this thinking on a new scale. The aspect of this rendering of Heidegger has been to push him to varying degrees, into what can generally be called philosophical anthropology.²² The second revolution of

²¹B & T, p. 68; H, 43.

²²An example can be drawn from Ludwig Binswanger's interpretation of the Heideggerian corpus. Binswanger saw B & T as disclosing the structural unity of Man's existence, hence grounding Man in Transcendental subjectivity--a subjectivity that "endows" or imposes Man in Transcendental phenomena. In other words, Binswanger saw Heidegger developing and extending the philosophy of Kant and utilizing Husserl's "Transcendental" phenomenology. As Binswanger says, Heidegger has "elucidated the structure of subjectivity as transcendence." /"The Existential Analysis School of Thought," Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology, eds., Rollo May & Ernest Angel (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1958), p. 194.7 But as we

Heidegger concerns the question as to the meaning of Beingness as such. Yet this revolution, far from being singularly occupied only with Being has revealed new insights into the Beingness; that is, the ontological characteristics, of man. It is this latter revolution that becomes the central, but not necessarily the exclusive, area of concern in this dissertation.²³

Ludwig Binswanger can be credited as being one of the first to recognize the significance of Heidegger's existential analytic, as found in Being and Time, for psychotherapy. Indeed, it was principally through Binswanger that Heidegger, in his capacity as being the primary influence on the development of an "existential psychotherapy," was introduced to this country. And for the most part, in

shall see, it is Heidegger's intention to overcome subjectivity, not to perpetuate it.

²³Otto Pöggler, a noted student and critic of Heidegger alludes to the dual classification of Heidegger's thought when he says: "Heidegger's thought is first classed among the philosophies of existence. . . . On the other hand, . . . the assertion is advocated with full energy that Heidegger's thought, as Heidegger himself has said and as one may demonstrate easily from his works, is not a philosophy of existence, that Heidegger's question is the question of Being. . . ." Pöggler further states that it is customary in classifying Heidegger, to draw attention to these two aspects of Heideggerian thought by reference to the "kehre," "a turning from existence as Dasein to Being itself." Otto Pöggler, "Heidegger Today," The Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol. 8, no. 4, 1970, p. 277. In this dissertation we will see that there are not two Heideggers, there is only the Heidegger concerned with the question of Beingness including the Being of Da-sein.

terms of psychology, Heidegger is still seen via the Binswangerian interpretation. Yet Binswanger saw Heidegger exclusively in the light of the previously mentioned "first revolution," i.e., in grounding man in transcendental subjectivity. It is somewhat ironic that now, after the fact, Binswanger admitted (1960) that he misunderstood Heidegger, although, as he puts it, it was a productive misunderstanding.²⁴

One of the basic insights of Heidegger's Existential Analysis was the revelation of Da-sein as Being-in-the-world. With this disclosure the dichotomy of subject-object was undercut. Binswanger made this insight central to his "Daseinsanalytik" orientation. "Only because through the concept of being-in-the-world as transcendence has the fatal defect of all psychology been overcome and the road cleared for anthropology, the fatal defect being the theory of a dichotomy of world into subject and object."²⁵ According to this view, human existence is reduced to a

²⁴Ludwig Binswanger, "Daseinsanalyse und Psychotherapie II," Psychotherapeutica et Psychosomatica, VIII (1960), 258.

"In this connection, however, I must note that I did recognize Heidegger's concern for a long time less sufficiently in its ontological importance for a philosophical anthropology. This misunderstanding, which is by the way yet a 'productive' one, still predominates in my work 'Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins'. (Zurich, 1942, 2 Aufl., 1953)." (My translation)

²⁵Quoted by Ludwig Binswanger, "The Existential Analysis School of Thought," in Existence, p. 193.

mere subject in which external objects are to be seen, but how this subject is to interact, communicate, or understand the "object" is never explicitly delineated. Yet despite Binswanger's endorsement of being-in-the-world, and his cry that the "fatal dichotomy" had been undercut, he nevertheless still remained tied to a subject-oriented posture which forced him away from seeing the central element of Heidegger's existential analytic--the nonsubjectivistic delineation of Da-sein.

For Binswanger, man is seen as essentially a transcendental subjectivity where the "existentialia" are regarded as transcendental, a priori structures that mold, form a design, and give structure to the objective world. Thus Binswanger sees Heidegger as perpetuating the Kantian a priori, transcendental framework. For Binswanger, being-in-the-world

represents an extremely consistent development and extension of fundamental philosophical theories, namely of Kant's theory about the conditions of the possibility of experience (in the natural-scientific sense) on the one hand, and of Husserl's theory of transcendental phenomenology on the other.²⁶

By transcendence, Binswanger means that toward which the transcendence is directed, the world, and that which has been transcended, the human being itself.²⁷ As he says, "Where we speak of 'world' in terms of existential analysis,

²⁶ Existence, p. 193.

²⁷ Ibid.

there world always means that toward which the existence has climbed and according to which it has designed itself. . . .²⁸

But, as we will see in more detail later, this conception of Heidegger's existential analytic is misdirected on two counts. First, Heidegger is not carrying on the Kantian idea of a priori structures as somehow molding or structuring experience. In point of fact, Heidegger is attempting to overcome this type of metaphysical representational thinking. And secondly, Heidegger does not reveal transcendence as the operation of a subject that climbs out of itself and goes to a world outside.

A further confusion on the part of Binswanger, and one that implicitly reveals his anthropological rendering of Heidegger, is his conception of "Care" to mean "being-in-the-world as being of the existence for the sake of myself (designated by Heidegger as 'Care'). . . ."²⁹ "Care" is seen in this sense as a self enclosed, hence, subjective self-concern. Thus Binswanger is forced into an "extension" of Heidegger's theory by implementing "being-beyond-the-world" which for Binswanger means "being of the existence for the sake of ourselves (designated by me as 'love')."³⁰

²⁸Ibid., p. 194; Ftn. 2.

²⁹Ibid., p. 195.

³⁰Ibid.

This not only distorts Heidegger's sense of "Care" but also misses the significance of being-with as a fundamental characteristic of Da-sein. To bring in "love" as an extension of "Care" is to render "Care" as a mood or feeling which, as has been seen,³¹ is antithetical to the sense in which it was intended.³²

Several things are required in order to follow the trail that Heidegger has blazed. As Heidegger often reminds us,³³ his is a thinking that is unterwegs, under-way. Those of us who follow this thinking must remember this but must also remember that our thinking is unterwegs as well. That is, in following we do not always follow clearly; the path we follow is not always obvious, the trail is often obscure. We who follow do so with a constant awareness that the going is difficult and often we ourselves have taken a wrong path.

It is hoped that in this dissertation it will be demonstrated that the path we are following is made doubly difficult by the blazing of a trail which resembles no set theory, doctrine, or position. It gives no one particular

³¹See pp. 8-9 above.

³²For an excellent description of Binswanger's misreading of Heidegger, as well as a general statement of Boss' position, see Charles E. Scott, "Heidegger, Madness and Well-Being," The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, IV, No. 3 (1974), 157-177.

³³Martin Heidegger, Holzwege (Frankfurt: Klosterman, 1950).

world-view; it does not use the traditional canons of logical coherence as found in all "systems" of thought. And it does not use a method that is easily recognizable, for his thinking is method in the sense of methodos, "the way to."

How does one go about following the path of a thinker of the magnitude of Heidegger? How does one meet such thought? Perhaps to answer these questions we should turn to Heidegger himself. In Was Heisst Denken?, Heidegger states that to have a face-to-face "converse" with a thinker there is one thing that is necessary: clarity as to how a thinker is to be encountered. "Basically, there are only two possibilities; either to go to their encounter, or to go counter to them."³⁴ To encounter a thinker you magnify first of all what is great in his thought and doing so reveal what is unthought in his thought. And it is this unthought quality that is "the greatest gift that thinking can bestow."³⁵ Yet the common sense attitude regarding the unthought is that it is merely incomprehensible. On the other hand, to go counter to a thinker's thought is to precisely minimize what is great in his thought and hence retard the coming to the fore of what is unthought. To

³⁴M. Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, Trans. Fred D. Wieck & J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 77.

³⁵Ibid., p. 76.

succumb to this way of thinking is to reduce the thought of the thinker to a commonplace presumptive know-it-all position. And as a consequence, "It makes no difference if we assert in passing that Kant [for example] was nonetheless a very significant thinker. Such praises from below are always an insult."³⁶

As a provocative thinker of our time, Heidegger has had his share of praise and insult. The latter results generally from the creation of a "straw-man" image of Heideggerian thought, i.e., an image that is created by the reviewer, not by Heidegger himself. One of our tasks in this dissertation is to vitiate this "straw-man" response on the part of some writers.

Marjorie Grene, for instance, acknowledges Heidegger's influence and the "appeal of his rhetoric about Dread and Nothingness."³⁷ This, in its own way, is a praise of sorts, at least in the sense of acknowledging an impact or influence that transcends the average thinker. But then Mrs. Grene states, resounding the ideas of Stuart Hampshire, that the "badness of the man and of his philosophy are intimately connected."³⁸ And further, referring to Heidegger's ontology, she says it is indeed empty and

³⁶Ibid., p. 77.

³⁷Marjorie Grene, "On Heidegger," Encounter, X (April, 1958), 68.

³⁸Ibid., p. 67.

arrogant nonsense."³⁹ Perhaps what is being witnessed here is not only a high degree of value-judgment assessment under the guise of a legitimate critique, but the very essence of what has been referred to as "countering" a thinker.

To carry this further, Mrs. Grene's book on Heidegger acclaims him as the basis of "existentialism"--a claim that she admits Heidegger would not accept; nevertheless, she makes it ("there is an existentialist Heidegger").⁴⁰ The existentialist Heidegger, as she calls him, was embedded within the ontological frame but independent from it.⁴¹ And referring to Heidegger's ontology, she says,

The trouble with Heidegger's ontology is not that it is ontology, but that it is spurious ontology, while his existentialism (we must call it that despite his disclaimer) expresses the ultimate insight of that tradition, the very heart of the existentialist message.⁴²

In this dissertation an attempt is made to make clear that to divorce Heidegger's ontological analysis from the concrete operations of ontic phenomena is to critically undercut the primary emphasis of Being and Time. To do this is to introduce the notion that Heidegger is an

³⁹Ibid., p. 68.

⁴⁰Marjorie Grene, Martin Heidegger (London: Barnes and Bowes, 1957), pp. 11, 13-14.

⁴¹Referring to ultimate loneliness and the importance of death, Grene says, "This is an 'existentialist' insight, which was in fact embedded in, but is nevertheless independent of the ontological frame." Ibid., p. 14.

⁴²Ibid., pp. 14-15.

existentialist, based on his philosophical anthropology. But Heidegger himself disclaims both these categorizations. He does so for a good reason. He is not an existentialist if by this one means a person who is preeminently concerned with the concrete actions of individuals as they exercise personal freedom, choice and assume or deny responsibility. Heidegger is concerned about these characteristics but on the ontological frame; i.e., the "way" they are rather than the "what" they are or the "what they do." If by "philosophical anthropology" one means the study of man, the rational animal, then Heidegger is not a philosophical anthropologist. His concern for "man" comes from the side of man's beingness, "that he is" rather than a presupposed categorization of "what he is."

Although Walter Kaufmann is not known for his appreciation of Heidegger's philosophy, a round-about praise can be found, if pushed slightly, when Kaufmann concedes that despite the "exceeding difficult and scholastic" style of Heideggerian thought, it did make discussions of death and despair and dread and care and other previously unacademic subjects quite respectable."⁴³ Yet this "praise" appears as a slightly disguised categorization of Heidegger as an existentialist. In his Hegel book, Kaufmann lumps

⁴³Walter Kaufmann (ed.), Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre (Cleveland and New York: World Publishing Co. & Meridian Books, 1956), pp. 34-35.

the thought of Heidegger, Kierkegaard, Sartre, and Camus together when he says, "One of the most glaring faults of most 'existentialism' is the lack of seriousness. One remains at the surface and is edified."⁴⁴

This is an example of the "countering" phenomenon at work. Heidegger's task in Being and Time, much less the remainder of his published works, was and is not a desire to "edify." This is a grossly over-simplified rendering of the so-called purpose of Heideggerian thinking. If there is an overriding purpose to the thought of Heidegger, it is to reawaken the issue of Beingness as such. This reawakening is not a desire on the part of Heidegger to edify but, indeed, to provoke and challenge, even to do violence to, to overthrow or overcome (uberwindung) existing modes of thought--this is not edification.⁴⁵

The implication coming from writers like Grene and Kaufmann is that if there is anything basically operative in the thought of Heidegger, and particularly in Being and Time, it is the existential quality of the work, not the ontological question. However, as it will be revealed in

⁴⁴Kaufmann, Hegel (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1965), p. 11.

⁴⁵As Heidegger states in Vom Wesen des Grundes (The Essence of Ground), the task of Being and Time was a "concrete, revealing sketch /project/ of transcendence. . . ." There is no hint of an attempt on the part of Heidegger to edify. (Trans. by Terence Malich, Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1969).

this dissertation, this assumption reveals a fundamental weakness of those who read Heidegger in this manner. If this is the case, and it is, it can be stated that the "real" revolution of his thought has been passed by with the facile manner in which he has been misunderstood. If legitimate, future philosophers will see the "real" significance of Heidegger to be exactly that which has been overlooked by many of his contemporaries.

2. Medard Boss

In 1926, at the age of 23, Medard Boss initiated his training analyses in Zürich. Among his teachers were Sigmund Freud, Eugen Bleuler, Ernst Jones, Karen Horney, and Otto Fenichel.⁴⁶ Like many young analysts in the middle or late '30s, he began to feel "suffocated with psychoanalytic theory" as presented by Freud.⁴⁷ Specifically, he was troubled by an overly deterministic theory which, when applied through treatment, aimed at freedom. In addition, he was becoming aware of the restrictiveness of this theory in that it did not seem to fit the phenomena. It was about this time that Jung, with a broader, less confining viewpoint, asked Boss to join him. With the aid of this more comprehensive view, specifically Jung's

⁴⁶ Medard Boss, Meaning and Content of Sexual Perversion: A Daseinsanalytic Approach to the Psychopathology of Phenomenon of Love (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1949), p. x; and "A Conversation with Medard Boss," Psychology Today, II (December, 1968), 58.

⁴⁷ "A Conversation," Psychology Today, 60.

concepts of Selbst and Selbstwerdung, "individuation," Boss began to realize that the general Freudian approach had unjustifiably reduced and objectified the human being. In his eagerness for rigor and upholding of the natural, scientific perspective, Freud had "isolated and objectified the psychic phenomena of man as an apparatus analogous to the physical organism."⁴⁸ Both Jung and Boss began to see that the "self" was unobjectifiable and could not be defined in terms of encapsulating compartments such as "the Ego," "the Id," and "the Super Ego."

While serving in the Swiss Army around 1943, Boss became interested in the concept of time and by chance happened to see an advertisement for a book on the subject. The book turned out to be Being and Time. At first, he could not grasp the basic notions of the work but only vaguely sensed "that here was something completely new, a fresh and decisive approach."⁴⁹ And within this newness he was aware that Heidegger was speaking about a non-objective view of man.⁵⁰

Sensing but not fully understanding the revolutionary implications inherent within Being and Time, Boss

⁴⁸ Boss, Meaning and Content, pp. x-xi.

⁴⁹ "A Conversation," Psychology Today, 62.

⁵⁰ "Here I encountered concepts and ideas which were philosophically adequate to this non-objectifying mode of thinking about man," Boss, Meaning and Content, p. xi.

communicated with Heidegger and thereby established a bond, the fruit of which was the sought-after understanding. Since the initial contact between these two men, many meetings have occurred⁵¹ and communications exchanged. Heidegger has helped Boss understand the initial problems of Being and Time and its relation to the "later" works, and Boss has in turn attempted to use that understanding as a basis for new psychotherapeutic approach. "In Heidegger's thinking I found at last a good, solid basis."⁵²

For Boss, this new understanding given to him by Heidegger himself was explicitly demonstrated with the publication of his first book in 1947, Sinn und Gehalt Der Sexuellen Perversionen.⁵³ With the publication of this book, Boss overtly severed his theoretical ties with Jung and established himself as an independent psychoanalytic theorist. The procedure of the book rests with its

⁵¹Heidegger has been a frequent visitor to Boss' home in Zollikon, Switzerland and has personally participated in several seminars at the Institute for Daseinsanalytic Therapy.

⁵²"A Conversation," Psychology Today, 62. More specifically, Boss states that the fundamental ontology of Being and Time is the basis upon which the ontic descriptions of the psychoanalytic situation are grounded. . . . These ontic descriptions are taken "on the basis of and seen in the light of Sein and Zeit." Personal interview, 1972.

⁵³Medard Boss, Sinn und Gehalt Der Sexuellen Perversionen: Ein Daseinsanalytischer Beitrag zur Psychopathologie der Phänomene der Liebe (Bern: Hans Huber Verlag, 1947). The English translation of this work has been previously referred to as The Meaning and Content of Sexual Perversions on p. 22.

characterization and criticism of both psychoanalytic and "anthropologic" positions (Von Gebssattel, E. Straus, H. Kunz, and to a certain extent, Binswanger and Jaspers) concerning the psychopathology of sexual perversions. There then follows the psychoanalytically oriented presentation and characterization of eight specific cases of sexual perversions, the major emphasis being that these particular modes of perversion represent a restriction or constriction of the mode-of-being of love as well as the all inclusive being-in-the-world of the isolated and personal individual. The preface to the English edition (1949), incidentally, contains a criticism of Ludwig Binswanger as incorrectly attempting to extract from Heidegger an isolated theory of man--an anthropology, something which Heidegger himself believes cannot be done.⁵⁴

Boss' second work was Der Traum und Seine Auslegung, 1953, and was published in English in 1957 under the title, The Analysis of Dreams.⁵⁵ With this work Boss becomes more explicit in his overall criticisms of psychoanalytic theory as well as more specific as to the guiding principles of Daseinsanalysis. The dream is the vehicle for this expression and finds itself released from causative explanations

⁵⁴Boss, Meaning and Content, p. xii.

⁵⁵Medard Boss, Der Traum und Seine Auslegung (Bern and Stuttgart: Hans Huber Verlag, 1953); and The Analysis of Dreams (London: Rider and Co., 1957).

and given a legitimacy of its own, commensurate with its phenomenal status. This position representing the overall tone of the work is captured in this statement: ". . . the theoretical approach which reduces all dream phenomena to mere representations of 'real objects,' the better to endow them immediately with manifold symbolic projections from the dreamer's unconscious, is quite unjustified."⁵⁶

Psychoanalyse und Daseinsanalytik, Boss' third book, was published in 1957. Its publication in English in 1963 (Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis) represents the definitive statement of Boss' position available in English to date.⁵⁷ Actually, the English publication represents a substantially enlarged work in comparison to its German counterpart. One thing missing from the English translation is a crucial discussion of Binswanger's position.

As the title suggests, the book is specifically concerned with demonstrating the basic differences between Freudian psychoanalytic theory and the Daseinsanalytic

⁵⁶Boss, The Analysis of Dreams, p. 101. In a personal conversation, Boss related that this work, and to a lesser degree, his work on sexual perversions suffered in translation. In point of fact, several crucial passages in the former work have been so mistranslated as to appreciably alter the intended meaning. This is dealt with later; see pp. 93-94, fn. 93.

⁵⁷Medard Boss, Psychoanalyse und Daseinsanalytik (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1963). It is highly regrettable that the English edition is now out of print.

orientation. In a penetrating critique of Freud,⁵⁸ which is reminiscent of Heideggerian critique of Kant, Boss demonstrates that it was Freud's explicit desire to stay within the confines of a strict, causal, and mechanistic natural-scientific framework that induced him to stray from the phenomena. As Boss shows, Freud's therapy was of a highly sensitive and even "phenomenological" nature but his theory was unduly distortive. Also contained in the book is a highly constructive, useful clarification of some of Heidegger's basic principles.

Although not a book, "Anxiety, Guilt, and Psychotherapeutic Liberation," is important enough to list here among Boss' major publications. Originally published as Lebensangst, Schuldgefühle, und psychotherapeutische Befreiung,⁵⁹ this work attempts to clarify the psychotherapeutic implications of anxiety and guilt by demonstrating their respective ontological grounds. Liberation from the oppressive weight of neurosis and psychosis can best be accomplished by the specific openness of the psychotherapist toward his patient. This "openness" is called "psychotherapeutic eros" by Boss, and goes way beyond the generally

⁵⁸ Boss' treatment of Freud in this book is an exceptionally fine example of what Heidegger describes as "encountering" rather than "countering" a thinker. See p. 17 above.

⁵⁹ Medard Boss, "Anxiety, Guilt, and Psychotherapeutic Liberation," Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, II (1962), 122-202.

known and accepted definitions of various types of love.

Indienfahrt eines Psychiaters was published in 1959 and published in English, A Psychiatrist Discovers India, in 1965.⁶⁰ This book reveals the intense experiences of Boss as he studied with the sages in India and Indonesia in 1956 and again in 1958. It is an in-depth look at some of the basic tenets of Oriental thought and, as well, reveals some of the weaknesses of prior translations and commentaries found in the West. These translations suffered from an overly Westernized interpretation of various Eastern cultural concepts or ideas. For instance, the highest of Indian Wisdom regards "chit" as a primordial illumination and opening-up which is non-objectifiable. If it is seen as subject or mind in the sense of psychological functions, it loses the meanings as seen by the Wisdom of the East. The similarity here with Daseinsanalysis is striking. Boss states,

. . . I remained greatly dumfounded by the entirely unexpected, very far reaching affinity between what the very recent Western 'daseinsanalysis' and what the very ancient Indian wisdom recognized as the most profound 'ground' of 'being-ness' as such; this 'ground' being called 'clearance,' 'openness': (Lichtung) by 'Daseinsanalysis,' and 'chit' by the Indian philosophical tradition. Could it be that in quite another part of our earth, in the Black Forest

⁶⁰ Medard Boss, Indienfahrt eines Psychiaters (Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1959); A Psychiatrist Discovers India (London: Oswald Wolf, 1965).

of Germany, the same deepest insight into that which is is trying to well forth?⁶¹ (Emphasis mine)

Boss' major work, yet to be translated, appeared in 1971. The title is as foreboding as seeing all of the 600 pages amassed before you. This forebodingness, however, is arrested when one realizes the scope and extent of the project. Its full title is Grundriss der Medizin: Ansätze zu einer phänomenologischen Physiologie, Psychologie, Pathologie, Therapie und zu einer daseinsgemässen Präventiv-Medizin in der modernen Industrie-Gesellschaft. A possible translation of this title is: Fundamentals of Medicine: Studies in a Phenomenological Physiology, Psychology, Pathology, Therapy, and, as appropriate to the Da-sein, Preventive Medicine and Social Psychiatry in the Modern Industrial Society.⁶² The importance of this work generally, and for this dissertation specifically, cannot be overly emphasized. Perhaps the best possible way to demonstrate this importance is to quote from the author's foreword:

First of all, however, the following book itself during all the time of its preparation has received the indefatigable attention of Martin Heidegger. He did not refuse his repeated critique (criticism) of

⁶¹Ibid., pp. 128-129.

⁶²Medard Boss, Grundriss der Medizin (Bern, Stuttgart, and Wien: Hans Huber Verlag, 1971). Hereafter this work will be referred to as Grundriss. The English translation of the title of this work was supplied by Dr. Brian Kenney, an analyst in training at the Institute for Daseinsanalytic Therapy.

of any paragraph which contained a "philosophical statement."⁶³

This citing of books written by Medard Boss was not designed to be exhaustive of his published works. Important journal articles both in German and English have been purposely omitted (these can be found in the Bibliography). By taking note of the major publications we have demonstrated not only the thematic concern of Boss but also the overall use of the Heideggerian corpus as grounding his approach.

Medard Boss owes a lot to Martin Heidegger. The obviousness of this fact tends to hide its reverse: the inherent difficulty of Heideggerian philosophy--yea, its oftentimes seemingly unfathomableness--has been greatly clarified without loss of meaning or content by the writings and in the personage of Medard Boss. In point of fact, the extent of this clarity is such that it offers, on occasion, new insights into understanding Heidegger, especially for the English reader.⁶⁴

⁶³Boss, Grundriss, p. 9. (My translation) Boss has stated elsewhere regarding Heidegger, "He has hoped that through me and my students and medical co-workers that the benefits of his thinking will come directly to the assistance of those who need him most of all." Richard Wisser (ed.), Martin Heidegger im Gespräch (Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 1970), p. 20. (My translation.)

⁶⁴Martin Heidegger, in one of his many visits to Zürich to participate in the "Zollikon-seminares" arranged by Medard Boss, made the statement that there is no better introduction to the existential analytic than through the works of Boss . . . that Boss has completely understood and conveyed this understanding of Being and Time through

It is our aim and purpose in this dissertation to investigate the meaning of Heidegger's fundamental ontology and to show its applicability to a psychotherapy. To accomplish this, the following needs to be mentioned. Heidegger's all pervasive concern was and has been the meaning, the question, of Being-ness. Being and Time introduced the question but insisted that a preliminary step was necessary, that of phenomenologically disclosing the questioner in his being. Subsequent works have dealt more with the primary question than the preliminary step. This does not mean that there has been a change in the sense of an alteration in Heidegger's thinking, but only a change of position within the original question. However, since the concern of psychotherapy, and in this instance, Daseinsanalysis, is primarily man--ontically speaking--Boss has remained with some of the language as well as the content of Being and Time, whereas Heidegger has in many instances abandoned some of the language. This does not mean that the later Heidegger has nothing to say to psychotherapy (as stated by Allers previously).⁶⁵ It does not mean that Boss has abandoned the "later" Heidegger or has stretched the original conception of Daseinsanalytik of

his writing. This account was related to this author by a student in attendance.

⁶⁵See above, p. 4.

Being and Time into something it isn't as Spiegelberg wants to suggest.⁶⁶

With the aid of Heideggerian thinking as its ground, Daseinsanalysis, as presented by Boss, is challenging some of the time-honored, as well as more contemporary, conceptions of psychology, and of psychotherapy in particular. Boss is therefore "revolutionary" in his own right and within his own specific area of concern. This revolutionary stance stems from his daring to penetrate into the "leveled-off" assumptions of psychology in general and to explicitly reveal these assumptions, as well as, the phenomena within psychology in their own immediate phenomenality. The implications for future orientations in psychology, much less the philosophy of science could--and most likely will--be dramatic. The concern of this dissertation, along with the exposition of Heideggerian thought, is to reveal these implications.

What follows is a general summary of the basic method and orientation of Daseinsanalysis. At this point,

⁶⁶Herbert Spiegelberg, Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry, p. 336. "What is puzzling about this Daseinanalytik, as used here by Boss, is that it is not exactly identical with its meaning in Being and Time. . . ." Boss is aware of the distinction between his use of Daseinsanalytic and that of Heidegger's in Being and Time. The latter is primarily concerned with following the ontological characteristics of Da-sein, whereas Boss is concerned with utilizing these characteristics in implementing ontic descriptions. To make this subtle distinction, Boss spells with "c" the term Daseinsanalytic whereas Heidegger uses "k". (Personal interview, 1972.)

no attempt is made to expand or ground what is stated; this awaits the remainder of the dissertation. This summary provides an introduction for the reader by revealing some of the basic themes of Heideggerian thought as they are applied to a "philosophy" of the behavioral sciences as seen by Medard Boss.

The term "science" is a compound of the two Latin verbs, "scire," to know and "facere," to make. Thus, in its etymological sense, the term "science" means "to make known." During the past three hundred years of the development of what is called "science," that which was to be "made known" was naturally assumed to be the "real world." Yet, with increasing insistence, the reality of our world was seen to be composed solely of "calculable, measurable objects which are related to each other in a causal, dynamic way."⁶⁷ But this is an unjustified usurpation of the very term "science." There is no legitimate justification for the assumption that only through a calculating and measurable approach can phenomena be known. This assumption is a pre-scientific article of faith.

An adjunct to the assumptive bias of science seeing reality as constituted only by calculable, measurable objects, has been the increasing "objectification" of

⁶⁷ Boss, "What Makes Us Behave at All Socially?" Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, II (1962), 56.

science in the sense of making itself value-free. To boast of or attempt to base oneself within a value-free discipline is not to rid oneself of values but is, in point of fact, to endorse with fervor a value. The across-the-board rejection of differential evaluations is made possible on the basis of a value judgment. "It is that value judgment of the natural sciences themselves which regard the levelling down of all values to a so-called objective, qualitativeless indifference as being of the highest value."⁶⁸

It is becoming clearer to modern investigators, both in philosophy and in some quarters of science, that the way man reacts to his world, in the sense of trying to articulate the world in some systematic "scientific" fashion, is guided by certain prescientific notions that each individual has (or carries with him). These notions refer in general to the goal and nature of man as well as the fundamental character of the world. Thus the so-called "pure facts" of science are not "pure" at all; they are brought forth into the foreground of attention by the prevailing prescientific notions of the time.

To take the stance that there are causal and dynamic forces operating behind the phenomena and hence define the reality of the phenomena is to perpetuate a

⁶⁸Ibid., 57.

prescientific bias. This is in fact one of the major articles of faith of the natural sciences. But to assume this, is to in large measure, degrade the phenomena themselves, to impoverish them and to "tell them," impose upon them, what kind of intellectual inferences reside behind them and constitute their "reality." The methodological procedure, on the other hand, which allows the phenomena themselves to tell us about their immediately given content is phenomenology. "Back to the things themselves!" Yes, but for the phenomena to reveal themselves as they are in their immediacy is to reveal themselves in their beingness. Thus they are phenomenologically disclosing their ontological character. Phenomenology is as ontology!

When a phenomenological procedure is implemented, it is found that phenomena are in themselves rich in content. We need not go behind the phenomena to ferret out so-called dynamic, causal structures; the phenomena themselves supply us with a thorough meaningful content. If this is the case the many mechanisms which have been promulgated in the name of "objective" science, the causal dynamic structures, will have to undergo serious reappraisal as to their legitimacy. We might find that some of our time-honored conceptions are not helping understand phenomena but are in fact hindering this comprehension and therefore must be abandoned.

It turns out that a phenomenological approach, specifically in relation to the questions of the nature

of man, far from being "overly philosophical," is in point of fact more "objective" than the so-called "objective" natural and behavioral sciences which have for the most part given us our definition of the "reality" of man. Phenomenology, by remaining with the phenomena themselves, may be "truer" to the phenomena in question and therefore not have to resort to the imposition of intellectual inferences. This is a "making known" of the phenomena which is qualitatively distinct from that given by the natural sciences. Could it be that phenomenology has helped us become more "scientific" than the natural sciences?

The ego concept has played a central part in the development of modern psychology, psychotherapy, and psychoanalysis to say nothing of philosophy in general. But what is the ego? It has been defined variously as a "substanceless bundle of perceptions, representations, and psychic experiences, sometimes defined as an intellectual or thinking substance, at other times as a nexus or as a center of psychic intentional acts."⁶⁹ The ego is also seen as the unity and individuality of the person, constituting the overt manifestation of his basic personality. Freud, for instance, saw the ego as a "psychic instance" somehow mediating between external and internal perceptions. Jung, on the other hand, saw the ego as exclusively conscious,

⁶⁹Medard Boss, "Ego? Motivation?" Journal of Existential Psychiatry, I (Fall, 1960), 275-283.

constituting the essence of consciousness and therefore the subject of all personal conscious acts.⁷⁰

If we examine these various definitions of the ego, nowhere will we find how the ego could make possible human perception, and above all, the awareness of things. How would the ego have to be constituted, we may ask, to allow us to enter into an understanding, meaning-disclosing relationship with the world? Nowhere can this be found in these definitions of ego. What can be found as a common element characteristic of these definitions is the presupposition of immanence. All see man defined as primarily "a precinct . . . self-contained and delineated over against the external world."⁷¹

If the ego is tacitly assumed to be this encapsulated precinct, how could it grant, be open to, things which confront the individual? How could it, in other words, transcend itself, get out of the encapsulation and go over to the objects in the world?

Immediate experience does not reveal the ego in its encapsulation but an "I" in relation to something. The "I" in other words is never seen in isolation. The "I" is only as in a relationship to something or somethings. This further reveals that man, being in relationship to "things,"

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 278.

⁷¹Ibid.

is always "outside" with things; i.e., things shine forth within the luminosity of man's openness to things and hence constitute, along with this openness, his essence. Man is never seen in his immediacy as an isolated ego or psychic instance that only later "relates" to our external world.

If the ego, and for that matter the id, are hypotheses which are not verified by immediate experience and are hence abandoned, how can we account for human motivation? After all, with the ego and id it was simple enough to see man as driven from within himself to something external to him. What if, instead of being driven, man in his being is attracted by what encounters and engages him, by what addresses and summons him, from what appears in the "light" of his existence?

But what about addiction and the state of bondage? Certainly we feel at times driven within to approach certain "external" things. Yet even addiction to something presupposes a hearkening, the awareness of a calling and summoning. To fall into slavish submission presupposes being called forth, being summoned. It is this same calling which creates for man the possibility of standing open to all the phenomena with which he encounters and to stand open authentically.

When man is revealed to exist in and as his relations to the objects of the world, inclusive of other men, then this, which is man's primordial nature, is called

Being-in-the-world. As Being-in-the-world man exists with a fundamental awareness that something is and/or can be. ". . . primary awareness of 'Being-ness as such' (if ever so vague) is the fundamental condition for the possibility of being touched and affected by something. . . ." ⁷² Man exists as this awareness because he stands outside with the objects he encounters. He "exists" in the literal sense of the verb "to exist" which is the English equivalent of the Latin verb "ekstare" or "ek-sistence," which means "to stand out into." Man "ek-sists" as this standing open and holding open, spanning a free realm of awareness for that which is encountered. ⁷³

Metaphorically, man as Being-in-the-world can be compared to an openness and a light pervading that openness in which all things appear and reveal themselves as the phenomena for which they are. Man, primordially speaking, is this light, a brightness which illuminates things; yet to follow our metaphor, light and brightness come about with varying hues and intensities. To follow traditional terminology, the brightness would be comparable to a basic comprehension, not necessarily thematic, and the varying hues comparable to mood or attunement. The two, therefore, cannot be separated. A tendency to be guarded against at

⁷²Boss, Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis, p. 37.

⁷³Boss, Grundriss, p. 487.

this point is to see this openness and/or brightness as being separate from that which appears within the brightness. On the contrary, openness, light, brightness needs the particular essents without which there would be no brightness. If, for instance, a light was shining and nothing appeared within the spectrum of light, there would be no light. Man is thus "thrown" on particular "essents" (objects) like the shining of a light and is in "need" of these "essents" in order to be what he is, i.e., Being-in-the-world.

As Being-in-the-world man is primordially not just open to the world of things or objects but other men as well. There is, in other words, a primordial being-with of men towards each other so that in direct and immediate "understanding" other men are seen to be in this world fundamentally in the same way I am. As Being-in-the-world man is "there" with other men, primordially and fundamentally. The world is therefore something I always share with others (the mitwelt). To follow our metaphor, humanity as a whole is a full brightness, a shining-together of individual brightnesses to constitute an all encompassing brightness which itself can reveal some things, and hide others. It is like the shining together of all individual sun rays to constitute the totality of the sun.⁷⁴

⁷⁴See Hendrik M. Ruitenbeek (ed.), Psychoanalysis and Existential Philosophy (New York: Dutton, 1962), p. 84. Boss states, "Humanity, as a whole, therefore, is

The somatic aspect, corporeality, of man is also a basic characteristic of Being-in-the-world. Primordially man is, has his abode, "out there" with relational possibilities; i.e., we are corporeality immediately as an aspect of existence. "How should essentially blind particles of matter and quanta of energy suddenly become endowed with the power of sight and be able to perceive things as they are in all their far-flung, manifold meaningful inter-relationships?"⁷⁵ How else but as being open to and with that which is encountered? Our "physical behavior" is constantly oriented toward that which confronts it on all levels at once--hormonal, cortical, muscular, and skeletal. In essence, the corporeal side of man's nature is nothing more than an aspect of man as Being-in-the-world; as such, it can only be fully understood from the standpoint of the totality of relationship to objects, fellow human beings, and matters of our concern at any given time.⁷⁶

Contemporary medicine is prone to use the terms "psychogenic" and "somatogenic" to refer to exclusive realms where the cause of a disease can be found. It

best comparable to the full brightness of the day which also consists of the shining-together of all individual sun rays." This is the Mitwelt. See B & T, p. 154; H, 118.

⁷⁵Boss, "Conception of Man in the Natural Sciences and Daseinsanalysis," Comprehensive Psychiatry, III (August, 1962), 193-214.

⁷⁶Ibid.

thereby perpetuates the dualistic idea of two substantial media through which man exists. Yet the essence of all phenomena, either healthy or diseased, "is the undifferentiated reality that underlies physical and psychic events--human existence, incapable of being concerned in objectifying terms."⁷⁷ Thus what is called "psychosomatic medicine," in terms of the Daseinsanalytic orientation, is a method whereby physical illness is seen as a deviant expression of modes of human existence.⁷⁸ The entire human life history, therefore, is an essential element in unfolding this human existence and cannot be reduced to a matter of statistics.

All men experience conflicts, confusions, disappointments, and upsets. What is of concern is not that he experiences these but the manner as well as the medium in which he projects and lives his existence. Environmentally, this can manifest itself in terms of conscious thematic acts or through the spheres of "unconscious," unthematic, bodily manifestations.

The term "hate" or "hatred" in German is Hass and the term "ugly" is Hässlich. In an attuned state of hate, all form or shape is distorted and made ugly or grotesque.

⁷⁷Medard Boss, "Mechanistic and Holistic Thinking in Modern Medicine," The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, XIV (1954), 48-54.

⁷⁸Ibid.

Yet by being attuned to hate one is not only held within a "psychic" sphere of destructive impulses or wishes, but includes the bodily sphere as well. The distorted grimaces, the taut muscles and peculiar feeling in the "pit of the stomach" are all too easily discernible to be lightly dismissed.

In a state attuned wholly to anxiety, the bodily sphere shows itself with equal force as found with hate. In the mood of anxiety the whole body will at times flush and there will also be observed gestures of retraction of the extremities. Internally, the body tightens with a constricted throat, the internal organs are cramped, breathing becomes difficult or pressured.

In joy, however, the body is lifted, is deconstricted. The breast lifts, the heart beats faster, there is an easy calm that overcomes the internal organs and, externally, the mimicry that was described in hate takes on its reverse.⁷⁹

We find in viewing man primordially as Being-in-the-world that the notion of a psyche as well as the representation of a body gives way. Man exists neither as an encapsulated psyche nor as a mechanistically or energetically contrived body but simply man exists ek-statically; i.e.,

⁷⁹Boss, "Conception of Man," Comprehensive Psychiatry, 211.

man exists as a luminating realm standing out and within the world openness in which all that is and has to be manifests itself, comes forth, and reveals itself. Thus, when Heidegger states that "man is the shepherd of Being,"⁸⁰ he means that man is that through which Beingness and things which "have" Beingness are revealed and thereby man lets the "revealed" (later Heidegger refers to this as "presence") unfold its own meaning to the highest extent possible.

Viewing man in this way demolishes the fatal dichotomy of mind-body, subject-object. ". . . there are no 'ob-jects' whatsoever which are--as this term would have them--thrown-over-against a subject's consciousness in order to give rise to mental images of themselves only within this subjective consciousness."⁸¹

Man as Being-in-the-world also reveals the artificiality of the dichotomy and dispute between "existentialism" and "essentialism." This dichotomy initially presupposes a Neo-Platonic dualism between a realm of "essential," supersensual ideas over against a less real world of defective, changeable realizations of these ideas found within the existential behavior of man.⁸²

⁸⁰Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," 210.

⁸¹Ibid., 212.

⁸²Ibid.

Daseinsanalytically and hence phenomenologically, if we stand open and with the phenomena themselves and let them reveal themselves to us in their immediacy, all such dichotomies vanish. Man has, viewed from the Daseins-analytic perspective, invariably pushed himself beyond the phenomena in order to extrapolate and imbue the phenomena in question with extensive theoretical structures. Such a procedure rests on pre-scientific notions about the status of the world and the phenomena of the world; i.e., this procedure is a "philosophical" system. Daseinsanalysis, on the other hand, does not intend to exchange one philosophical system for another but merely attempts to stay with the phenomena themselves. It is a method.

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY: "THE WAY TO SOMETHING"

The Heideggerian method is phenomenological. Although the "later" Heidegger abandons the term phenomenology, the method remains the same. Of primary concern in this chapter is the elucidation of Heidegger's method and how Boss uses it in psychotherapy. The task in section 3 is to develop Heidegger's own meaning of phenomenology. In section 4, this meaning is contrasted with that of Husserl's. Section 5 reveals the counter-concept to phenomenology--leveling off--and how it is the task of phenomenology to overcome this "tendency." In section 6, phenomenology as interpreted and used by Boss is presented.

3. Phenomenology: "Only as Phenomenology is ontology possible."

For those who are convinced that the "later" Heidegger is different in expression as well as content from the earlier Heidegger, the brief description of phenomenology offered by Heidegger himself in his preface (or letter) to Richardson's Through Phenomenology to Thought should prove to be revealing, if not downright remarkable. There are two essential points revealed by this discussion. The first revolves around a Heidegger writing a reply to

Richardson's questions, a Heidegger in the so-called "later" phase, who refers to his use of phenomenology in Being and Time as what he still considers, ". . . a more faithful adherence to the principle of 'phenomenology'."¹

The second point, an adjunct of the first, is that Heidegger himself would place so much emphasis on and distinction between the prepositions "from" and "through." Richardson had originally conceived of the title of his work as "From Phenomenology to Thought." Heidegger suggests that if the term "phenomenology" is conceived as a philosophical position--as it came to be through Husserl--then the use of the term "from" is justified; i.e., that Heidegger's use of "phenomenology" is to be distinguished from Husserl's. For the latter, as Heidegger states, phenomenology functions as a philosophical position, "according to a pattern set by Descartes, Kant, and Fichte."² If, however, "through" is used instead of "from," it is to signify phenomenology "as the process of" allowing the most proper concern of thought to show itself. . . ."³ The

¹William J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: Martinus Wijkhoff, 1967), p. xiv. The point here bears repeating. The later Heidegger is not a different Heidegger in terms of an alteration of views, but a Heidegger at a different location on the path of questioning Beingness. Or, as Medard Boss succinctly stated it, "The Kehre is nonsense." (Personal interview, 1972).

²Ibid.

³Ibid. This is Richardson's translation of "als das Sichzeigenlassen der eigensten Sache des Denkens. . . ." P. xvii. Italics added. Translation of Sache as "concern" should be noted.

title should then be, as suggested by Heidegger, "Through Phenomenology to the Thinking of Being."

Yet that which is "the most proper concern of thought" is Beingness itself. Hence, phenomenology properly understood, is a thinking of Beingness. Any distinction, therefore, between phenomenology and the "thinking of Being" disappears. The two are the same. Expressed differently, the "thinking" of the expression "the thinking of Being" is equivalent to "phenomenology" and the "Being" is equivalent to ontology. Thus, "only as phenomenology is ontology possible," or Being is revealed through thinking--albeit a special way of thinking.⁴

What is revealed by this important play on words is again a change in the Heideggerian expression, i.e., the language, but no correlative change in content. This alteration of expression was precipitated by the captivity of the language of Being and Time, ". . . to contemporary modes of (re)presentation and language. . . ." ⁵

The process which allows the most proper concern of thought to show itself, is not a forced or contrived

⁴In one of Heidegger's latest publications translated into English, he says, "But in what is most its own phenomenology is not a school. It is the possibility of thinking, at times changing and only thus persisting, of corresponding to the claim of what is to be thought." In the essay, "My Way to Phenomenology" as found in On Time and Being, trans., Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 82.

⁵Richardson, p. xiv.

definition of phenomenology. As Heidegger demonstrates in Being and Time⁶ the term "phenomenon" etymologically is derived from the Greek word $\phi α ι ν ε σ α ι$ which has the double meaning of "showing itself" or "being shown." It may also mean "to come to the light" since this particular Greek word is etymologically connected with the Greek word for light, $\phi ω ς$. The suffix "ology" of the term, phenomenology, comes from the Greek $λογος$, and as Heidegger notes⁷ is closely related to the term $ε η λ ο γ ε ι ν$ which means to "make manifest what one is talking about," or as Heidegger suggests, "letting something be seen."

Phenomenology, states Heidegger in Being and Time, is neither a "stand-point" nor a special "direction" and

⁶ B & T, p. 51; H, 28-29. The thinking of Being and Time was one in which metaphysics was to be overcome by going back "into the ground," yet the language used was one held in check by tradition; i.e., metaphysics itself. New modes of expression had to be found and old expressions (terms like phenomenology and ontology) had to be abandoned. Heidegger states in one of his later works, "Our Western languages are languages of metaphysical thinking, each in its own way. It must remain an open question whether the nature of Western languages is in itself marked with the exclusive brand of metaphysics, and thus marked permanently by onto-theo-logic, or whether these languages offer other possibilities of utterance--and that means at the same time of a telling silence." Identity and Difference, trans., Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 73. Perhaps the abandonment by Heidegger of the linguistic expression in Being and Time reflects his own awareness at being caught within the "from which" referred to in the Introduction.

⁷ B & T, pp. 55-56; H, 32-33.

will remain neither as long as it understands itself.⁸

Phenomenology for Heidegger means "to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself." This is equivalent to the expression, "to the things themselves."⁹ Yet this is only half of the definition of phenomenology as Heidegger intends it. What about the "things?" What about the "matter" of thinking? What is it that phenomenology lets us see? To answer these questions poses some difficulty, for phenomenology does not follow the general tendency of terms having the suffix, logos--theology, biology, psychology, and so forth--which demarcate their subject matter. Phenomenology does not in fact designate the object of its research, nor does it characterize the subject-matter. The emphasis of phenomenology as seen in reference

⁸ B & T, p. 50; H, 27.

⁹ B & T, p. 58; H, 34. The expression in German, "Zu dem Sachen Selbst," is generally translated, "to the things themselves." Yet Sachen is not Dingen. A more proper translation or at least an understanding of Sachen would be "matter," or "concern of thought." The expression, "Die Sachen des Denken," for instance, is translated, "the matter of thinking."

In his essay "The End of Philosophy" (On Time and Being) pp. 61-62, Heidegger reveals that the call that thinking address itself "to the things themselves" has taken place in modern philosophy with the works of both Hegel and Husserl, the former in his Preface to the System of Science (The Phenomenology of Mind, 1807) and the latter in Philosophy as Exact Science. Yet for both Hegel and Husserl, the call to things means a grounding in the subjectivity of consciousness. The next section of this dissertation deals with the distinction between Husserl and Heidegger, regarding this issue of subjectivity.

to "logos" is on the "how" with which a "what" is to be treated; i.e., a method for revealing what is otherwise hidden or concealed. That which shows itself in a phenomenological sense has for the most part been covered up, "hidden from view." What we generally "see," what are for the most part "things" of experience, are semblances and appearances which "hide" (cover up) the phenomenologically "seen." This phenomenologically "seen" thing is nothing less than that which constitutes the meaning and ground of that which appears or is a semblance--the Beingness of entities "itself." Beingness, however, is not one entity among others. It is not this entity or that entity, but the Beingness of all entities.

Yet this Beingness remains hidden or covered up for the most part and must be wrested from the "things" (appearances, semblances) seen. This is accomplished as interpretation (auslegung) in relation to Beingness and interpretation as hermeneutic in the sense of the phenomenology of Da-sein. The meaning of interpretation (auslegung) is a "laying out" or "laying bare" of possibilities--or an uncovering. Interpretation as hermeneutic operates as the "laying bare" of the as structure of the Understanding (Verstehen).¹⁰ In other words, it aims at the meaning of

¹⁰The Understanding (Verstehen) will be considered later. (See p. 155 below.) The term "hermeneutic," borrowed from theology, is used by Heidegger in its original sense as "interpretation" or description but with a special reference for Da-sein.

that which is to be interpreted. Yet a warning must be issued. Not only Understanding but Interpretation, as well, function for the most part unthematically.¹¹

In dealing within the framework of scientific proofs, the scientist must not presuppose that which it is his task to demonstrate. To do so is to operate within a circle. Yet Heidegger reveals that the Understanding as interpretation does indeed operate within a circle in that it already understands what is to be interpreted. What does Heidegger mean by this? Da-sein is, as Being-in-the-world, spread out and strung along--or ek-static. The world is part of the very definition of Da-sein; thus Da-sein, as disclosedness (openness) already "is" that which is being disclosed via understanding; that is, ". . . in every understanding of the world, existence is understood with it and vice versa."¹² By the rules of basic logic this is seen as a vicious circle.

¹¹B & T, p. 190; H, 49. "That which is understood gets articulated when the entity to be understood is brought close interpretatively by taking as our clue the something as something, and this articulation lies before (leigtvor) our making any thematic assertion."

¹²B & T, p. 196; H, 153. Elsewhere Heidegger states, "If we must first define an entity in its Being, and if we want to formulate the question of Being only on this basis, what is this but going in a circle?" B & T, p. 27; H, 7. In his essay, "What Is Philosophy?" (Was ist die Philosophie?), (New Haven: College and University Press, n.d.), Heidegger calls philosophy itself a circle. To ask what philosophy is requires beforehand a knowledge of what it is; i.e., we can ask our question only if we have previously taken a look into philosophy. This is going around in a circle. P. 43.

However, Heidegger declares that, to the contrary, it is a vehicle for the most primordial kind of knowing. The knowing of Being-ness itself as it announces itself from the things themselves devoid of any artificially contrived explanations.¹³

The circle is a direct correlation of what Heidegger refers to as the ontological difference, that is, the distinction between Beingness and beings or essents. Beingness manifests itself only as essents. Yet essents are because of Beingness. The circularity found within this relational difference captures the essence of Heideggerian thought. In a personal letter to Medard Boss, Heidegger said that the sufficient distinction between the mode of being of a specific species of things or living beings and Beingness as such, "the whole road of my thinking is concealed, insofar as one follows its progression through the essence of metaphysics."¹⁴

Since the circle serves as a vehicle for a primordial kind of knowing (ontological), a knowing of Beingness itself, the point is not how to escape the circle but how to get into it in the right way. We must, in fact, leap (springen) into it. In Being and Time the leap is merely pointed to,

¹³B & T, pp. 194-196; H, 152-153.

¹⁴Medard Boss, Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis, trans., Ludwig Lefebvre (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1963), p. 36, Ftn. 4. See also p. 134 below.

it is not given a full disclosure as to its essence; this awaits the so-called later Heidegger. Nevertheless, the leap, as found in Being and Time cannot be abandoned as a topic yet. Important elements of the leap (springen) are revealed by Heidegger in subtle ways. For instance, in section 26, regarding the "Dasein-with" of others, Heidegger refers to a solicitude which leaps in (einspringen) and one which leaps ahead (vorspringen).¹⁵ The importance of the etymological root of springen is apparent, but what is perhaps not so apparent is the ontological distinction and significance of the two forms einspringen and vorspringen. The latter is ontologically more appropriate--note that this does not mean "better."

What are the subtle nuances of these distinct ontological possibilities revolving around the phenomenon of leaping? Perhaps an answer lies in the statement by Heidegger at the very beginning of Being and Time:

In the question of the meaning of Being, there is no circular reasoning but rather a remarkable "relationship backward or forward" which what we are asking about (Being) bears to the inquiry itself as a mode of Being of an entity.¹⁶

¹⁵B & T, p. 158; H, 122. Footnote 1 on that page refers to the translation of einspringen and suggests a more idiomatic translation as "intervene for him." Boss translates these as "intervening care and anticipatory care." P & D, p. 73. These are further explained in Section 12.

¹⁶B & T, p. 28; H, 8.

A leap suggests not only a "going to" but a "coming from." In Identity and Difference, Heidegger expands the significance of the leap by revealing the "coming from." Heidegger is speaking about the relationship of Being and man and asks how can this domain of belonging together be entered. He answers, "By our moving away from the attitude of representational thinking. This move is a leap in the sense of a spring. The spring leaps away, away from the habitual idea of man as the rational animal who in modern times has become a subject for his objects."¹⁷

A leap in thought leaves the representational, conceptualizing of metaphysical thinking and enters the realm of the mutuality in immediacy of Da-sein and Beingness. This is not a leap into the mystical but a leap which allows what is to reveal itself, a letting shine forth of phenomena free from the grasp and manipulation of conceptual thought. The leap is the "way" to something, or the "how" something is revealed. Phenomenology, as Heidegger sees it, is this way or how.¹⁸

¹⁷Heidegger, Identity and Difference, p. 32. Since our concern here is primarily the leap itself, it will be mentioned only in passing that this particular quote hides within it the basic question of Being and Time, the ontological difference and its meaning as well as the issue of representational thinking, or what has been and will be referred to as "immanence and non-immanence." This latter point reveals the metaphysical entity, the subjectivity of the subject. And a hint, at least, is given to the "domain of belonging together," what Heidegger refers to as Ereignis.

¹⁸In his later works Heidegger introduces the German expression, der Schritt Zurück, the step back, which seemingly is a type of leap much like hermeneutics was (is) a

Phenomenology is unique among methodologies in that it does not base itself on the traditional schemata of laying down an axiom from which a sequence of propositions is deduced, or in other words, it does not base itself on "proof." Phenomenology is a "how," not a "what" in the sense of a standpoint or a position, for phenomenology does not "posit" anything, it simply attempts to reveal or disclose that which is revealing or disclosing itself to us.¹⁹ Phenomenology "is not a making, it is a seeing as a given."²⁰

Phenomenology as method directs the thinking of Heidegger (whether this thinking is found in Being and Time or any of his later works). As the "how" with which the "what" is to be interrogated, phenomenology is a seeing in the sense of a revealing or uncovering and conversely is not a making in the sense of positing. It is somewhat puzzling, therefore, to hear the charge that Heidegger is operating as did Kant, by fiat. If the philosopher is restricted by his method from deducing or proving, say,

special type of interpretation. "The step back . . . moves out of metaphysica into the essential nature of metaphysics." Identity and Difference, p. 51. On Time and Being, p. 30.

¹⁹B & T, p. 50; H, 27. "Thus our treatise does not subscribe to a 'stand-point' or represent any special 'direction,' for phenomenology is nothing of either sort, nor can it become so as long as it understands itself."

²⁰Medard Boss, personal interview, 1973.

for example, the self, then all he can do "is to presuppose the constitutive nature of the self by fiat."²¹

Jacob Needleman, in his book, Being-in-the World, says that Heidegger is operating by fiat when he presupposes being-in-the-world. For Needleman, operating by fiat means that Heidegger has refused to accept traditionally accepted criteria for working with the problems of philosophy. Needleman says, for instance, that, ". . . the entire argument of Sein und Zeit can be read as a 'justification' . . . of the essential Being-in-the-world of the Dasein."²² And further, "The inherent structure of the Dasein is such that Being-in-the-world is presupposed; it is antecedent to all other experiences or modes of being of the Dasein."²³ In order to demonstrate this fiat and/or presupposed nature of Being-in-the-world, Needleman presents two quotes from Heidegger which he assumes will demonstrate his point; the two quotes are these:

. . . What then is there left to ask when one presupposes that knowing is already merged with its

²¹Jacob Needleman, Being-in-the-World, trans. and Intro. (New York and Evanston: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), p. 17. Needleman in supporting his claim quotes from Sartre: "In his abrupt, rather barbaric fashion of cutting Gordian knots rather than trying to untie them, he gives an answer to the question posited as pure and single definition." Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans., Hazel Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library), p. 244.

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid.

world which it was not supposed to get to except by transcending the subject?²⁴

Knowing is a mode of the Dasein founded on its being-in-the-world. This being-in-the-world as a fundamental structure, requires antecedent interpretation.²⁵

If the "in context" nature of both of these quotes is examined it will be found that instead of endorsing Needleman's claim, just the opposite is true. For instance, regarding the first quote, if Needleman had included the first part of the quoted sentence, a completely different situation would be revealed. The first part of that sentence reads, "But if, as we suggest, we thus find phenomenally that knowing is a kind of Being which belongs to Being-in-the-world, one might object that with such an interpretation of knowing, the problem of knowledge is nullified;" and thus the remaining part of the sentence follows, that quoted by Needleman; but with the addition of the first part of the sentence it is plain that Heidegger is not the one who uses the expression "presuppose," it is the one who might object. The objector naturally would assume Being-in-the-world as "presupposition" since he "knows" that knowledge is really "inside" and that the object is really "outside." On the preceding page from where this quote was extracted by Needleman, Heidegger states,

²⁴Ibid., B & T, p. 88; H, 61.

²⁵Ibid., B & T, p. 90; H, 62. Both of these quotes differ only slightly with the McQuarrie and Robinson translation.

. . . no matter how this inner sphere may get interpreted, if one does no more than ask how knowing makes its way 'out of' it and achieves 'transcendence,' it becomes evident that the knowing which presents such enigmas will remain problematical unless one has previously clarified how it is and what it is.²⁶

The point that Needleman overlooks is that Heidegger has not presupposed at all but has found phenomenologically that knowing is a kind of Being that belongs to Being-in-the-world.

The second quote covers the last two sentences of Section 15. Heidegger frequently uses the last few sentences or even a whole paragraph of a section to introduce the theme(s) of the following section and the two sentences quoted by Needleman are no exceptions. As found in the English translation which varies slightly from the translation provided by Needleman, the quote reads: "Knowing is a mode of Dasein founded upon Being-in-the-world. Thus Being-in-the-world, as a basic state, must be interpreted beforehand."

Before any phenomenological clarification of knowing is brought about, Being-in-the-world, as a fundamental state of which knowing is a mode, must be clarified first. The term, "Interpretation," in this sentence needs to be seen in the phenomenological signification of "laying bare." The point is that Being-in-the-world is not presupposed in the sense of "posit," nor are any of its equiprimordial

²⁶B & T, p. 86; H, 60-61.

constituent characteristics, but it, and they, are phenomenologically disclosed or revealed. Dasein, ontologically understood, shows itself immediately without derivatives or deductions as Being-in-the-world.

Another discrepancy in Needleman's treatment of Heidegger revolves around the former's charge that "This concern of man as to the nature of Being is fact for Heidegger just as the necessary sensory element of experience and knowledge is fact for Kant."²⁷ But Man is not concerned, for the most part, with Being-ness, in point of fact, just the opposite is true; his preeminent concern with things takes him farther away from Being-ness. What is the "fact?" As Boss states, "That Man's essential structure consists of the understanding of Being is not a theoretical postulate, but a fact."²⁸ It is the "understanding" of Being-ness which is the fact; that man in his essential nature is immediately "aware" of Being-ness as

²⁷Needleman, Being-in-the-World, p. 21.

²⁸Quoted, and evidently translated, by Jacob Needleman, Being-in-the-World, p. 21. This statement was taken from Boss' Psychanalyse und Daseinsanalytik (Bern: Hans Huber Verlag, 1957), p. 61. In the English edition of Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis, which is an expanded version of the German text, Boss has said, "Just as no one would dismiss the description of man's having two arms as merely a dogmatic assertion without any proof, simply because this fact can only be seen and can neither be 'proved' by nor derived from, assumed presuppositions, it is a little justified to call Heidegger's insights into the fundamental nature of man's existence dogmatic, unverified assumptions." P. 31. See also pp. 35-36.

such, the "is-ness" of a thing or things, prior to any determination as to what kind of being it is. The "concern" is for the most part with the being or thing, not its Being-ness. As Needleman states it, the fact is, "Man is the being concerned with Being."²⁹ This is a dubious rendering of what Heidegger means by Seinsverständnis or the understanding of Being-ness.

Needleman seems to be pushing (in the sense of forcing) the similarities between Kant and Heidegger. It appears to be better to stress the differences between these two thinkers rather than concentrate on their similarities.³⁰

4. Heidegger, Husserl, and Consciousness

Heidegger's article on phenomenology, prepared at the request of Husserl for an anticipated entry into the Encyclopedia Britannica, was never published in that work. Husserl became dissatisfied with Heidegger's apparent divergence from the main stream (Husserlian) of phenomenology. The article itself was later published and within it is a question as to shift in thought (philosophy) from the Greeks and their concern with being (Seiendes) to

²⁹Needleman, Being-in-the-World, p. 21.

³⁰This point will be expanded when the existentialia are considered. See also Heidegger's treatment of Kant's "I Think" below, p. 66 and in Being and Time, pp. 247-249; H, 203-205.

modern thought's concern with consciousness. Is this shift arbitrary, says Heidegger, or "is it perhaps demanded by the peculiarity of that which, under the title of Being, is constantly attended to as the problem area of philosophy?"³¹ Whatever the case, the concern with consciousness (Bewusstsein) in all its ramifications is the domain of phenomenology. Yet as Heidegger later points out, Husserl and phenomenology both fail in being radical enough; they do not inquire into the mode of Being of consciousness, or more specifically, the subjectivity of the subject.³²

Perhaps it is this specific neglect of the subjectivity of the subject that induced Heidegger's comment, via his preface in Richardson's work, that Husserl was carrying on a pattern set by Descartes, Kant, and Fichte.³³ But after all, what is more evident than the givenness of the "I"? In point of fact, this "I" is seemingly so evident that it could naturally serve as a starting point for philosophy. And it follows that as the initial and primordial unit for philosophy, all other "givens" be disregarded and we as philosophers be content with expanding this

³¹Heidegger, "The Idea of Phenomenology," New Scholasticum, XLIV (Summer, 1970), p. 335.

³²See Walter Biemel, "Husserls Encyclopaedia Britannica Artikel und Heideggers Anmerkungen dazu," Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, XII (1950), pp. 246-280.

³³Richardson, Through Phenomenology to Thought, p. xiv.

formal, reflective awareness of the "I". This whole concern is provided under the framework of a "formal phenomenology of consciousness." But, what if this reflective awareness of the "I" of actions does not disclose Da-sein to everydayness but hides it? In that case a formal phenomenology of consciousness would be perpetuating this very hiddenness of Da-sein and indeed, for Heidegger, this is precisely the case.³⁴ Since this message is found in Being and Time and not in some of his later works, could it be that this is an implicit criticism of Husserl's phenomenology?

One of the perennial problems of philosophy has been that of "Reality" or an external world which is extant (Vorhanden). Attempts to prove the existence of this external, extant world have been fruitless, not because of an insurmountable impasse, but because the very formulation of the question--on ontological not linguistic grounds--is repudiated. The basic neglect of an existential analytic of Da-sein has tended to foster the re-asking of the question, epistemologically, as to the "problem of reality." Yet, this basis, says Heidegger, cannot ". . . be obtained by subsequently making phenomenological corrections on the concepts of subject and consciousness."³⁵ Again,

³⁴B & T, p. 151; H, 115-116.

³⁵B & T, p. 250; H, 207.

could this statement be taken as an implicit criticism of the phenomenology of Husserl?

It comes as no surprise to learn from Spiegelberg that Husserl had a suspicion that there were hidden attacks against his phenomenology by Heidegger in Being and Time as well as in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.³⁶ Indeed, Heidegger was leveling attacks against Husserl by questioning the legitimacy or depth of a phenomenology of consciousness. Yet there is no explicit criticism to be found in Being and Time concerning Husserl directly. There is, however, an indirect attack. It occurs with Heidegger's treatment of Descartes and Kant. Recall that in Richardson's book Heidegger has stated that Husserl was continuing a pattern established by Descartes, Kant and Fichte.³⁷

Heidegger's treatment of Descartes in Being and Time is incomplete in that the proposed phenomenological destruction of the cogito in Part Two, Division 2, was never published.³⁸ Nevertheless, enough is provisionally revealed

³⁶Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: An Historical Introduction, Vol. I (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), p. 332.

³⁷Richardson, p. xiv. See p. 37 above.

³⁸Referring to the definition of the world as res extensa, and a consideration of the Cartesian ontology of "world," Heidegger says, "The considerations which follow will not have been grounded in full detail until the 'cogito sum' has been phenomenologically destroyed. (See Part II, Div. 2)." This is contained in that portion of Being and Time that has never been published. B & T, p. 123; H, 89.

so that at least the problem of consciousness, "mind," and/or subject becomes apparent. And this problem centers around Descartes' neglect of the sum of the cogito sum. In other words, he left undetermined the meaning of the Being of the sum. If the sum is to be determined ontologically it needs to be seen as "I am in a world" in such a way that the "I am" is a state of Being of which some of the possibilities of the Being are a comporting of myself--as cogitations--as Being alongside entities within-the-world. Descartes, on the other hand, regarded these cogitations as extant (Vorhanden) and contained within an extant ego which was worldless--the res cogitans.³⁹ Thus, by positing a lone solitary "I" (ego), cut off and separated from a world, he undermined, not only the meaning of the Being of the cogito sum, but the phenomenon of world as well.

The difficulty is compounded when it is seen that even the positing of an "I" or a "subject" ontologically posits the subjective, even if there are ontical ". . . protestations against the 'soul substance' or the 'reification of consciousness'."⁴⁰

Regarding the question of "I" or "ego," Kant's treatment is superior to that of Descartes in that he does

³⁹B & T, p. 254; H, 211.

⁴⁰B & T, p. 72; H, 46.

not see the "I" in isolation--a worldless ego. Expressed positively, he sees the "I" in the context of "I think" or "I take action." Secondly, Kant is aware of the impossibility of ontically reducing the "I" to a substance. Yet in rejecting the substantiality of the "I", ". . . he merely rejects a wrong ontical explanation of the 'I'; he has by no means achieved an ontological interpretation of self-hood."⁴¹ For Kant, the "I" as consciousness is the form of representation in general, that is, as the formal structure of representing, the "I" becomes subjectum which binds together--it is the "logical subject." But to define the "I" as subject in this manner is to do so in an ontologically inappropriate manner in the sense that as that which binds together it has the characteristics of a ". . . self-sameness and steadiness that is always present-at-hand."⁴² Making the "I think" a subject which is extant (Vorhanden), Kant thereby falls back on to a metaphysics of substantiality. After a sequalitous route the "I think" comes back to the res cogitans. "'Consciousness of my Dasein' means for Kant a consciousness of my Being-present-at-hand in the sense of Descartes."⁴³

⁴¹B & T, p. 366; H, 318.

⁴²B & T, p. 367; H, 320.

⁴³B & T, p. 247; H, 203. "When Kant uses the term 'Dasein' he has in mind the Being-present-at-hand of consciousness just as much as the Being-present-at-hand of Things." Ibid.

In Kant's "Refutation of Idealism,"⁴⁴ the theorem that consciousness of my own 'Dasein' proves the 'Dasein' of external objects, operates on the level of extantness (Vorhandenheit). For Heidegger, that Kant demands a proof at all for the "Dasein of things outside of me" shows that the subject--the "in me"--is taken as the starting point. But even if this critical priority of the isolated subject--the "in me" or ego--is given up, Descartes' position would still be retained. "What Kant proves . . . is that entities which are changing and entities which are permanent are necessarily present-at-hand together."⁴⁵ In other words, Being-in-the-world is never touched as a theme for his argument; instead he falls back on the traditional distinction of an extant subject over against an extant object and their connection.⁴⁶

Since Heidegger has claimed that Husserl maintains a position held by Descartes and Kant we can ask, How is this so? Basically, Husserl defines consciousness in its essence as intentional; i.e., consciousness is always

⁴⁴Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans., Norman K. Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), pp. 274 ff.

⁴⁵B & T, p. 248; H, 204.

⁴⁶Ibid. "Kant presupposes both the distinction between the 'in me' and the 'outside of me,' and also the connection between these. . . ." Also see Heidegger's "On the Essence of Truth" (Vom Wesen der Wahrheit) in Existence and Being, Intro., Werner Brock (Chicago, Ill.: Henry Regnery Co., Gateway, 1968), p. 321.

conscious of something--"Every cogito contains its cogitatum."⁴⁷ Does this definition preclude a subjectivistic or substantival conception? An explicit attempt on the part of Heidegger to answer this question appeared with the publication in 1929 of Vom Wesen des Grundes.

If one characterizes every way of behaving toward being as intentional, then intentionality is possible only on the basis of transcendence. It is neither identical with transcendence nor that which makes transcendence possible.⁴⁸

Special care must be taken concerning the term transcendence. It does not refer to subjectivistic consciousness, or more specifically, to consciousness as an immanence somehow going over ("climbing-out-of-itself) to an external world regulated by "things."⁴⁹ Transcendence does mean, is, the ecstatic unity of Da-sein, or in other words, "openness" (Lichtung).⁵⁰ It must be noted at this

⁴⁷Joseph J. Kockelmans, A First Introduction to Husserl's Phenomenology (Pittsburg, Penn.: Duquesne University Press, 1967), p. 174.

⁴⁸Martin Heidegger, Vom Wesen des Grundes, trans., Terrence Malik, The Essence of Reason (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 29.

⁴⁹Spiegelberg, Phenomenological Movement, p. 305. Spiegelberg, for instance, in his summary of Vom Wesen des Grundes, says that this essay is concerned with "Transcendence which means the self-transcendence of man in the direction of a world." (Emphasis mine.) This is an overly subjectivistic reading of "transcendence" as intended by Heidegger.

⁵⁰See Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics, trans., Ralph Manheim (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., Anchor Books, 1961), p. 75. "But the 'transcendental' there intended is not that of the subjective

point that Heidegger had already in Being and Time alluded to this grounding of intentionality on transcendence, in a footnote. He says, "That the intentionality of 'consciousness' is grounded in the ecstatical unity of Dasein, and how this is the case, will be shown in the following Division."⁵¹ The Division to which he referred was never published.

Being-in-the-world as transcendence "makes possible" Da-sein's concernful being alongside the ready-to-hand and its thematizing of extant (Vorhanden) phenomena. This "making possible" refers to the openness, inclusive of that which openness is open for, which Da-sein is as ecstatically "projected." Or, as Heidegger says, "Having the ground [gründend] in the horizontal unity of ecstatical temporality, the world is transcendent. It must already have been ecstatically disclosed so that in terms of it entities within-the-world can be encountered."⁵² This may be stated another way. Da-sein is open, cleared so that it may "understand" itself and entities intentionally.

consciousness, rather it defines itself in terms of the existential-ecstatic temporality of human being-there." It would have been better if Ralph Manheim, translator of Einführung in die Metaphysik, had left "Dasein" untranslated for reasons to be explained later.

⁵¹B & T, Ftn. xxiii of Division 2, Chap. IV, p. 498.

⁵²B & T, p. 417; H, 355-366.

In other words Heidegger is referring to a "pre-intentional state," that of transcendence. Whereas the expressions "pre-intentional" and intentionality are not referred to explicitly in Being and Time, they can nevertheless be found implicitly. For instance, Heidegger states that Da-sein, as Da-sein, finds itself already encountering entities within-the-world. This is a result of Da-sein as transcendence; i.e., as openness to and with entities within-the-world. "The fact that such entities are discovered along with Dasein's own 'there' of existence, is not left to Dasein's discretion. Only what it discovers and discloses on occasion, in what direction it does so, how and how far it does so--only these are matters for Dasein's freedom, even if always within the limitations of its thrownness."⁵³ It appears, and we must be careful not to push Heidegger on this point, that the operation of the what, the how and how far are intentional whereas that which is not left to Da-sein's discretion is pre-intentional. It might be objected that this identification of intentionality (intentional acts) does not take into consideration intentionality as the simple reference to an object.⁵⁴ This criticism may be true to a point. The intention of an object, however, implies the subject who, or that,

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ See J. N. Mohanty, The Concept of Intentionality (St. Louis: Warren H. Green, Inc., 1972), p. 96.

intends, it does not reveal the openness which makes that intention possible. If one stays on the level of intentionality he is forced into a subjectivity.

Thus for Heidegger, Husserl, like his predecessors Descartes and Kant, fails to be "radical" in the sense of following through with the notion of the Being of consciousness itself--the sein of Bewusstsein. Husserl did not investigate the way consciousness is, instead, he concentrated on what consciousness is. As such, he falls back into a subjectivistic, metaphysical posture. This is apparent when he takes the acts of a universal, "transcendental ego" as constituting the world. By doing this, he, like Descartes and Kant, falls back on the concept of an extant subjectivity which is worldless.⁵⁵

This does not negate Heidegger's relationship to phenomenology as a methodology. Heidegger would agree with Husserl's requirements "not to hunt deductively after constructions unrelated to the matter in question, but to derive all knowledge from its ultimate sources. . . ."⁵⁶ These "ultimate sources" refer to the phenomena themselves. But Heidegger will not accept a reduction to subjectivity. For him this is a move dictated by a metaphysics which rests on an unawareness of its own origins, a metaphysics which perpetuates a substantial and/or subjective basis.

⁵⁵See Mehta, pp. 21-23.

⁵⁶Quoted in Mehta, p. 23.

Heidegger sees Husserl as a product of this metaphysics by his perpetuating a subjectivism through the conception of consciousness as basically intentional and/or grounded "within" a transcendental ego.⁵⁷ Heidegger would contend that by accepting a definition of consciousness as intentional one is tacitly endorsing the idea of an immanent subject relating to a transcendent (or constituted) object.

Since Husserl sees consciousness essentially as intentional and Heidegger sees intentionality as presupposing Da-sein as transcendence, consciousness for Heidegger becomes problematic in its basis. Anyone using consciousness as a synonym for Da-sein fails to understand Heidegger's aim and as well, perpetuates a subjectivity which it is Heidegger's intention to overcome.⁵⁸

Spiegelberg says that Heidegger in Being and Time, while shifting emphasis from consciousness to "human being," nevertheless remains subjectivistic since he makes man the starting point.⁵⁹ This and other statements by

⁵⁷This "interpretation" of Husserl is not without its critics. See Mohanty's The Concept of Intentionality, especially pp. 129-132 and 148-152.

⁵⁸"Any attempt . . . to re-think Being and Time is thwarted as long as one is satisfied with the observation that in this study the term 'being there' is used in place of 'consciousness'." The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics, Barrett and Aiken, III, p. 134. The term "being-there" is Ralph Manheim's translation of Da-sein.

⁵⁹Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, p. 303. "The Phenomenology of Sein und Zeit is still subjectivistic to the extent that it makes man its point of departure."

Spiegelberg⁶⁰ reveal that he has misunderstood Heidegger's Being-in-the-world and transcendence and still sees them, as did Husserl, in the subjectivistic model of a subject "in" or over "here" relating to an object over there. When intentionality and/or consciousness is seen this way, it falsifies Heidegger's revealing of Da-sein's openness by presupposing consciousness as immanence. To assume this posture is to perpetuate the conception of consciousness as a thing or container which for Heidegger is the legacy of Descartes, Fichte, Kant, and Husserl. A phenomenological disclosure of Da-sein will lead through a critique of consciousness as immanence; this awaits Section 11.⁶¹

In the Introduction⁶² it was seen that Binswanger misunderstood Being-in-the-world and transcendence by confusing them with a subjectivistic orientation; i.e., a subject "moving" toward a world. It will be noted that this is similar to the position of Husserl as well as Spiegelberg. That Binswanger understood transcendence essentially in the

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 301. Spiegelberg's use of "human being" as a translation of Da-sein misses the emphasis that Heidegger wants to put on Da-sein as ek-static. He also says that Heidegger's approach, "beginning from human being and leading to Being itself, reflects at least to some extent Husserl's primary emphasis on subjectivity." And "Sein und Zeit represented an effort to substitute human being for the subject of pure consciousness, but it still approached Being from the same direction." P. 314.

⁶¹See pp. 196-210 below.

⁶²See pp. 14-15 above.

same manner as Husserl is no accident since he was greatly influenced by Husserlian phenomenology. In fact, as Spiegelberg has pointed out, Binswanger, after his statement concerning his "productive misunderstanding" of Heidegger, turned again toward Husserl.⁶³

Contained in the forward to the third printing (1966) of Boss' Sinn und Gehalt Der Sexuellen Perversionen and hence not available in English, is a statement regarding Binswanger's use of Daseinsanalysis and his misunderstanding of it. Boss states that during several seminars offered in Zürich jointly by himself and Heidegger, that Heidegger repeatedly told the participants that Binswanger had misunderstood the Daseinsanalytik and had indeed perpetuated a thinking coming from Kant and Husserl. As Boss says,

With these opportunities Heidegger never tires of confirming to the psychiatrists that the concepts introduced into psychiatry by Ludwig Binswanger have nothing to do with his Daseinsanalytic understanding. On the contrary, there could not exist any bigger error than this one which Binswanger committed with his characterization of the Daseinsanalytic as an extreme consequent confirmation of the doctrine of Kant and Husserl.⁶⁴

5. The "Leveling-off" of Phenomena

Only as ontology is phenomenology possible because all things revealed by phenomenology "are." Only as

⁶³Herbert Spiegelberg, Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1972), pp. 209-210.

⁶⁴Medard Boss, Sinn und Gehalt der Sexuellen Perversionen, p. 10. (My translation)

hermeneutic is phenomenology possible for that which does phenomenology "is," and "is" in a special way. Its "isness," is equiprimordially founded by that which appears in the "openness" (clearedness) and brightness of its Beingness; an openness and brightness which is uniquely its "own," thereby establishing a ground of reference relations, or environmentality, which functions as the basis for interpretation. Yet, for the most part, the Da-sein is not its own. It has fallen prey (Verfallenheit) to the objects which help constitute its essence. It not only has fallen prey to objects but covers them up in their primordially, thus "seeing" them derivatively.⁶⁵

"Covered-up-ness is the counter-concept to 'phenomenon'."⁶⁶ Since Dasein essentially and for the most part falsifies the primordially of the phenomena by covering them up, the procedure of phenomenology is to lay bare these covered-up phenomena by returning to, revealing the phenomena in their primordially. This is primarily the meaning behind the statement, "Back to the things themselves."

Throughout Being and Time Heidegger has employed the terms "leveling off" (nivellieren) and "leveling down" (einebnen) to describe this covering-up characteristic of

⁶⁵The next chapter deals with the characteristics of Da-sein.

⁶⁶B & T, p. 60; H, 36.

Da-sein--a characteristic which is described by Heidegger as an "essential tendency of Dasein."⁶⁷ "Leveling-off" belongs to distantiality and averageness as constituting "publicness which in turn directs the way in which Da-sein interprets itself and its world."⁶⁸ Through publicness everything that is gets observed in its own unique primordial structure and is seen in what might be referred to as a watered-down generality (commonness) which masquerades as clarity. Phenomenology operates to cut through this often multilayered generalness in order to reveal the "thing" in its essence. This requires doing violence to the generalized phenomena.⁶⁹

⁶⁷B & T, p. 165; H, 127. "This care of averageness reveals in turn an essential tendency of Dasein which we call the 'levelling down' of all possibilities of Being." See also p. 265; H, 222. In What Is Called Thinking? (pp. 118-119) Heidegger refers to the seduction of language which entices man into an averageness or commonness. Perhaps in this work he is carrying on, without the terminology exhibited in Being and Time, the same unveiling concern as when he speaks of the "covering up" tendencies of Da-sein. He says language plays with our speech; it lets speech drift into the more obvious meanings of words. "It is as though man had to make an effort to live properly with language. It is as though such a levelling were especially prone to succumb to the danger of commonness."

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 165; H, 127.

⁶⁹B & T, p. 359; H, 311. "Dasein's kind of Being thus demands that any ontological interpretation which sets itself the goal of exhibiting the phenomena in their primordiality should capture the Being of this entity, in spite of this entity's own tendency to cover things up. Existential analysis therefore constantly has the character of doing violence [Gewaltsamkeit] whether to the claims of the everyday interpretation, or to its complacency and its tranquilized obviousness."

Since the leveling down tendency of Da-sein is an essential element, it can therefore be described in various ways such as distantiality, averageness, and publicness. Another way of describing this phenomenon is through the "as" structure and its two forms, the primordial "as" referred to as existential-hermeneutic and the "apophantical as" of an assertion.⁷⁰ For instance, a hammer is an entity which lies in a context of equipment that is ready to be used--or in Heideggerian language, ready-to-hand (zuhanden). As ready-to-hand it reaches out to, and lies within, a reference relation of potential equipmental involvements; i.e., the hammer functions as something with which something is done. Yet, if an assertion is made about the hammer, an alteration occurs whereby the hammer is now seen as an "about which;" i.e., it becomes an object. In so doing, the assertion says something about the hammer as a what; it has become an "extant" (mere entity; Vorhanden).⁷¹ The alteration in question takes place as a result of pushing the "as" of the existential-hermeneutic interpretation whereby the entity reaches out to a totality of involvements, to a plane of mere extantness. This alteration is described by Heidegger as a "leveling down" of the

⁷⁰ Ibid., pp. 200-201; H, 157-158. The following is a summary of what Heidegger discusses on these two pages using the example of the hammer.

⁷¹ Vorhanden has been translated by Macquarrie and Robinson as "present-at-hand" which basically means an object. In this dissertation the term "extant" is used.

primordial "as" to an object status of extantness, the "apophantical as" of an assertion.

Throughout Being and Time Heidegger offers examples of this leveling tendency of Da-sein. For instance, a major theme of Being and Time, and one that has become central to "existentialist" readings of Heidegger, has been that of death. Death is revealed to Da-sein by the attunement (Befindlichkeit) of anxiety (Angst). Anxiety, Heidegger warns, must not be confused with fear, particularly in relation to death, fear of one's own demise. On the contrary, anxiety serves as the disclosedness, the revealing of Da-sein as thrown Being towards its end. That is, anxiety reveals Da-sein in its individuality, its ownmostness, which is non-relational (unbezügliche) and which cannot be outstripped (unüberholbare). Yet Da-sein, with leveling as a basic tendency, covers up its ownmost Being-towards-death by fleeing from it. "Dying is levelled off to an occurrence which reaches Dasein . . . but belongs to nobody in particular."⁷² Da-sein is thus able to characterize death as an actual event--an event that happens to others. It thereby misses death as a possibility--its own possibility. In so leveling death as one's ownmost possibility, the nonrelational and not-to-be-outstripped aspects of death are also covered over.

⁷²B & T, p. 297; H, 253.

In Section 3, it was seen that Heidegger regards phenomenology with its leap--and in his later works, the step-back, as operating as a rather ". . . remarkable 'relatedness' backward or 'forward'."⁷³ This backward or forward relationship can be referred to among other things, as the "coming from" and "going to." This "remarkable relatedness" is found in various forms throughout all of Heidegger's works. It is, speaking generally, the essence of his "Method," the essence of phenomenology. The "coming from" and "going to" might possibly be referred to as a dialectical relation; but caution must be taken in using this term since Heidegger himself disparages using it.⁷⁴ Da-sein as falling (Verfallenheit) falls towards, into, objects in the world, but this implies not only a falling into but a falling from, for falling reveals that in the face of which Da-sein flees. It appears that for Heidegger

⁷³Section 3, p. 54 above; B & T, p. 28; H, 8.

⁷⁴Heidegger states in Being and Time (p. 47; H, 25) that "'dialectic,' which has become a genuine philosophical embarrassment. . . ." Further that dialectic becomes superfluous when the ontological characteristics of Da-sein are worked out. It appears that Heidegger's dislike for dialectics is based on the relationship with subject and object, a relationship which Heidegger finds unclear as to its ground. For instance, the Greeks conceived of entities as a presence or presencing, to be known by a subject (B & T, p. 48; H, 25-26). But the question of what allows presencing, the presence of the present, was unasked. Da-sein, it must be remembered, is essentially Being-in-the-world; its essence is already defined by the present for it is open to the presencing. There is, in other words, an undercutting of the subject-object distinction upon which dialectic is based.

the essential characteristics underlying the Daseinsanalytic is to reveal, via the leap, the "falling from." To lay bare, disclose, Da-sein's primordiality, it must be "wrested from Dasein by following the opposite course from that taken by the falling ontico-ontological tendency of interpretation."⁷⁵ The term wrested here can be equated with phenomenologically laying-bare the leveled off, or covered up, phenomena of falling Da-sein and revealing these phenomena in their essence.

For instance, as has been seen with death, Da-sein as falling levels down the phenomenon equating it with an actual event that occurs, robbing it of its essential characteristics as a potentiality which is dramatically ownmost. By following "the opposite course," revealing that from which Da-sein flees, the ontological significance of death is disclosed.

In the later works, such as Identity and Difference and On Time and Being, the characteristics of "coming from" and "going to" can be seen operating, yet in a slightly different manner than in Being and Time. Whereas in Being and Time the central point was the unfolding of Da-sein, in these two later works the issues are broader, dealing with metaphysics, technology, Beingness, and Time. For instance, in Identity and Difference, Heidegger refers to moving out

⁷⁵B & T, p. 359; H, 311.

of metaphysics into the essential nature of metaphysics. This is not merely pushing metaphysics one more step or revealing a presupposition heretofore not thought, but indeed moves out of metaphysics altogether. This move is accomplished by the step-back which for Heidegger means "the manner in which thinking moves, and along path."⁷⁶ (Emphasis mine.)

In the essay, "Time and Being," Heidegger states that in the beginning of Western metaphysics, Beingness was thought but only in the sense of things, or as he states it, only the "gift" is thought, not the "It gives" of the gift.⁷⁷ This "self-concealment" of Beingness can be disclosed by following the opposite course of exclusive preoccupation with Being seen as the totality of things or Being seen as a Being (an essent) but towards that which gives essents. Put in another way, Heidegger moves from what is given in the openness of beings to the openness itself which has for the most part been concealed in beings themselves. This openness, Lichtung, is what has been revealed by the Daseinsanalytic of Being and Time and remains a major theme in Heidegger's later writings.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference (New York, Evanston, and London: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 50. See pp. 52-54 above for discussion of moving out of metaphysics to the essential nature of metaphysics.

⁷⁷ Heidegger, On Time and Being, trans., Joan Stambaugh (New York, Evanston: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 8.

⁷⁸ This point is expanded in Chapter III in the discussion of Da-sein.

Whether dealing with the essential characteristics of Da-sein as found in Being and Time or with the issue of the Ereignis and the oblivion of the difference between Beingness and beings as can be found in the later works (notably the two just cited), this "dialectic" of the "coming from and going to" can be found.

Medard Boss also uses this dialectical relationship in his Daseinsanalysis. In the essay, "Anxiety, Guilt, and Psychotherapeutic Liberation,"⁷⁹ Boss refers to the "of what" (Wovor) and the "about what" (Worum) of anxiety. Each anxiety reveals the "of what" of which it is afraid and an "about what" about which it is alarmed. For instance, the anxiety of death is the "of what" and existence, being, is the "about what."⁸⁰ Guilt as well demonstrates this dual relationship. There is always a something which is owed and a creditor or a "to whom" to which something is owed.

6. Medard Boss and Phenomenology

Medard Boss assiduously adheres to Heidegger's claim that Phenomenology, following the dictum "to the things

⁷⁹Medard Boss, "Anxiety, Guilt, and Psychotherapeutic Liberation," Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, II (1962), 179-180.

⁸⁰Heidegger says ". . . das Wovor der Angst ist das gemorfene In-der-Welt-sein; das Worum der Angst ist das In-der-Welt-sein können." (Emphasis mine.) Sein und Zeit, p. 191. Macquarrie and Robinson render this, ". . . that in the face of which we have anxiety about is our potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world." Being and Time, p. 235.

themselves!" is ". . . opposed to all free-floating constructions and accidental findings. . . ." ⁸¹ For Boss this means setting aside a philosophical and psychological heritage which has relegated to the domain of "self-evident," derived constructs and assumptions that from their inception were imposed from outside the phenomena in question. Positively stated, for Boss, phenomenology means letting the phenomena themselves speak to us. ⁸² This rather simple admonition is not an empty or "floating" methodological procedure but rests on the phenomenologically disclosed fundamental characteristics of Da-sein. These characteristics reveal the essential lighting-up, illuminating, disclosing quality that is Da-sein as Being-in-the-world. But this light or illumination would not be anything at all without that upon which it operates as disclosiveness; i.e., there would be no light at all unless there were something that could be lit up; hence, light is a "being-with-things-primordially." Da-sein, as this lighted realm, is what it is in relation to those things which come into the purview of its light or disclosedness, and vice versa, "things" are

⁸¹B & T, p. 50; H, 38.

⁸²Regarding phenomenology, Boss says, "It is a science which simply wants us to stay with the phenomena themselves; a science which lets the objects themselves tell us all about their immediately given, inherent meaning content instead of us telling the objects what kind of intellectual inferences must be assumed to exist behind them." "What Makes Us Behave at All Socially?" Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, IV (February, 1964), 61-62.

by reason of their having been disclosed. By following the phenomenological admonition of letting the phenomena themselves speak, without any contrived techniques to force this "speaking,"⁸³ Boss reveals autonomous phenomena which for some--Freud for instance--would be seen as deceptions, not legitimate or even nonexistent.

"Analysis of Dasein categorically refrains . . . from imposing some arbitrary idea of being and reality--however customary or 'self-evident'--on the 'particular essent' (Seiendes) we call 'man'."⁸⁴ It is this strict phenomenological adherence that fundamentally distinguishes Daseinsanalysis from the natural, and many schools of the behavioral, sciences. Since the inception of natural science, the watchword has been to "find," or explain phenomena

⁸³ Heidegger's phenomenology is a "laying bare of the phenomena" devoid of technical devices to do so. He says, "The more genuinely a methodological concept is worked out and the more comprehensively it determines the principles on which a science is to be conducted, all the more primordially is it rooted in the way we come to terms, with the things themselves, and the farther is it removed from what we call 'technical devices,' though there are many such devices even in the theoretical disciplines." B & T, p. 50; H, 27. Could this statement possibly be taken as a criticism of Husserl's "way" of phenomenology?

⁸⁴ Boss, Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis, p. 31. Boss has said, "Daseinsanalysis (or analysis of Dasein) is neither a philosophy nor a psychotherapeutic procedure. It is a new empirical research method or way of observation." Quoted in Gion Condrau's Die Daseinsanalyse von Medard Boss und ihre Bedeutung fur die Psychiatrie (Bern: Hans Huber Verlag, 1965), p. 9. (My translation.) Boss has also stated that "Daseinsanalysis is not a system of readymade truth, but a method--how to approach things. It is letting what appears speak to you." Personal interview, 1973.

by appealing to "dynamics" or forces "that somehow exist" behind the phenomena. In many instances these "forces" have been regarded as "more real" than the phenomenon itself. Since the behavioral sciences, for the most part, adopted the procedure as well as the practice of the natural sciences, this "force" or "cause" hunting has been perpetuated. In several of his publications, Boss uses a statement by Sigmund Freud that epitomizes this natural and behavioral science approach and indeed, for Boss, represents the basic working principle of those sciences. Freud states:

We do not seek merely to describe and classify phenomena but to comprehend them as indications of a play of forces in the psyche, as expressions of goal-directed tendencies which work in unison or against one another. We are striving for a dynamic conception of psychic phenomena. Perceived phenomena must in our conception recede behind the merely assumed, posited tendencies. (Italics in the last sentence are those of Boss.)⁸⁵

⁸⁵ Sigmund Freud, A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis (New York: Simon and Schuster, Clarion, 1969), p. 60. The translation differs slightly from the one used by Boss; for example, the last sentence of the Riviere translation reads, "In this conception, the trends we merely infer are more prominent than the phenomena we perceive." The quote in this dissertation was taken from "Anxiety, Guilt, and Psychotherapeutic Liberation," Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, II (1962), 175. It can also be found in Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis, p. 30; "What Makes Us Behave at All Socially?" p. 54; "Meaning and Content of Sexual Perversions," p. 11; and "The Conception of Man in Natural Science and Daseinsanalysis," Comprehensive Psychiatry, III (August, 1962), 212. It is interesting to note that Binswanger also makes use of this quote from Freud and remarks, "This is the genuine natural-scientific spirit. Natural science never begins with just the phenomena; indeed, its main task is to divest the phenomena of their phenomenality as quickly and as thoroughly as possible." Quoted in Needleman's Being-in-the-World, p. 156.

The three hundred or so year history of the natural sciences, and now the behavioral sciences which follow this ideal, demonstrate allegiance to a conception of science which relegates the reality, independence, and uniqueness of the phenomena to hypothesized forces, dynamics, devices, and so forth. Boss contends that the behavioral sciences follow a framework exemplified by Newton and Freud; but that if the behavioral scientist listened instead to Newton's great antagonist Wolfgang Goethe he would hear Goethe say from his "Maxims and Reflections," "By all means, do not search behind the phenomena; the phenomena themselves are the teaching, their immediate appearance tells us what actually is."⁸⁶ Yet Boss is quick to point out that an approach based on Goethe's admonition, a phenomenological approach, does not attempt to abandon, let alone destroy, the achievements of the natural sciences. The phenomenological approach allows for an evaluation and recognition of the essence of the natural sciences themselves--an essence which the natural sciences themselves cannot see at all. Phenomenologically, the natural sciences are revealed as a particular pre-scientific attitude or frame of reference toward what it encounters. "It is that world-relationship in which our world reveals itself insofar as its phenomena

⁸⁶ Quoted in Boss, "What Makes Us Behave?" p. 61. This call back to Goethe can also be found in Heidegger's Zur Sache Des Denkens which has been translated into English under the title, On Time and Being, pp. 65-66.

are calculable, measurable, and predictable."⁸⁷ As such, it is but one world-relationship among many.

When the phenomena themselves get relegated to a secondary status in favor of dynamics or forces that somehow underlie them they then become covered up or "leveled." Daseinsanalysis attempts to stay with the phenomena and thereby resist this leveling tendency characteristic of man as a whole, a tendency which desires to flee from the phenomena in order to rest secure in causes or forces that underlie them. A curious thing occurs, as Boss points out, when this leveling tendency is curtailed by strictly adhering to the phenomena; analysis of Dasein may be more "objective" and more "scientific" than those behavioral sciences which use the methods appropriated from the natural sciences. The term, "scientific," as has been seen, in its etymological sense, means to "bring about knowledge" (scire, to know, and facere, to make). "If 'scientific' is used in this unprejudiced manner, the claim that the methods of natural science alone can yield precise information becomes unwarranted."⁸⁸

In order to give explicit testimony to the method of Daseinsanalysis--a method which cannot successfully be divorced from the ontological structures it reveals--three

⁸⁷Ibid., p. 64.

⁸⁸Boss, Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis, p. 29.

examples will be given. Since at this point primary concern is with the phenomenological method, content, in the form of the fundamental characteristics of Da-sein itself must await the next chapter. The examples comprise a cross section of human behavior, the dream of a "normal" woman, the so-called repression of a nineteen-year old girl resulting in a paresis of the legs, and the hallucination of a schizophrenic.

a. Phenomenological analysis of dreams. It is to Sigmund Freud's merit that a whole new spectrum of behavior was revealed as meaningful and significant for an understanding of man. Unconscious phenomena, particularly that associated with dreams, became, in essence, the dwelling place for Freud's peculiar genius. Yet, true to his pre-scientific bias for a natural scientific approach, the phenomena in question became "leveled." This leveling was occasioned by a conceptual ordering of a ". . . world in which everything can be reduced to a predictable interplay of forces, and consequently to cause and effect. With such assumptions no theory other than the Freudian is possible, for only dreams of wish or instinctual fulfillments are susceptible of an immediate and dynamic explanation."⁸⁹

⁸⁹ Boss, The Analysis of Dreams, trans., Arnold Pomerans (London: Rider and Co., 1957), pp. 36-37. Freud's natural scientific bias led him to the dogmatic assertion that all dreams are nothing but wish fulfillments, energy for which came from infantile, individual wishes.

If dreams are regarded as "nothing but" representations and reproductions of "real objects" from the waking world, then the dream phenomena, as phenomena, have become impoverished as to their own phenomenality; they have, in essence, become leveled. Methodologically speaking, Daseinsanalysis attempts to cut through this leveling in order to expose the phenomena in their own phenomenality. Expressed in another way, Daseinsanalysis returns to phenomena in their own primordially and lets them "speak." This returns the phenomena to their own sphere, not one based on a reference to the waking world. Dreams, therefore, are legitimate in their own realm, can speak within that realm, and do not need to be sifted through a mechanism or dynamism contrived by the waking world to fit its own criterion of explanation. This does not leave us with two irreducible "worlds," for after all, both are manifestations of Being-in-the-world. We are always within a world whether in dreaming or in the waking state.

The following is the verbatim report of a 32 year old lady whom Boss describes as both mentally and physically healthy. A woman of more than average intelligence who had set about recording immediately upon waking any dreams she had experienced.

Tonight I had a strange dream of an urn. At first I dreamt that I was sitting at the dinner table with my husband and children. The table was in our dining-room, which I had made even more cozy by moving the sideboard. I felt safe and peaceful in this room

which was so dear to me. On the walls I could see the really good pictures which my husband loved to collect: in the windows I could see flowers, and in front of me the very attractively set table. On it was a lovely beefsteak with roast potatoes and a juicy lettuce. I can still feel the seductive odour of the roast beef pleasantly tickling my nose, and the mere thought of the delicious juiciness of the lettuce still makes my mouth water. Greedily I took one bite after another, for I was very hungry. I was fully absorbed in eating, and my husband and my children were tucking it in as well. "Do you remember," I asked my husband a little while later, "that we had exactly the same menu on the first day of our honeymoon in Cannes?" He confirmed it with a smile, adding, "It was exactly a year ago." In the dream I was not in the least disturbed by this ridiculous assertion, and by the fact that our children, five and six years old, were sitting at the table. We had actually been married for ten years. Indeed, I was fully convinced that my husband was right, and I then thought quietly of those happy days. I looked at my husband and my children, and I felt extremely fond of them and very near to all of them, especially to my eldest son. While he had originally been sitting in his usual place at the opposite corner of the table he was suddenly and strangely transported right next to me. In the dream it did not appear strange that he had suddenly changed places without any movement on his or anybody else's part. It was quite reasonable. Nor did it strike me as peculiar that while I was sitting so happily amongst my family, there suddenly appeared colourful bridges, reminiscent of very bright rainbows. They extended across the table between me and my family. A large and golden urn hovered on these bridges between us, and particularly near by favourite son.

While I was so absolutely happy, I suddenly thought: "Who knows how long we shall be together? Who knows what the future will hold? Won't the Russians be here shortly?" I imagined how the Russians might suddenly enter our house one night and kill all of us. But just as quickly I thought of turning our garage into a hiding-place. I did all this in such vivid detail that, in my imagination, I could already see a troop of wildly gesticulating soldiers storming the house. And as so often happens in dreams, it was no longer a matter of imagination, but now I could actually see the Russians approaching. However, I immediately pulled myself together and with great effort of will I dispelled all these dark images. I was

determined to feel only the happiness of the present and to leave the future to God. Full of eagerness I again turned to my husband and children and began to devise a plan for a drive in the afternoon.

I then awoke, because the maid had been knocking at the door. But for quite some time I did not know where I was. The luncheon table around which all of us had just been chatting so merrily, had been so real and vivid in all its detail, that it confused me utterly to find myself in bed. At first I could not decide which of the two was real: the luncheon which I had just dreamt of, or my bed.⁹⁰

Most dream theorists, including those from opposing schools of thought, would agree that what occurs in dreams generally reflects behavioral patterns or orientations in the waking life which for various reasons have not been or could not be realized, lived out, or unfolded. In the dream just cited, for example, it is known that the woman had gone to bed quite hungry. It is also known that she was basically a maternal woman who wanted to devote herself to her family but was forced to work and hence was not able to realize that devotion, at least to the extent that she wanted to. Also, it is known that for some time prior to her dream she had fears of a Russian invasion. She had even considered preparing for such an invasion but had always suppressed these ideas when they arose.

Most dream theorists, in point of fact, would consider that in this particular dream, and dreams in general,

⁹⁰ Boss, Analysis of Dreams, pp. 77-79. What follows is a paraphrase and summary of Boss' phenomenological description of this dream.

certain instinctual drives, wishes, or even basic characteristics of the dreamer find some form of hallucinatory expression.⁹¹ Yet, in all of these considerations, the question remains: are not these dream phenomena themselves by-passed as to their own phenomenality in favor of either a psychological explanatory mechanism or an interpretation based upon the waking state? If this is the case and the dream phenomena is by-passed, does not this reflect an idea, perhaps an all too hasty idea, of the dreamer as a person who is merely asleep and in whom pictorial images make their appearance and run their subjective and fantasy-laden courses? "Can the definition of such a dream as a hallucinatory image mean anything else than the fact that its phenomena are prejudged as mere hallucinations and representations of the corresponding objects of the waking world?"⁹²

To consider all dream phenomena as hallucinations is to imply a form of sensory confusion. This implication is derived from the waking state which naturally devaluates the dream phenomena itself. If this implication of sensory confusion is then used to interpret or explain, the dream

⁹¹Boss states, for instance, that Freud, "believed that he had found . . . the source of energy of the dream, once and for all, in our infantile instinctual wishes. Very dogmatically, therefore, he states that all dreams are wish fulfillments: . . ." P. 29.

⁹²Ibid., p. 81.

as dream has become doubly misinterpreted. Yet it has often happened that dreamers highly prize the dream state, often above that of waking experience. If dreams are relegated to the status of unreal hallucinatory images, man finds himself in the dubious position of often prizing, finding comfort in, unreal hallucinatory states. In the dream cited, the woman did not experience just images, mental pictures reproducing physical reality but instead experienced, felt, and actively participated with her "body," as well as her "mind" or "soul," in a world which was as real to her as had ever been experienced in her waking state. Did she not, upon awakening, wonder which was the real world, her bedroom or the dinner table scene of the dream?⁹³

⁹³On this point Boss is critical as well about some "existential" approaches to dream analysis--notably that of Binswanger. According to Boss, Binswanger would read into the happy and contented orientation of our dreamer an "embodiment" or expression of the basic patterns of her life. He would in fact equate these embodiments as "the theme of elevation, the rising phase of the wave of existence." Yet it will be seen that Binswanger is also characterizing the dream on the basis of the waking state itself--as dream phenomena merely representing objects in the waking world. Boss further criticizes Binswanger's "existential" approach to dream analysis as referring to a Cartesian framework whereby it is presupposed that the "dreamer is inherently involved in dream images in a Cartesian sense, as an object-substance or as a subject-thing. Ibid., pp. 82-83.

After Boss has criticized Binswanger's expression "basic patterns" or "embodiment" as unduly imposing the waking life on dream phenomena, he says on page 112, "Corresponding to this unequivocal mood, only those objects and people are allowed to enter the respective dream world whose essence and being correspond exactly to the behavior

Seeing our dreamer as involved in a dual relationship of external and internal worlds--a volume of space occupied by a body on one hand and an independent psychic experience on the other--merely artificially abstracts the dream phenomenon itself and cuts it loose from its own phenomenality. "The room of her dream was from the very beginning the happily attuned space of her whole existence."⁹⁴

But what of the beef-steak and green salad that our dreamer reported that she was "fully absorbed in eating?" Does not this reveal some form of wish-fulfillment? Yet, if the dream itself is interrogated, there is no trace of wish. From the beginning of her dream, food was supplied to the dreamer so that there was no wishing but only eating. Yet it is true the dreamer went to sleep hungry;

patterns in which the dreamer himself happens to be moving." (Emphasis mine.) It would appear Boss has made use of the very expression he has criticized Binswanger of using. What is wrong? The translation of Boss' dream book Der Traum und seine Auslegung (Bern: Hans Huber Verlag), 1953⁷ should be regarded as defective in places. In this particular passage, the expression, "behavior patterns," needs to be replaced by "attunement." Boss himself stated he was unable because of publishing deadlines to do anything about it. (Personal interview.) A similar discrepancy occurs in Chapter 13 where Boss is comparing Daseinsanalysis and Psychoanalysis and states that Daseinsanalysis is "indifferent both to psychotherapeutic techniques and to practical consequences and aims." (P. 119.) This statement is wrong in translation as well as the statement preceding it which refers to Daseinsanalysis as being comparable to psychoanalysis only in the sense that both are "systems of psychology offering a theoretical understanding of man." These mistranslations have been corroborated by Boss himself. (Personal interview.)

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 83.

but if we begin our analysis on the pre-dream state, a state external to the dream itself, we then push the phenomenon itself from our purview and concentrate on external causative explanations.

Perhaps in viewing the dream we can discern certain oral drives or instinctual experiences. Yet even here if concepts such as drives or instincts are emphasized the concrete phenomena become disconnected. The immediate experience of our dreamer was neither a drive nor an instinct but the table laden with good things to eat, the pleasing aroma of the cooked meat, the salad--all of these attracted her. "To turn this feeling of being attracted by an actual something into an inner propensity means falling victim to the customary subjective interpretation of man."⁹⁵ This means, for Boss, equating man with his body whereby he is considered to be driven by both internal and external forces. Yet, and this is to repeat, to have this view is to deal more with abstractions--explanations or theories--than the phenomenon itself.

For Boss existence applies to dreams as well as the waking state. To "exist" for Boss means to be within a world--"within" in the sense of being "outside," alongside particular relationships. Primordially, and this means essentially speaking, our dreamer "existed" within

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 85.

a world which was attuned to, among other things, hunger. The attunement to hunger reveals a world of eatable things.

The term hypermnesia is used to designate a heightened sense of memory. Since our dreamer was able to recall vividly and accurately the exact menu of her honeymoon dinner some ten years previous, the dream might be explained as a product of hypermnesia. But the experience of this meal was not lost in the past. Ever since its happening it had been a part of her experience, remaining as part of her life history. Since this experience was part of her very being, it was never irretrievably lost. It is because past events are and serve as that which constitutes the beingness of each individual that any particular event can reappear freely. In the mood of happiness our dreamer was open to happiness in its various forms both as past experience and future anticipation. Our dreamer has revealed her unqualified sense of happiness within the dream. Perhaps only on one other occasion--her honeymoon in Cannes--had she experienced such happiness. In other words, the happiness experienced as a young lover and that experienced as a dreamer corresponded so that the attunement of happiness found in the latter experience allowed her to rediscover the happiness of the former. To assert that she was able to remember accurately the menu of an experience ten years previously due to a heightened sense of memory is again to attempt to explain

the dream in terms of a non-dreamlike theoretical formulation.

Even though the dream as a whole seems to be somewhat comprehensible there nevertheless remain certain elements of nonsense and even absurdities. Several examples can be illustrated. For instance, it seems rather absurd that our dreamer would think about the Russians attacking and thinking so intensely that she would suddenly see "real" Russians attacking her. Secondly, it seems nonsensical that the husband would contend that their honeymoon had occurred only a year ago when in point of fact, it had been ten years. This is especially ludicrous when our dreamer agrees with him while sitting next to and opposite her five and six year old children. Thirdly, it seems utterly absurd that the favorite son would be bodily transported from his initial position to a seat next to his mother. The golden urn, in turn, hovering above a rainbow emanating from or to all the members of the family seems to be quite nonsensical.

It should be noted that these four illustrations of so-called nonsensical information revolve around four prominent features. The experiencing of the Russians coming to life, so to speak, from mere images is a manifestation of imagination. The husband with his pronouncement of the time of their honeymoon and the son being transported from one place to another manifest the problem

of temporal and spatial relationships. The fourth event, whereby the urn and rainbow appear (present themselves) is confronted by a preoccupation with explaining phenomena in terms of symbols.

It is generally believed by psychologists and philosophers alike that when thinking about something that cannot be perceived by the senses, what takes place is a copy or representation of a sense perception which flashes before the mind or brain. Given this orientation, it would seem difficult to explain how these inner representations could suddenly turn into concrete external objects within a dream. It could be that the theory of representational images does not adequately describe what is taking place but instead tries to force the phenomenon by attempting to explain it.⁹⁶

For Boss, as well as Heidegger, to imagine something or to think of an absent person or object is not to exist "in" some mental representation of the object but to

⁹⁶"In the entire history of the sciences, there has hardly been one creative investigator who did not mistake some speculative abstraction in his philosophy for the result of empirical investigation. Freud, for example, suddenly believed in the reality of his instinctual abstractions just as Jung suddenly considered his idea of the archetype as an actual fact." Ibid., p. 54. Further, Boss has made this observation, there is a ". . . tendency in our modern, technical way of thinking which leads us away from what is directly given towards an objectification of all phenomena. It urges us to make reality unreal by thinking only in terms of mere abstractions and to erect an artificial and calculable 'pseudo-reality'." Ibid., p. 74.

exist "outside," with the thing, object, or person in question.⁹⁷ ". . . If man were not so constituted that by merely thinking of an object that cannot be seen by the senses, he could overcome all distance so as to be with it, he would never be able to imagine anything at all, i.e., to come into the immediate presence."⁹⁸

Our dreamer existed with the Russians from the very start, with them as relational possibilities both in her dream state and in her waking life as well. In the dream state, however, her whole being was concentrated on and towards the Russians and their possibility as aggressors so that eventually the thought about Russians condensed into physically perceivable forms. It is because she was open and with the Russians as a possibility that she was able to relate to them at all. It was not the case that somehow the Russians were within herself.

The dream offers to man a special revealing of the primordial characteristics of time and space. Our dreamer, for instance, condensed ten years into one with no apparent apprehension or even awareness at having done so. If it is said that this, as well as other dreams, is merely a manifestation of a confused or disturbed sense of time (or

⁹⁷This reflects a crucial ontological characteristic of Da-sein--its characteristic of Being-in-the-world (in-der-Welt-sein) which is extensively investigated in Chapter IV, Section 11, under the heading of "non-immanence."

⁹⁸Boss, Analysis of Dreams, p. 89.

space) the primordial characteristics are denied and a derived sense of time and/or space becomes the standard. In our dream the contraction of time was a result of an attunement with happiness which brought the past closer since her present attunement corresponded with one felt in the past. So intense was this "bringing closer" that the dreamer managed to remember in detail the dinner she had enjoyed while being in that particular attunement.

In reference to space, our dreamer mentioned the "magical" and sudden proximity of her favorite son while at the same time mentioning the psychological factor of how close he was to her heart. Closeness, bringing closer are existential characteristics of Da-sein, i.e., they operate primordially and essentially. It therefore must be contended--based on the phenomenological disclosure of Da-sein--that such events in time and space as revealed by our dreamer, do not constitute a breaking down or deterioration of temporal and spatial relationships, but to the contrary, reveal a more primordial, original sense of time and space that remain, for the most part, hidden from the activities of daily life.

Central to virtually all contemporary theories of dreams is the opinion that most dream content is symbolic in nature. In our dream example, the golden urn hovering above a rainbow-like bridge between the dreamer and her family would be seen by these schools of dream theories as

highly symbolic. Did this urn, for instance, symbolize the heart of our dreamer going out to build bridges or bonds between the dreamer and her family? Can we legitimately consider the dream urn as well as the bridge to be merely symbols which represent the dreamers inner subjective disposition? Or, could both the urn and bridge be considered objects themselves devoid of any symbolic representation?

For Boss, all contemporary psychologies which utilize the concept of symbolic representation find themselves in difficulty because, "they consider the essence of things in themselves as much too impoverished."⁹⁹ In essence, the richness of the object itself is leveled to a point of impoverishment whereby to see it meaningfully at all it must be covered up, undergirded, by symbolic representation.

Boss demonstrates the magnitude and depth of the objects themselves by referring to the description of a bridge as found in Heidegger's "Bauen Wohnen Denken" and that of an urn as found in Pindar's Isthm (Ode V, verses 1-3). Both give an elaborate description of the respective object revealing the rich, multifarious relationships and possibilities of each.¹⁰⁰ The point made by Boss and reinforced

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 100.

¹⁰⁰ A content amplification, at this point, of the respective descriptions by Heidegger and Pindar would push the essential core of this section into interesting but nevertheless unnecessary dimensions. The point brought

by Heidegger as well as Pindar, is that objects themselves are capable of revealing their own meaning and content-- a content that is often more rich and full than what is customarily thought or believed. Imposing symbolic forms and interpretive schemes on the dream phenomena does nothing but restrict the unfolding of the objects' own meaning.

In his attempt to investigate the nature of symbolic representation and whether or not it actually helped or hindered the unfolding of dream content and meaning, Boss conducted an experiment using five women of different behavioral propensities. The psychological conditions of all five women had been studied extensively through Daseinsanalytic sessions. Each woman was hypnotized and given the suggestion that she would dream about a man well-known to her who in fact loved her, but who would approach her nude and with sexual intentions. Since each woman had previously had spontaneous dreams of this nature, it was believed the experiment would be harmless. Three

out here is that the phenomena themselves are rich in content and can themselves be interrogated without recourse to some theoretical superstructure. It should be noted, however, that Heidegger's approach in this particular essay is phenomenological but the language and style are not that as found in Being and Time. The essay reflects Heidegger's phenomenological thinking (this expression would for him be redundant)--the thinking of the so-called later Heidegger. The essay can be found in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans., Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 145-161.

of the women who were open and non-inhibited reported dreams which followed the suggestion explicitly and which were pleasant and openly erotic. The two remaining subjects, neurotic, middle-aged spinsters, reported dreams that were so similar in content that Boss chose to relay only one. The elder of the two, 47 years of age, dreamed that she was confronted by an unknown, rather coarse soldier, dressed in a uniform, brandishing a pistol which when discharged nearly hit her. She awoke in a fright. After repeated and searching questioning it was concluded that the soldier was completely unknown to her. It was discovered that as a young girl she had been confronted by some soldiers who had been billeted in her village and that she had become so frightened that she had run home and had virtually been at her mother's side ever since. It was disclosed as well that she had a deep, almost terrifying fright of guns and that she identified them with males.

Freudian interpretation of this dream would have undoubtedly seen the uniformed, unknown soldier who, according to the hypnotic suggestion, should have been unclothed and someone known, as an unmistakable disguise and distortion by the dream censor. Through this method the offensive nakedness could be hidden from the consciousness of the dreamer. Freud would have been hard pressed to explain why a man supposedly well known to the dreamer,

as had been suggested, would become transformed into a totally unknown soldier. Most likely he would have tried to explain this as a further attempt of disguising in order to disarm as completely as possible the "indecent" quality of the dream. The pistol naturally would have been seen by Freud as a symbol of the male genitalia--the phallic.

If the dream phenomena themselves are allowed to speak we get a much clearer image of the overall attunement of the women involved in the experiment. The three non-neurotic women, following the suggestion, dreamed of a pleasurable, open, and sensual relationship with a man who was allowed to approach each woman naked. The two neurotic, closed down, and restricted women experienced an anxious relationship, dangerous and anonymous. The man was not allowed to approach naked. The elderly spinster was incapable not only in her dream but also in waking life of opening up to a mature love relationship. In a state of great anxiety objects generally appear as anonymous and this overall attunement meets and affects all objects and experiences in a similar manner. The man appeared, not as a friend, but as a threatening, uniformed anonymous person. The soldier's uniform is identified not only with maleness, but it also makes men anonymous, impersonal. It also, in this instance, reveals the dreamer's narrow, restricted, closed down, anxiety-laden relatedness to her world.

The pistol, as well, reveals not some super symbolic camouflage, but a threatening situation. The dreamer had been and was extremely frightened of firearms in any situation. They, for her, referred to a threatening situation which endangered life. The pistol manifested itself to the dreamer because of her attunement to anxiety. In this attuned state all that could appear and did appear was seen in the light of her attuned anxiety. Everything about her dream was attuned toward the "anxious" and the frightful. For Boss, dreams reveal existence not conceal existence. "Dream phenomena are therefore always just what they are as they shine forth, they are an uncovering and unveiling and never a covering up or a veiling of psychic content."¹⁰¹

In a criticism of Boss' position regarding dreams, Richard M. Jones states that Boss has not held to the requirements of logical thinking. According to Jones, Boss admonishes dream theorists and analysts for interpreting dreams from the perspective of the waking state and then proceeds to do the same thing, i.e., see dreams and

¹⁰¹Boss, Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis, p. 262. Boss says, as well, that things often dreamed of reflect the "pitch" to which the dreamer is attuned, making it unnecessary to appeal to an unconscious or a consciousness. "People in the mood of anxiety are . . . open only to the perception of those features of the world that are a threat to them." P. 100.

interpret them via the waking state.¹⁰² Jones completely missed the point Boss is attempting to make. For Boss, both dreaming and existing in the waking state are characteristics of Being-in-the-world, yet each is autonomous. To dream is to be open to the world in an understanding, meaning-disclosing relating to what is encountered. It is as "real" as the waking state yet with its own autonomy. To see the dream as a mere alteration of the waking state, as mere pictures or images within a psyche is to prejudge the dream phenomenon and hence destroy its autonomy. This position by Boss does not preclude looking at the dream from the perspective of the waking state (as the analyst or patient must) as long as dream phenomena are allowed their own autonomous relationships. Jones' criticisms reveal his complete misunderstanding of the ontological disclosure of man as Being-in-the-world and pushes him back into a stance that can only be described as Cartesian; i.e., as viewing man as a subjective enclosed ego somehow relating to an objective order.

¹⁰²Richard M. Jones, The New Psychology of Dreaming (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1970). "If then, we should hold Boss to the requirements of logical thinking, it is difficult to see how we could avoid attributing to this position the suggestion that to truly understand a dream one should stay asleep. In practice, however, Boss does observe dreams from the standpoint of the waking state and he does interpret them." P. 107.

b. Phenomenological analysis of repression. In Freudian theory the concept of repression achieved a rank almost equal in status to that of the unconscious into which something was being repressed. As Freud saw it, repression, as a concept, naturally follows the concept of the unconscious, for the repressed is that which is turned away from a consciousness and therefore resides in the unconscious. In Freudian language, repression occurs when an instinctual representative, such as an idea, mental image, or an affect or emotion is not ego-syntonic. These ego-dystonic images, or affects, are those which are not compatible with the overall integrity and/or ethical ideals of the ego. The mechanism of repression is described by Freud in these words:

The unconscious system may be . . . compared to a large anteroom, in which the various mental excitations are crowding upon one another, like individual beings. Adjoining this is a second, smaller apartment, a sort of reception room, in which consciousness resides. But on the threshold between the two there stands a personage with the office of doorkeeper, who examines the various mental excitations, censors them, and denies them admittance to the reception room when he disapproves of them. . . . it does not make much difference whether the doorkeeper turns any one impulse back at the threshold, or drives it out again once it has entered the reception room. . . . The excitation in the unconscious, in the antechamber, are not visible to consciousness, which is of course in the other room, so to begin with they remain unconscious. When they have pressed forward to the threshold and been turned back by the doorkeeper, they are "incapable of becoming conscious," we call them then repressed.¹⁰³

¹⁰³ Sigmund Freud, A General Introduction to Psycho-analysis, p. 260.

Although Freud refers to the analogy just cited as crude hypotheses and ones that only ". . . indicate an extensive approximation to the actual reality,"¹⁰⁴ nevertheless, the mechanism underlying these hypotheses is clearly demonstrable. To compound the importance of this model, Freud refers to the doorkeeper as "what we have learned to know as resistance in our attempts in analytic treatment to loosen the repressions."¹⁰⁵ The doorkeeper, or whatever that represents, is that which pushes ego-dystonic material way from entering consciousness when this repressed material is referred to, either explicitly or implicitly, the censor or doorkeeper offers resistance in the form of trying to maintain its repression.

The phenomenon of defense, non-admittance and resistance, in psychotherapy can be acknowledged without the explanatory hypotheses offered by Freud. "If we look without prejudice," says Boss, ". . . at defenses as well as that which is defended against, at resistance and the resisted, we begin to see that they have nothing whatever to do with Freud's hypotheses concerning the inner structure of the psyche or with any of the rest of his abstract speculations."¹⁰⁶ (Emphasis mine.)

¹⁰⁴Ibid.

¹⁰⁵Ibid.

¹⁰⁶Boss, Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis, p. 117.

Boss offers the following as an example of repression:

A nineteen-year-old girl passed by a flower nursery on her way to work every day. A young handsome gardener who worked there seemed obviously interested in her; each time she passed he would look at her for a long time. The girl became excited whenever she was near him and would feel herself peculiarly attracted to him. This attention bewildered her. One day she stumbled and fell on the street directly in front of the entrance to the nursery. From then on both her legs were paralyzed.¹⁰⁷

In the course of psychoanalytic treatment it was learned that this girl's parents were prudish to an extreme degree which often manifested itself in hostility at the slightest sign of sensuality. Also significant were the statements by the girl herself that her attraction to the gardener, a unique feeling of attraction, persisted even after the paralysis.

The assumption of the Freudian mechanics of explanation would allow the assertion that an "inner" struggle took place between unconscious instincts and the authoritative censorship of the super-ego; somehow when the girl approached the gardener, "sensual" strivings welled up from her unconscious. These psychic or instinctual representations, unable to express themselves openly, appeared in the form of a paresis of the legs. This explanation is predicated on the assumption that within her brain or "mind" there exist areas which house conscious and

¹⁰⁷Ibid.

unconscious psychic representations or images from the external world. But what is the justification for such assumptions? The phenomenon? What does the phenomenon itself reveal?

Paralysis is a phenomenon that occurs only to beings who are mobile. A chair, or rock does not have or attain a state of paralysis. Paralysis occurs in a being when its movement has been stopped by some blockage.

At the time leading up to and including the paralysis of her legs, the girl's whole existence was nothing else but her being open and drawn toward the gardener. But also present was the protective attitude of her parents towards any kind of sexuality. "The paralysis of the girl's legs shows that she had surrendered herself to her parents' attitude and that she still existed under its spell completely."¹⁰⁸

Being caught, so to speak, between the pull of the attitudes of her parents and being drawn toward the gardener, she was able to maintain herself in the love relationship only by warding off, blocking her movement towards him. Nevertheless, even with this blockage there remained a human relationship between the girl and the gardener. There was no repression into the unconscious either of the gardener or his image; instead there was only the oppressive

¹⁰⁸Ibid., p. 118.

presence of the gardener in the world of the girl. "Without his oppressive presence, her blocked relationship toward him would not have taken such complete possession of her existence as her paresis shows it did."¹⁰⁹

Although the girl had become possessed by her being attracted to the gardener, this does not necessarily mean that she was intellectually or reflectively aware of it. In fact, the girl had "fallen prey" to the rigid dictates of her parents' attitudes to such an extent that she could not, in any intellectual or articulated sense, recognize the oppressive presence of the gardener as oppression. In point of fact, without this oppressive presence of the gardener, the blocked relationship toward him would not have taken so complete a possession of her existence as demonstrated by her paralysis. The paralysis demonstrates that the girl's openness was not her own, that anything like an independent selfhood did not exist as her openness; ". . . the blocked relationship in which her existence was so completely absorbed could only occur within the bodily sphere of her existence . . . in the form of the paralysis of her legs."¹¹⁰

To assume that the hysteric paralysis was "something else," a disguised, unconscious, instinctual impulse,

¹⁰⁹Ibid., p. 119.

¹¹⁰Ibid.

is to degrade the paralytic phenomenon itself. The girl in fact existed "outside," within, the relationship toward the gardener. The paralysis only reflects the extent to which she was "outside" and with the gardener however inauthentic (open or closed down) her relationship to him was. This adherence to the phenomena in question only reveals how contrived it is to think of repression as thoughts and emotions being stuffed into an unconscious. To the contrary, repression ". . . can be understood much more adequately as the inability of an existence to become engaged in an open, free, authentic, and responsible kind of relationship to that which is disclosed in the relationship."¹¹¹

c. Phenomenologically disclosing the "hallucination" of a schizophrenic. The reasons for including this particular case as an example of the phenomenological procedure of Daseinsanalysis are two fold: first, the history of this case was used by Medard Boss in the seminars in which Martin Heidegger participated; secondly, the case itself is reported both in Boss' Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis and in his new publication Grundriss der Medizin.

The Sun Man. In the spring of 1961, a young man was hospitalized in the psychiatric clinic of the University

¹¹¹Ibid., p. 120.

of Zürich because of an acute nervous breakdown. After several days of rest and with the administration of tranquilizers the man calmed down enough to give the following report to the doctor.

Doctor: Why were you in a state of such severe anxiety?

Patient: Shortly before I came to the hospital, I went through one entire night in which I saw the sun. I lay in my bed; the shutters were closed and it was quite dark in the room. Suddenly, around half past nine, the sun appeared on the wall opposite the bed. ^{/A} man lay sleeping on the floor beneath the sun.⁷¹¹²

Doctor: Can you describe that a little more precisely?

Patient: It was a round disk about fifteen or twenty centimeters in diameter. It was on the wall at about head level and it moved slowly during the night from left to right, gradually rising higher.

Doctor: Of what was the disk composed?

Patient: It was nothing but intense light, brilliant yellow in color. There were no solid parts.

Doctor: Did you see that in the same way you would have seen, let us say, the lighted lamp on the ceiling?

Patient: No, my attention was wholly taken by this sun. It aroused a feeling of anxiety in me. I could not let it out of my sight for one second, or something terrible would have happened. It was something stronger than man. I had to be on my guard lest it come after me.

Doctor: Didn't you wonder a bit when you suddenly saw this thing?

¹¹²The English version omits this sentence. In the German texts the sentence reads: "Unterhalb dieser Sonne lag auf dem Fussboden ein Schlafender Mann." Grundriss der Medizin, p. 497.

Patient: No, because I knew from the very first moment what it meant. I know that you perhaps would have gone up to it if you too had been in the room; you would have followed the disk with your eyes and touched it. However, I knew at once what it meant. I was in a state of fearful anxiety and did not venture to get out of bed.

Doctor: Just why do you use the word "sun" in referring to this phenomenon?

Patient: I had just that day been compelled to think continuously of the sun. All the time I had the feeling that my sex organ was connected with the sun in the sky and was being excited by it. If I had lost sight of the sun on the wall, the real sun would have come close to the earth and the earth would have gone up in flames. I was becoming more and more anxious about that.¹¹³

A follow-up interview with the patient a year after his schizophrenic attack, revealed that he felt himself well and under control. He had returned to his fairly lucrative job at a factory and still lived with his parents in an apparently congenial atmosphere. He spent most of his free time by himself either cycling or mountain climbing. While he could remember explicitly the details of his illness, they nevertheless remained for the most part incomprehensible to him; yet he sensed that there was great meaning in them. He then added, "It was something that is always there in ordinary life as well, but I cannot apply it to specific individual situations." He also insisted that the illness had not been a mere waste of time. "Because of the illness I have above all come to see clearly that

¹¹³ Boss, Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis, pp. 219-220.

one depends on others. If one neglects his relationships with others, one gets nowhere and one's life lacks all direction."¹¹⁴

During the interview the patient corroborated a report given earlier by his relatives that a few weeks before his "nervous breakdown" a dear and close friend had not appeared at a prearranged rendezvous and had not contacted him afterward. The young man saw this as a betrayal on the part of his friend. The friend had been from earliest childhood the person closest to the young man who was still profoundly hurt by the "betrayal" and still concerned about it.

The mentioning of the friend brought an increased excitement during the interview so that the doctor changed the subject. In response to the question of his most vivid experience during the illness itself, the patient replied that it was the night the sun had appeared to him. When the doctor asked what significance these imaginations had for him, the young man smiled embarrassingly and said, "'You must not get the idea that I idolize the sun. The sun was for me the highest power from which proceeds all energy and growth!'" In regard to the question of his state of panic and anxiety when confronting the sun, the young man replied, "'Just because it can at the same time

¹¹⁴Ibid., pp. 220-221.

scorch and annihilate everything.'" And immediately he added, "'Now I am going to stop talking. I don't want to become ill again'."115

This patient's world prior to his psychosis was that of an inordinately reserved factory worker who still resided with his parents. No matter how constricted or restricted this world was, it nevertheless was the time-space open to him through which and with which our patient dwelled in security and contentment. Within this world relationship, the closest thing to our patient had been his long standing friendship. When this collapsed so did the dwelling place of his Da-sein within this world-relationship. There was no other to help support the openness within his world. His words had been, "' If one neglects his relationships with others, one's life lacks all direction.'"116 He therefore felt completely insecure, exposed, and in danger of annihilation, "because being-a-human-being never really occurs other than as an existing in and as this or that relationship with what at any given time succeeds in showing itself in the meaning-elucidating light of man's primordial nature."117

115 Ibid., pp. 221-222.

116 Boss, Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis, p. 222.

117 Ibid. The German version of this sentence is slightly different; it reads, ". . . weil Mensch-sein sich nie anders als ein Existieren in diesen oder jenen verstehenden Bezügen zu dem ihm Begegnenden ereignen kann, das

The collapse and emptiness of his "world" following the "betrayal" by his friend required something to refurbish it, to fill it again. Since this loss of his friend was of such magnitude for the patient only another of great proportion--something "superhuman" or "supernatural"--could fill the emptiness. Thus an uncanny sun broke into the emptiness of his world, a totally new reality for him, nonetheless real for him as shown by his answer covering his perception of the ceiling light or lamp. The cold emptiness which had been his world was now transformed into a warm brightness of unheard of power. Yet this sun identification would not have been possible unless he had had a previous understanding of the nature of the sun, its nourishing and growing potentialities as well as those of its destructiveness. In other words, the sun holds in its power being as well as the non-being of everything. For him he could immediately comprehend the meaningfulness of the sun-disc on his wall as the "highest power from which proceeds all vital energy and growth, but which can at the same time scorch and annihilate everything."¹¹⁸ From this

in den Weltereich seines offenstandigsenis hinein anwest."
 ". . . because being human can never come about other than as an existing in the understanding relations and responsiveness to whatever encounters it, to whatever comes to be present in the world realm of being-open." Grundriss, p. 500. Translation provided by Dr. Brian Kenney.

¹¹⁸Ibid., pp. 223-224.

awareness he came to know of a coming up, a dawning, of what had come to be present and of what would "go up" into non-being. The sun also allowed him to perceive light-being, an "enlightenment," a "dawning" of comprehension, understanding perception of something as something. For if the Da-sein were not of this nature of a "dawning," or "rising," then "never a light over anything could have dawned" on anyone. Without this primordial dawning or coming-up--the comprehension of something as something--then neither of the other two "dawnings" would have been possible; that is, the awareness of sun-ness as such and the "coming-up" dawning, of things in their being and "going into" nothingness.¹¹⁹

Yet the patient was psychotic, "mad"! Wasn't his hallucination nothing but an illusion, sheer nonsense? The patient himself, however, regarded the incident, even after it had occurred, as quite meaningful and as an event that had enriched his life. This experience enabled him to "see" that there was something quite incomprehensible, impenetrable, fundamental, "something which is also there in everyday life," but is "not applicable to specific individual situations. . . ." Could it have been that this sun coming as a result of his psychotic unbound being-in-the-world, disclosed something of the hidden nature of that which pervaded everything, that merely "is" as a particular

¹¹⁹Ibid., p. 224.

being? It is not "applicable to the specific situation," but is nevertheless in "the everyday." Yet being different from everything that simply is, it itself cannot be a thing that is simply observed as something definite and particular. That he sees this intangibility does not reduce it to a nullity as something void and empty. He "knows," although in a manner he is not able to articulate, that what he has sensed has to do with the concrete being of all things; i.e., with Being-ness as such.¹²⁰

Most likely the hallucinated sun presented the patient, not with nonsensical illusion, but with a meaningfulness with which he was unable to cope. This is not surprising since his condition was psychosis, the opposite of an autonomous, energetically reflecting, mature self. The boundaries of his Da-sein had been thrown open not by his own maturity but by the betrayal of his friend, a betrayal which left his already insecure, sensitive self to the mercy of the "Other" which would take his friend's place. The other, the "super-meaning" of the sun, overwhelmed him to a certain extent that it robbed him of what little autonomy and freedom he had. At this point, the German description of this patient and schizophrenia in general adds something that is not found in the English; Boss says,

¹²⁰Ibid., p. 224. Grundriss, p. 502.

The psychotic description of a Da-sein, the widening of the being-open of an existence, often seems to go together with a "superhuman" penetrability for the address of what is not observable in the everyday, and yet is the foundation of the everyday. One can speak of a schizophrenic supersensitivity for what is otherwise hidden. Nevertheless, schizophrenically ill patients prove to be men who are not equal to their supersensitivity. If they could stand firm in the face of what they perceived, they would not be ill, but would become and remain a visionary with genius, a philosopher, or a poet.¹²¹

¹²¹Boss, Grundriss, p. 503. (Translated by Dr. Brian Kenney.)

CHAPTER III

DA-SEIN: ITS FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS

The way to something, the method, of Heidegger and Boss is phenomenology. But that entity which uses phenomenology needs to be revealed ontologically. The entity is Da-sein. In this chapter the basic characteristics of Da-sein will be investigated. In section 7, Da-sein's fundamental characteristic, openness (Lichtung), is revealed and described. Included in this section is a statement concerning Ereignis. In section 8, the description of Da-sein's equiprimordial characteristics is continued by looking into the "existentialia" as presented in Being and Time, but as interpreted by Boss. In section 9, it is revealed that Boss offers an interpretive expansion of the original "existentialia" to include spatiality, temporality, corporeality, being-together, memory and historicity, and being-mortal.

7. Da-sein as "Lichtung"

Being and Time is essentially an investigation into the characteristics of that entity which poses the question of Being-ness as such--Da-sein. While this entity

is in fact "man" Heidegger prefers not to use this term because it comes already "loaded" with all kinds of suppositions, assumptions, and prejudices. Instead, he uses the neutral term, Da-sein. But more specifically, Da-sein is used to designate the ontological characteristics that "is" man. It is therefore legitimate to speak of the Da-sein that "is" man; if, on the other hand, the expression "the Da-sein" "in" man is used, the "in" must be seen not in the sense of an immanence but more in the sense of "as," or "how" man is.¹

The term, Dasein, (Da-sein is preferred in this essay for reasons explained below) has given readers, translators, and specialists in Heidegger difficulties since its initial use in Being and Time. The term itself in ordinary German means: exist or existence, be there, presence and life;² and as Heidegger himself has pointed out, the term has been employed in Metaphysics to mean existentia, actuality, reality, and objectivity.³ Most translators of Heidegger's works into English have left the term untranslated; but a few have offered these as

¹The problem of the "immanence" of consciousness, the container theory, has already been alluded to and is treated further in section 11 below.

²Cassell's German and English Dictionary, Cassell and Co., Ltd., 1970. London, pp. 97 and 100.

³Heidegger, "The Way Back into the Ground," pp. 133-134.

possible English equivalents: Richardson's "there-being," Manheim's "being-there," Brock's professed equivocation "human life," Gelven's professed equivocation "to be here," Magda King's professed equivocation over the use of "factual existence, man's being, or man," Marjorie Grene's "human being," and Spiegelburg's "human being."⁴

Heidegger complicates the understanding as well as the translation of Dasein by saying, "Any attempt, therefore, to re-think Being and Time is thwarted as long as one is satisfied with the observation that, in this study, the term 'being there' is used in place of 'consciousness'."⁵

This complication is due to what appears to be a deep-seated habituation on the part of man; that is, conceiving himself as a subject which somehow relates to an objective order. When man is reflected upon and conceived in this fashion the conception is anthropological. Since it has been Heidegger's task to undercut this anthropological (subjective) conception of man, it is not difficult to understand his abhorrence at being classified as a

⁴Richardson, pp. 34-35; Manheim, p. xi; Brock, p. 14; Gelven, p. 22; King, p. 69; Grene, p. 24; Spiegelberg, p. 300.

⁵"The Way Back into the Ground," Barrett and Aiken, Vol. 3, p. 134.

philosophical anthropologist or an existentialist.⁶ As Joan Stambaugh has stated, "Man is, in the language of Being and Time, Being-there (Da-sein), man is the 'there' of Being. This has nothing to do with subjectivity and nothing to do with the concept of human existence of 'existentialism'."⁷

But what does Heidegger mean by the expression "subjectivity" and, as well, the expression "substance" which he conceives to be one and the same thing?⁸ The tendency of modern thought, which can be traced back to Plato, is to conceive of man as "rational." Reason here means the faculty of representing something as something. Reason then becomes the dimension of subjectivity in which what is, is only as an object for a subject.

In a footnote in Vom Wesen des Grundes, Heidegger points out that the published sections of Being and Time had no other task than "a concrete, revealing sketch

⁶Karl Löwith quotes Heidegger as saying, "'For the anthropological interpretation when taken ontologically, can be carried out only on the basis of a clarified ontological problematic in general. . . ." Karl Löwith, "The Nature of Man and the World of Nature for Heidegger's 80th Birthday," The Southern Journal of Philosophy, VIII (Winter, 1970), 311.

⁷Identity and Difference, p. 12.

⁸"We are faced with the fact that metaphysical thinking understands man's selfhood in terms of substance or--and at bottom this amounts to the same--in terms of subject." "Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics," found in Barrett and Aiken, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, Vol. 3, p. 135.

[project] of transcendence. . . ." ⁹ We have seen that the term "transcendence" for Heidegger means openness. ¹⁰ If, however, transcendence is conceived as a consciousness open to objects in the world, a self, somehow relating to objects, then the message and intent of Being and Time is not only lost but is, in point of fact, pushed into the very sort of subjectivity which Heidegger attempts to overcome.

It is important to see that Heidegger in Being and Time was indeed attempting to undercut subjectivistic, representationalistic conceptions of man by revealing via a hermeneutic phenomenology the essential characteristics of man. Those characteristics, ontological traits, were designated by the term, Da-sein. To see Heidegger in any other way--specifically as seeing Da-sein as the essential nature of self or subjectivity, is to obliterate the essential task of Being and Time, the ontological disclosure of the characteristics of Da-sein, i.e., the disclosure of Da-sein as transcendence. Towards the end of the essay, "On the Essence of Truth," (Vom Wesen der Wahrheit) Heidegger makes this statement:

Not only is every sort of "anthropology" and every sort of subjectivity (of man regarded as a subject) abandoned, as was already the case in Sein und Zeit, and the truth of Being pursued as the "ground" of a

⁹The Essence of Reason, p. 97.

¹⁰See p. 68.

fundamentally new attitude to history, but an effort is made in the course of this lecture to think in terms of this "ground," i.e., Da-sein.¹¹

Following Heidegger's suggestion, it is essential that the term Da-sein be seen not as a "what" man is but as a "way" man is. To characterize Da-sein as a "what" is to impose artificially on Da-sein the status of an object, an extant (Vorhanden). Da-sein can only be understood by its existence.¹² Da-sein, hence, is non-objective; but neither is Da-sein subjective in the sense of an encapsulated, self-contained ego.

"Da-sein heisst sein bis Da."¹³ Da-sein means the "Being-of-the-there" or "Being-the-there." But the "there" is not a place in the vulgar sense of "over there" or "over here"; "there" means "openness" (world-openness). The Being of this openness is Da-sein. "Da-sein is its disclosed-ness," disclosedness in the sense of "illumination."¹⁴ By illumination Heidegger means that realm into

¹¹"On the Essence of Truth," in Brock's Existence and Being, pp. 323-324.

¹²"... Because we cannot define Dasein's essence by citing a 'what' of the kind that pertains to a subject matter, and because the essence lies rather in the fact that in each case it has its Being to be, and has it as its own, we have chosen to designate this entity as 'Dasein,' a term which is purely an expression of its Being." B & T, pp. 32-33; H, 12.

¹³Medard Boss, personal interview. The expression Da-sein is used in this dissertation (instead of Dasein) in order to emphasize the notion of Being-the-there. Also see Calvin Hall and Gardner Lindzey, Theories of Personality, 2nd ed., (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1970), p. 559.

¹⁴B & T, p. 171; H, 133.

which all beings, essents, may come forth, make their appearance, or become present.¹⁵ "To say that it ∫Dasein∫ is illuminated ∫erleuchtet∫ means that as Being-in-the-world it is cleared ∫gelichtet∫ in itself, not through any other entity, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing."¹⁶ (Emphasis on "cleared" and "clearing" are mine.) Further, "The entity which bears the title "Being-there" is one that has been 'cleared'."¹⁷ (Emphasis, Heidegger.) The term "cleared" as noted by the translators, MacQuarrie and Robinson, comes from the German term, Lichtung, which generally means a "clearing" in the woods.¹⁸ In the same reference they stress the importance of the fact that the terms erleuchtet and gelichtet are cognates of the noun Licht which means "light."

Although mentioned only sparsely by Heidegger in Being and Time, the terms "cleared" and "light" are nevertheless of central importance in that treatise. Both of these terms refer to the fundamental characteristics of Da-sein. "The entity which bears the title "Being-there" is one that has been 'cleared'."¹⁹ To be cleared is at the same time to "be light."

¹⁵Boss, P & D, p. 39.

¹⁶B & T, p. 171; H, 133.

¹⁷B & T, p. 401; H, 350.

¹⁸B & T, p. 171; H, 2.

¹⁹B & T, p. 401; H, 350.

The light which constitutes this clearedness [Gelichtetheit] of Dasein, is not something ontically present-at-hand as a power source for a radiant brightness occurring in the entity on occasion. That by which this entity is essentially cleared--in other words, that which makes it both "open" for itself and "bright" for itself--is what we have defined as "care," in advance of any temporal interpretation.²⁰

The importance of this passage, and those previously cited as dealing with the term "Lichtung" can easily be missed by casual and superficial reading.²¹ What Heidegger has done here is to reveal the fundamental characteristic (ontological) of Da-sein in a single but all pervasive term--Lichtung. The existential analytic has the task of revealing the equiprimordial traits of Da-sein as Lichtung which is as Being-in-the-world. That this was done in Being and Time should not be overlooked.

Heidegger's use of primordial word meanings is clearly exemplified with his understanding of the important

²⁰B & T, pp. 401-402; H, 350.

²¹Heidegger is acutely aware of the flagrant misunderstanding of his overall thinking and specifically that found in Being and Time. In his essay, "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics," he refers to the oblivion of Being manifested by philosophy, "by the somnambulistic assurance with which it has passed by the real and only question of B & T. What is at stake here is, therefore, not a series of misunderstandings of a book but our abandonment by Being." P. 137. Heidegger is not always so subtle in his characterizations of those who would fit into the category of "somnambulistic." In Identity and Difference he refers to his essay "What Is Metaphysics?" as defining metaphysics "as the question about beings as such and as a whole. The wholeness of this whole is the unity of all beings that unifies as the generative ground." He then adds, "To those who can read, this means: metaphysics is onto-theo-logy." Identity and Difference, p. 54.

German term Licht. In its primordial sense, as used by Heidegger, the word has a double meaning. First, what is in German Lichtung means essentially an opening, a clearance (as in the forest) or a vacancy. The relationship of these terms with "space" should not be overlooked, in point of fact, in this context Lichtung means "giving space" or "giving room." Thus "light" is seen as an openness, a "space," an emptiness, in which something may enter or appear. The second sense of the word licht is this entrance of "light" itself into the openness or clearedness. The second sense presupposes the first, for without the openness to light, light would not be seen.

Da-sein as "cleared" is an openness to and within the world. Thus Da-sein is an openness to which the phenomena of the world may enter, the Beingness of beings and this openness itself is revelatory of Beingness as such. As Heidegger states, "To characterize with a single term both the involvement of Being in human nature and the essential relation of man to openness ('there') of Being as such, the name of 'being there /Dasein/' was chosen for that sphere of being in which man stands as man."²² Da-sein is as "world-openness." But "world" in this sense does not mean something other than Da-sein, something "over

²²Heidegger, "The Way Back," p. 133. Also in Walter Kaufman's Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, p. 213.

there;" "world" is the openness of Beingness. "'World' is the clearing of Being, wherein man stands out from his thrown essence."²³ The openness of Da-sein stands "prior" to anything, any light that appears "in" that openness. But priority here is to be seen in the primordial sense of Licht.

Da-sein, in the sense of Lichtung as openness or clearedness, is not an object. As the "there," openness, of Being, Da-sein is that through which beings in their Beingness become manifest as such. It, Da-sein, is unobjectifiable.

In 1969, Heidegger's work, Zur Sache des Denkens,²⁴ was published. In that work an essay entitled, "Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens," contained important elements covering the topic now under consideration. This work has recently been translated by Joan

²³"Letter on Humanism," p. 215. Boss states, "Synonymous with 'there'--the 'Da' of 'Dasein'--Heidegger also uses the terms Welt (world), Weltenwurf, in the sense of Welterwurf (the 'throwing open of the lightened realm of the world'), and Welt-Entschlossenheit, in the sense of Welt-Erschlossenheit (world disclosure)." P & D, p. 39. It will be recalled that the term, Entschlossenheit, is generally translated "resoluteness." Boss has stated that the suggestions for altering Entwurf and Entschlossenheit to Erwurf and Erschlossenheit, were made by Heidegger himself. Personal interview. See also Heidegger's "Letter on Humanism," p. 215.

²⁴Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens (Tubingen: Neimeyer Verlag, 1969).

Stambaugh under the title On Time and Being.²⁵ In this essay, Heidegger identifies openness [Lichtung] as that which grants a possible letting-appear of something. It is that which is the clearing. The German term licht also means open, but not in the sense of clearing. "But light never first creates openness, rather, light presupposes openness."²⁶ Into this openness, or clearing, not only light is free to enter in the form of a brightness and/or darkness, "but also for resonance and echo, for sounding and diminishing of sound. The clearing is the open for everything that is present and absent."²⁷

Also from the "later" Heidegger can be found numerous references to openness, clearing, and light. For instance, in Identity and Difference, Heidegger states that "it is man, open toward Being, who alone lets Being arrive as presence. Such becoming present needs the openness of a clearing, and by this need remains appropriated to human being."²⁸ For Heidegger, Man and Beingness are appropriated

²⁵Heidegger, On Time and Being (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1972). The translated text bears no mention of the source, Zur Sache des Denkens.

²⁶On Time and Being, p. 65.

²⁷Ibid. The similes, brightness, darkness, resonance and echo will be met again when discussing the existentialia in the next section.

²⁸Identity and Difference, p. 31. See also p. 67 in that work where Heidegger refers to the way Beingness gives itself in the way in which it clears itself. This means that Beingness reveals itself historically and epochally.

to each other. From "Letter on Humanism," Heidegger states, "The standing in the clearing of Being I call the ex-sistence of Man."²⁹

The use of "light" in a descriptive as well as explanatory sense is not new to the history of philosophy. It is probably best known in the sense of the light of reason, or lumen naturale. But, according to Heidegger, the lumen naturale does not inquire into the openness or clearedness that is free for "light." Lumen naturale, reason's light, "throws light only on openness. It does concern the opening, but so little does it form it that it needs it in order to be able to illuminate what is present in the opening."³⁰ In other words, lumen naturale has failed to investigate the ground of that which presents itself in and to this ground. But this sounds familiar. In "Letter on Humanism," Heidegger says that metaphysics knows the "clearing of Being" only as the looking at what is present within it. ". . . the truth of Being as the clearing itself remains concealed from metaphysics."³¹ And in Being and Time, lumen naturale is referred to by Heidegger as an "ontically figurative" way of referring to the existential-ontological structure of

²⁹"Letter on Humanism," p. 100. See also that essay, pp. 204, 207, and 215.

³⁰On Time and Being, p. 66.

³¹"Letter on Humanism," p. 204.

Da-sein, "that it is in such a way as to be its 'there'."³² It turns out that Lichtung, the "clearedness" (openness) of Da-sein, the "clearing of Being" is that ground from which the roots of the tree of metaphysics takes its nourishment.³³ The charge made by Heidegger in Being and Time, and up to the present is that metaphysical thinking, philosophical thinking, has failed to take into account this "openness."³⁴

³²B & T, p. 171; H, 133. Even in Being and Time, Heidegger is not denying the image of lumen naturale but relegating it to the ontic order which for him sees this image as implying an opposition between a subject who knows and the object of its knowledge. This involves the subjectivism to which Heidegger takes exception. See Richardson, p. 59, fn. 86.

³³Heidegger uses the analogy presented by Descartes, that philosophy is like a tree whose roots are metaphysics, the trunk is physics, and the branches are other sciences, in order to reveal the unthought bases of thinking ("The Way Back," p. 129). This particular essay is considered by Heidegger himself as a good introduction to his thought (Personal interview with Medard Boss).

³⁴One of the central themes of the "thinking" of the "later" Heidegger has been to elucidate the viability of metaphysics (philosophy) to see the clearing, the openness, of Beingness. Metaphysics always thinks of beings in reference to other beings. When asked what beings are, metaphysics always answers with beings. This basic representational thinking, however, owes its sight to the light of Beingness. "The light itself, i.e., that which such thinking experiences as light, does not come within the range of metaphysical thinking; for metaphysics always represents beings only as beings." ("The Way Back," p. 129). When metaphysics thinks of beings as beings it is oblivious to Beingness as such. This means that it is oblivious to the difference. (Hence, "difference" refers to what Heidegger in Being and Time referred to as the "ontological difference"--see pp. 51-53 above.) By being oblivious to the difference, metaphysics fails to see Beingness as the clearing, that which gives light to beings

In a letter to Medard Boss, Heidegger stated that the "whole road" of his thinking could be discerned within the sufficient distinction between Seiendheit, the mode of being of individual things--being-ness, lower case--and Seyn, Being-ness as such.³⁵ This distinction is what has been referred to as the ontological difference. Philosophy, as metaphysics, has not interrogated this difference; it reposes in the Beingness of what is present. This means that it thinks in terms of representing objects as objects. It also means that it has failed to see that which gives presence, the light or clearing of Beingness, in which

as such; it fails to see its essential nature. Only through a leap (spring) can thinking think the essence of metaphysics. (See Identity and Difference, pp. 50-51 and 72. Beingness gives! By this, Heidegger means the es gibt, the "it gives" in the sense of "there is." Beingness is that which gives. But the tradition of Western philosophic thinking (metaphysics) has been exclusively concerned with the "what," represented by what is given. The "It gives," "withdraws in favor of the gift which it gives. That gift is thought and conceptualized from then on exclusively as Being with regard to beings." (On Time and Being, p. 8.) The gift is what is present and metaphysics asks only about what is present in regard to its presence. It does not raise the question about how there can be presence, or presencing, at all. (See On Time and Being, p. 70.) The presencing of what is present refers to the openness (Lichtung) which allows the present to appear. Presencing, openness, and the allowing to appear remain unthought in metaphysics and for Heidegger this extends to philosophy as well. (See "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking," in On Time and Being, pp. 55-73.)

³⁵Portions of this letter can be found in Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis, p. 36, ftn. 4. See p. above.

things make their presence, thus coming into unconcealment (UnVerborgenheit).

If the clearing is heeded--and this requires the leap (spring) from metaphysical thinking to that thinking as letting-be (Gelassenheit)--what is revealed is not only the clearing, the presencing of the present but also the relationship of Beingness and man. This is Ereignis.

" . . . in allem Verstellen des Gestells lichtet sich der Lichtblick von Welt, blitzt Wahrheit des Seins." (Emphasis added)

" . . . in every displacing of Gestell, the clearing-emerging of world opens up; the truth of Being flashes."³⁶
(Emphasis added) With Ereignis, the thinking of Heidegger moves into its latest stages. Yet it must be emphasized that this is not an alternation on his part of previous thinking, but indeed an extension along the path. In Unterwegs zur Sprache, Heidegger notes that it will probably come as a shock to many who follow his thought to realize "that the author has been using in his manuscripts the word Ereignis . . . for more than twenty-five years."³⁷
Nevertheless, Ereignis marks a significant deepening of

³⁶ Martin Heidegger, "The Turning," trans., Kenneth R. Maly, Research in Phenomenology, Vol. I, 1971, pp. 3-16; p. 13, ftn. 22.

³⁷ Martin Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache (Pfullingen: Günther Neske Verlag, 1971, originally 1959), p. 260. This note can also be found in J. L. Mehta's The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, p. 213, ftn. 30.

Heidegger's original Seinsfrage and at the same time it is an understatement of sorts to say that Ereignis is not easily understood but easy to misunderstand. As Heidegger states in Identity and Difference, the term Ereignis should be taken as a key term in the service of thought and "it can no more be translated than the Greek (Logos) or the Chinese Tao."³⁸

The term Ereignis simply means "event." Yet Heidegger uses it, as he does so many of his terms, in the etymological sense of "the occurrence of owning"--Er-eignis. Translators of Heideggerian works tend to use the expression "disclosure of appropriation" or the "event of appropriation" or simply "e-vent."³⁹ The term appropriation, while catching the flavor of the meaning of Er-eignis, may indeed be too harsh.

Er-eignis refers to the relation belonging to Beingness, time, man, and essents as such. Yet it is not a relationship in the traditional sense of something relating to another thing. The "es gibt," the "there is," or "it gives" is understood by Heidegger as "there is something which grants." And the "something which grants is

³⁸ Identity and Difference, p. 36.

³⁹ See Richard Hofstadter, Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. xxi; Heidegger, Identity and Difference, p. 14; and Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (Nijhoff, 1963), p. 614.

Er-eignis."⁴⁰ But there is an immediate difficulty; "that" (the "it") which grants is no "that" or "it" in the sense of being a thing. Our language, and hence our thought, tends to isolate Beingness and man into independent existing entities, even though they are in relation. Er-eignis is the identity which grants, makes possible as well as pervades both (as well as time) in their difference. In this case Er-eignis supercedes both the expression Beingness and man. As Heidegger expresses it, "when Beingness is thought in its truth it undergoes a transformation and in consequence loses its name; in the Er-eignis Being itself is 'got over'."⁴¹

It should not come as a shock to find Heidegger saying that Beingness thought in its truth loses its name. For years Heidegger has been trying certain locutions which would convey the uniqueness of Beingness as such. This has been prompted as well by this term's repeated associations with traditional metaphysical thinking. Heidegger has used the German expression Sein, for instance, as ~~Sein~~ and the old German term Seyn. Er-eignis as e-vent should not be conceived as an entity or even a "happening"

⁴⁰ See Joseph J. Kockelmans, "Heidegger on Time and Being," The Southern Journal of Philosophy, VIII (Winter, 1970), 331-332. Also see On Time and Being, p. 19 and pp. 38-41.

⁴¹ Quoted in Mehta's The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, p. 214. This quote comes from Heidegger's Vorträge und Aufsätze, p. 71.

between entities; it is as the sphere of primordial Identity whereby Beingness and man (as well as time) attain their own essential natures (Eigen) as well as be one with the other in mutual owning and unity. "Being belongs, along with thought, in an Identity of which the nature has its source in that letting belong-together which we call the Er-eignis."⁴²

Was ist der Er-eignis? What is the Er-eignis?

The question itself is inadequate since by the very nature of grammar the question asks about Er-eignis as if it were a something which is present. Our grammar is suited to asking questions about beings; but Er-eignis is no being and as such cannot be seen as an event or happening (of something) or an appropriation or Identity (of something) or is "it" an emanation from anything. "Heidegger clearly states that Ereignis cannot be described by any grammatical form of sentence; it only can be experienced."⁴³ The question "what is Er-eignis?" not only asks about a something but asks about the way of beingness of the Er-eignis. But Beingness as such belongs within Er-eignis in that Beingness "emanates" out of Er-eignis. Thus the question "what is Ereignis?" is doomed from the very start.

⁴²Ibid., p. 212. Supposedly this statement, as found in Mehta's work, comes from Heidegger although it is not footnoted.

⁴³Medard Boss, personal letter, Feb. 9, 1974. See Heidegger's On Time and Being, pp. 19-20.

Despite this bleak forecast, Er-eignis can be described in a periphery manner. Er-eignis is that which brings Beingness, Man, Time, essents, and so forth, into their own (eigen) "natures" as well as belonging together. In other words, Er-eignis bestows, grants, the area of openness (Lichtung). To repeat, it must be understood that Er-eignis in granting (the "it" of es gibt) supercedes both Beingness and Man. Seeing or understanding Er-eignis as "appropriation" might give one the impression of an "after the fact" phenomenon; i.e., something happening on this side of Beingness, man, and the others. But Er-eignis is not to be seen as a "coming before or after" but as a "giving," a granting of the essential nature. As Boss says, "The English translators seem to have misunderstood the 'Ereignen' and the 'Eigenes' of things by deriving their meaning from 'Sich-aneignen' which is to appropriate. The Heideggerian 'Eigen' and 'Er-eignen' however, have 'only' to do with what you call 'the essential,' the proper nature of something."⁴⁴

Primordial Er-eignis is that whereby man is allowed to challenge and be challenged by Beingness.⁴⁵

⁴⁴Medard Boss, personal letter, Feb. 9, 1974.

⁴⁵Er-eignis is also seen as, and holding open, the Geviert which is translated and means the "four regions of the Square," sometimes referred to as the "Four-fold," or "Quadrante." Heidegger has not elucidated the Four-fold with the detail and development as he has Er-eignis and hence this relationship remains somewhat obscure and

This mutuality of challenging reveals itself historically

problematic as to its meaning. Specifically, Heidegger discusses the Geviert in "Bauen Wohnen Denken," "Das Ding," and "Holderlins Erde und Himmel." The Four-fold regions are those of Earth, the Heavens (Sky), Gods (Divinities), and Mortals. The Earth is that from which and out of which everything emerges. In ancient times this was called Physis by the Greeks. "'The Earth is that into which the emergence of all that comes forth is as such referred back' in which it remains embedded as its sustaining principle." (Taken from "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" in Holzwege, quoted in Mehta, p. 218.) Heaven is the pure principal of light in which everything that emerges into unconcealment shines forth. The Gods, or Immortals, are the messengers of divinity which usher in the area of holiness in which God may appear, even if but through his absence. The Mortals refers to man as that which takes upon himself his own death as death. Each of these four belongs to, is in relation to, the others and as such involve an insoluble unity. "But 'on the earth' already means 'under the sky.' Both of these also mean 'remaining before the divinities' and include a 'belonging to men's being with one another.' By a primal oneness the four--earth and sky, divinities and mortals--belong together in one." (Building Dwelling Thinking" in Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 149.) The central core of the unity of the Four-fold is Er-eignis itself.

In the essay "the thing" (found in Poetry, Language, Thought, pp. 165-182), Heidegger illustrates the gathering together and holding in unity of the Four-fold by reference to a jug or pitcher. The pouring out of the wine or water from the jug combines the four aspects of the Four-fold. Water comes from the earth in the form of rain or from springs--wine comes from the vine and the sky is that which gives rain as well as growing nourishment of the sun. Mortals use the water or wine to quench thirst or to warm their hearts and as for the Gods, the liquid is used often as a libation. All four entail the other, mirror each other (Spiegel--Spiel--mirror game). "The mirroring even grants to each of the four their own respective freedom, yet, at the same time, binds each (of the liberated) to the unity (singleness or simplicity) of their essential mutuality." Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze (Tubingen: Neske Verlag, 1954), p. 178 (My translation). This mutual interdependency and "owning" is reminiscent of Hegelian dialectics, at least dialectics as understood devoid of the "Hegel myth" of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. /See Hegel: The Man, His Vision and Work, by Gustav Mueller (New York: Pageant Press, 1968), pp. 4-10.7 It is enough here to point out these similarities without pursuing them in detail.

in the configuration of various epochs. As man, Da-sein is open, cleared (Lichtung) for the challenge of things; he sees these in the "light of truth" of various epochs, "as a-lethia, as nomoiosis, as doctrina, as certitude, as the Eternal Presence of the same, as Ge-stell."⁴⁶ Thus truth reveals itself, therefore, not only as history but as destiny (Geschick). This means that man finds himself "thrown" into and within the grip of the prevailing form of truth manifested within a particular epoch. Yet truth in its primordial sense, truth as Er-eignis, that which bestows the clearing, remains hidden; indeed, it is progressively pushed further into oblivion via the various historical epochs. Primordial truth in the sense of Er-eignis remains hidden because Er-eignis cannot "present" itself, be given as an object of thought, categorized within a concept, represented as some-thing. It is un-objectifiable since it is "that" which gives the light, gives and is the Identity, which enables the present to be present.

Historically, Beingness has been seen in the sense of the present, being present. The meaning of present, the presencing of the present, has not been seen. The epoch of contemporary history is the Ge-stell. For Heidegger this is the age whereby the configuration of man and

⁴⁶Mehta, p. 232.

Beingness, the mutual challenge of both, is the age of Techne, Technology. In this age that which presents itself is basically seen via representational thinking; i.e., man represents essents in respect to what they are, how they are, why they are. But all representing is thinking in terms of grasping (Be-greifen). In this sense, thinking is a chasing, a pursuing and a derogation of what is.

But thinking can become more thoughtful. It can return to and reveal that which gives the presencing. The nature of man, as disclosed through fundamental ontology, reveals that he is as a turning away and turning towards. As such, man is capable of turning towards that from which he has turned away. This, as has been seen, requires the leap, or the step back. But this type of thinking, thinking that thinks Beingness, must be initiated in terms of the truth of Beingness itself, not in terms of the represented. To do the latter would be to fall into subjectivity. To reveal the essence of thinking, as well as that of man as Da-sein, must be attempted, "from the side of Being and so must be described in terms of Being itself rather than of man as metaphysics invariably does."⁴⁷

Thinking, in the sense that Heidegger sees it, "is not a grasping, neither the grasp of what lies before us,

⁴⁷Mehta, p. 241. These are the words of Mehta, not Heidegger.

nor an attack upon it."⁴⁸ Thinking does not mould into shape by gripping; it does not re-present that which it thinks. Thinking which ceases to be representational and conceptual simply "lets-be." It is a waiting which by waiting leaves itself open for what is being waited for.⁴⁹ In so waiting man stands within (Instancy--Instandigkeit) what is nearest; i.e., Er-eignis, as primordial truth, the nearness (Nähe) itself.

It is important to see thinking in the sense of Gelassenheit, in its own-mostness; i.e., as it is in itself, not as the opposite of some already preconceived notion of what thinking should be. If thinking is conceived in this fashion as an opposite, it would be an abdication of thought, a leap into the mystical or some kind of intuitive, unmediated cognition. But this is not what Heidegger means by thinking.

As Heidegger points out in his "Letter on Humanism" when one hears about the opposition to such things as "humanism," "logic," "values," "world," "God," it is immediately assumed that the negative of these "positive" phenomena is endorsed.⁵⁰ To be in opposition to logic, for

⁴⁸What Is Called Thinking? p. 211. Was Heisst Denken? It would better fit Heidegger's meaning as developed in this work if it were translated, "What demands thinking?" or "What e-vokes thinking?"

⁴⁹See Discourse on Thinking, p. 68.

⁵⁰"Letter on Humanism," p. 213.

instance, does not mean to run headlong into the illogical or to proclaim irrationalism as truth. Thinking "counter to logic" means returning to the essence of logic (logos), and thinking through this essence by letting this essence shine forth in its ownmost phenomenologic content.

Thinking in this manner is a leap which merely transforms the nature of thought, so that "surrendering its conceptuality, its will to grasp, it becomes a simple co-respondence to the Ereignis, content in its function of letting what is reveal itself, of letting truth shine forth in all its obscuring-revealing mystery."⁵¹

To recapitulate, the central theme of this section is the term Lichtung. The Lichtung, which is Da-sein as openness, is granted by Er-eignis. The openness of Da-sein, the unobjectifiable essence of man, allows for the "entrance" and "exit" of things into or within the openness. And at the same time, those things which manifest themselves are integral with the essence of Da-sein, for without those "things" the openness would not be open to be filled, the clearing would not be cleared for things to manifest themselves and be. The mutuality suggested here of openness and that which comes into the openness as unconcealment suggests that man is owned by Beingness as that clearing "into" which Beingness manifests itself. This suggests

⁵¹Mehta, p. 247.

that man as Lichtung is needed by Beingness and that man in turn tends the openness. "Man is the Shepherd of Beingness."

Heidegger states in Sein und Zeit, "Erschlossenheit aber ist die Grundart des Daseins, gemäß der es sein Da ist. Erschlossenheit wird durch Befindlichkeit, Verstehen und Rede konstituiert und betrifft gleichursprünglich die Welt, das In-sein und das Selbst." (But disclosedness is that basic characteristic of Da-sein according to which it is its there. Disclosedness is constituted by attunement, primary comprehension, and human language, and refers equiprimordially to the World, Being-in and the Self.)⁵² He also says, in reference to disclosedness, "In the following, 'disclose' and 'disclosedness' will be used in a special terminological sense to signify 'to lay open' and 'to have been laid open.' 'Disclose, therefore, never means something like obtaining something indirectly through inference'."⁵³

"Disclose" (Erschliessen) in the sense of laying open needs to be seen as erleuchtet, illuminated. Da-sein is the realm of lumination into which all beings may shine forth. This realm of lumination refers to the cleared, open realm of the "there." As Heidegger says of Da-sein,

⁵²Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 220. (My translation.)

⁵³Ibid., p. 75. (My translation.)

"To say that it is illuminated ('erleuchtet') means that as Being-in-the-world it is cleared [gelichtet] in itself, not through any other entity, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing."⁵⁴ Luminosity, however, occurs only when there is something to illuminate. The primordial unity of man as Da-sein and his world is "the inseparable one of a luminating realm and what shines forth in the luminosity."⁵⁵ The resemblance between Lichtung as gelichtet (light) and erleuchtet (illumination) needs to be seen.

8. The Existentialia

Jacob Needleman's Being-in-the-world contains an elaborate argument, as has been seen⁵⁶ that attempts to demonstrate the "fiat" nature of both Kant and Heidegger. In addition, Needleman argues that Heidegger's Being-in-the-world involves the "constituting," through the endowing of meaning of the being of the world as well as the self. And further, "Care and its components, the existentialia, function for Heidegger in a manner analagous to the Kantian categories in that they are the forms through which ontic

⁵⁴B & T, p. 171; H, 133. Richardson says, "To say that there-being is 'lit up' (erleuchtet) means that, insofar as it is to-be-in-the-world, there-being is illumined not by some other being but rather is itself the lighting process (Lichtung). This luminosity of the there (disclosedness of the world) is not something added to there-being but it is its innermost constitution." (Emphasis mine.) p. 59.

⁵⁵P & D, pp. 84-85.

⁵⁶See above, p. 57.

reality can manifest itself to the Dasein."⁵⁷ (Emphasis added.) Yet, Needleman concedes that there is a difference between Kant and Heidegger on this point; the former saw the forms as creating objects to be encountered as "not-self" in the world, whereas the latter regards "care and its components" more in the sense of "matrices" which represent possible modes of relationship between Da-sein and world. As matrices, "care and its components," form a place, or an internal relation among possible groups of variables. It is with this conception that Binswanger moves on to his notion of "meaning-matrix" and "world-design."

Needleman's overall argument falsifies Heidegger's description of the existentials in the sense that it views them as a priori structures that somehow mold the "phenomena" into meaningful ontic activity. This presupposes that the existentials somehow meet and alter "external" experience. By doing this, not only is the distinction between ontological and ontic radically bifurcated but the scepter of subject-object relationships is "allowed to re-enter."⁵⁸ If this occurs, the meaning of Da-sein as

⁵⁷ Being-in-the-World, p. 22.

⁵⁸ Note in the previous quote from Needleman (Ibid., p. 22), that the use of the expression "ontic reality" indicates the attempt to radically separate the ontic from the ontological, thus re-introducing a subject-object imbalance. This is most emphatically antithetical to Heidegger's description of ontological and ontic realms.

Being-in-the-world is thwarted in its intent and in its place re-enters the idea of Da-sein as a Being that relates to, and hence is over against, a world. But Da-sein does not relate to a world, Da-sein is already "in" the world as being with the world. Da-sein is Being-in-the-world and this is a fundamental, primordial characteristic. If the existentials are regarded in this manner, as a priori structures or matrices which meet and mold, then the ontic characteristic of existing human beings would, by necessity be seen as a posteriori realization of these molding structures. It is this type of "metaphysical" thinking that Heidegger particularly in Being and Time is trying to reveal as a distortion of the phenomenological findings. As Boss says about Heidegger,

He emphasizes continually that one must not picture the essential condition of Dasein (as he has shown it) as something which exists in itself, forms a background, and is of the nature of a design (in the sense of 'Platonic Ideas'), a design which has to be deduced, by logical procedures, from observable human phenomena which always fall short of the design itself.⁵⁹ (Emphasis added.)

⁵⁹P & D, p. 40. Heidegger states in Being and Time, ftn. 10, p. 75; H, 50: ". . . to disclose the a priori is not to make an 'a-prioristic' construction." (Emphasis added.) Boss has said, "What is Anwesenheit, coming to the present, is not molded by existentialia, but they merely serve the objects to shine forth, they give the light." (Personal interview.) And Heidegger has also said, ". . . the significance-relationships which determine the structure of the world are not a network of forms which a worldless subject has laid over some kind of material." B & T, p. 417; H, 366. (Emphasis added.)

In short, the existentialia do not refer to capacities that man has but refer to what Da-sein is. Da-sein is only as Being-in-the-world, not as some potential or capacity that shapes the world as Kant's forms and categories did. Da-sein is a meaning-disclosing entity in the world but the emphasis is on is, not has. Da-sein does not have a capacity to endow meaning. Da-sein is the disclosing of meaning. But meaning is always to be seen as meaning of something, not meaning as an abstraction in and of itself. The position argued for by Needleman tends to separate ontological and ontic "reality" into two distinct regions. Needleman states for instance, ". . . the expression Being-in-the-world is an empty formula that says nothing about human beings, but only about human being. . . ." ⁶⁰

Sartre says in Being and Nothingness that the ontological realm and the ontical realm are "two incommunicable levels" which create two problems requiring separate solutions. ⁶¹ For Sartre, the ontological realm is an abstraction which has little or nothing to do with the actual observable concrete behavior of the ontic realm. In

⁶⁰ Needleman, p. 20.

⁶¹ Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 248. The use of the phrase "ontological structures" by Sartre reveals a tendency to think of ontological characteristics that Da-sein has as properties or things. Yet the ontological characteristics are revelatory of ways of Being. See Being and Nothingness, pp. 247-249.

essence, as Sartre sees it, these two realms exist on radically different and incommunicable levels. This argument misses Heidegger's own explicit assertion that the ontological characteristics must never be severed from ontic, concrete phenomena. ". . . the roots of the existential analytic, on its part, are ultimately existentiell, that is, ontical."⁶² A philosophical interrogation of the existentiality of existence in order to provide for an adequately founded ontological problematic must, and can only be seen as an existentiell, ontic possibility of each existing Da-sein.

To distinguish radically ontological characteristics from ontical behavior and concrete action is to perpetuate a conception as old as Plato who distinguished between the world of "ideas" and the "physical" world perceived by the senses. And, as well, it perpetuates the legacy of Descartes' bifurcation of reality into res cogitan, again "idea" or "mind," and res extensa, the world of measurable, quantifiable, and hence "real" things. With their radically split "realms of reality" both Plato and Descartes faced the dilemma of getting these two realms into some kind of harmonious relationship. The former had the problem of "participation," the latter that of "interaction."

⁶²B & T, p. 34; H, 13.

The phenomenological disclosures of Heidegger's works reveal the opposite of the tendency to make distinct the two basic structures of human existence. It is only as ontological that ontic phenomena are and only as ontic that ontological phenomena are. It is not only the case that ontological characteristics of human existence "make possible" ontic or concrete phenomena, but that these ontological characteristics are found "in" and "alongside" ontic phenomena. This point cannot be over-emphasized!

Existentialia as ontological characteristics of human existence are found "accompanying" all ontic phenomena. Heidegger describes this accompanying relationship with the use of the German expression walten.⁶³ The term itself means basically to rule, govern, control, or manage. Richardson translates walten as "holding sway."⁶⁴ But this has the connotation, as do the other meanings, of suppression or stifling and this is not what Heidegger means by the term. He means, on the contrary, pervading something as its essence, an essential or proper characteristic. This is the opposite of suppression in that it is not holding something down but instead is allowing or

⁶³See Identity and Difference, pp. 36 and 100. Also Heidegger's, Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (Frankfurt: Klosterman, 1959), p. 21.

⁶⁴Richardson, p. 223. Whereas the use of this expression is found particularly in post Being and Time works, its meaning can be used to describe the relation of ontological existentialia and concrete phenomena. (Medard Boss, personal interview.)

enabling something to appear in what it actually is. This is not a molding, a fabricating, or a design of matrices or patterns, but rather a letting of phenomena come forth in more or less complete or covered-up fashion. For an example, the existential of attunement (Befindlichkeit) is not a thing or particular being but an ontological feature, trait, or characteristic that pervades each ontic manifestation of attunement--a particular mood. For instance, it can be stated Daseinsanalytically that for each particular depression wartet the existential of attunement. Attunement in this case is revealed as the essence of depression. Thus every ontic manifestation of concrete (ontic) behavior is revelatory of the essence or trait pervading that behavior. Any attempt to make these two realms radically distinct and "incommunicable" not only falsifies the phenomenological disclosures but, if interpreted as coming from Heidegger, misreads and falsifies Heidegger's intent.

Perhaps one of the major reasons for this kind of erroneous interpretation of Heidegger's thought can be found in the tendency of Western thinking to reify concepts, abstractions, and "word-signs." It would appear that this tendency is especially prevalent when considering the existentialia as found in Being and Time. In Was Heisst Denken? Heidegger alludes to a type of behavior he calls "Blink." The term evidently comes from Nietzsche, but

Heidegger interprets it as meaning "to play up and set up a glittering deception which is then agreed upon as true and valid--with the mutual tacit understanding not to question the set-up."⁶⁵ According to Heidegger, this type of thinking forms the metaphysical basis of the modern age. Whether it is the "blink" or not, Western man seems propelled towards a repeated hypostatization of abstract, conceptual phenomena. Even though steps may be taken to guard against this behavioral trait, it is nevertheless at times seemingly difficult to maintain a posture of openness.

The existentialia are easily mistaken as something that Da-sein has, rather than the way Da-sein is. To fall into this trap is to reintroduce those elements of thought which the hermeneutic phenomenology of Being and Time has attempted to make transparent. To do so is, for Heidegger, a perpetuation of the oblivion of the question of Beingness.

⁶⁵What Is Called Thinking? pp. 74 and 82. Heidegger uses the example of the "invention" of happiness to illustrate blinking. ". . . despite this invention of happiness, man is driven from one world war into the next. With a wink the nations are informed that peace is the elimination of war, but that meanwhile this peace which eliminates war can be secured only by war. Against this war-peace, in turn, we launch a peace offensive whose attacks can hardly be called peaceful. War--the securing of peace; and peace--the elimination of war. How is peace secured by what it eliminates? Something is fundamentally out of joint here, or perhaps it has never yet been in joint." P. 83.

In terms of architectonic, Being and Time specifically concerns itself in the existential analytic with the primordial and all encompassing existential Being-in-the-world (in-der-Welt-sein). It then turns attention to the equiprimordial characteristics of Being-in-the-world. These characteristics are then repeated on an altogether higher and "more ontological" descriptive basis due to a unification of all existentials, including the modes of Da-sein, i.e., authenticity and inauthenticity, in Care (Sorge).

The fundamental concern in this section will be the elucidation of the existentialia as those characteristics which constitute, equiprimordially, Being-in-the-world. It is apparently easy to convince oneself, when considering "the" existentialia, that Heidegger has presented an exhaustive description of Da-sein. From this conviction, one can jump into a full-fledged critique of Heidegger's project for so-called missing aspects of man's being.⁶⁶ Nevertheless, this represents Heidegger's intention as stated in the beginning of Being and Time to present an existential analytic of Da-sein oriented primarily

⁶⁶ Criticisms that center on Heidegger's deletion of a social and/or political theory are too numerous to mention in total. However, the introduction provided by the translators of "The Question of Being," Jean T. Wilde and William Kluback, is a good example as well as the dissertation by Renee Weber, "Individual and Social Being in Heidegger's Being and Time." Both of these are referred to in section 12.

to working out the question of Beingness as such. The analytic of Da-sein, therefore, "cannot attempt to provide a complete ontology of Dasein. . . ." ⁶⁷ He further states that the existential analytic is not only incomplete but is also "provisional." ⁶⁸ Even when the meaning of Da-sein is seen as temporality, the leading question of the meaning of Being will not have been reached, but a necessary step in preparing the ground for arriving at such an answer will have been taken. Being and Time is incomplete as the author gives notice.

Being-in-the-world is as Erschliessenheit (disclosedness), Verstehen, Befindlichkeit, Verfallenheit, and Rede. Since Erschliessenheit (disclosedness) has already been discussed as Lichtung, clearedness and lumination, ⁶⁹ the following will deal with the remaining four existentialia (referred to in Being and Time as existentials).

(a) Being-in-the-world as Verstehen

Verstehen, as an existential, has been translated by Macquarrie and Robinson as "Understanding." Richardson prefers "comprehension" in that it allows an etymological sense of grasping or seizing whereby Da-sein seizes Being. ⁷⁰

⁶⁷B & T, p. 38; H, 17.

⁶⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹See p. 167 below.

⁷⁰Richardson, p. 34, Ftn. 15.

The term Verstehen conveys the meaning of a thematic, conceptual understanding, whereas the existential described by the term is not this at all. It has been suggested by Boss that Vernehmen be used instead of Verstehen.⁷¹

Vernehmen also means to understand but it also means to perceive or become aware of and/or to "hearken to."

Vernehmen in terms of the existential Verstehen means an apprehension of significations which are more or less thematic. With this meaning, feelings, "intuitive" and so forth are also included so that the existentialia of Verstehen turns out to be not a cognitive, intellectual operation but more or less an apprehension in the sense of apperception. Boss has used the expression, "primary comprehension," to designate this existential.⁷²

Heidegger himself expresses the importance of seeing primary comprehension as belonging to and constituting the Being of the primordial "there." As such it is not a "what" that somehow resides in or is added to a subjectum, nor is it a kind of knowing that comes from within an immanent self-perception.⁷³ As openness Da-sein discloses to itself possibilities and it is this disclosure of possibilities that "is" primary comprehension. Thus as

⁷¹Private communication corroborated by the use of Vernehmenda in Grundriss.

⁷²Boss, P & D, p. 40.

⁷³B & T, p. 184.

an existential it is always pressing forward into possibilities. This "pressing forward" of primary comprehension occurs because it "is as" Entwurf.

The term Entwurf is easily translated from good, workable German as "projection" from the verb entwerfen which means to project, sketch, trace out, draw up. But Heidegger uses the word, as he does many of his words and particularly with regard to the existentialia, in a primordial sense. The translators of Sein und Zeit call attention to this primordial sense by writing that the basic meaning of this word "is that of 'throwing' something 'off' or 'away' from one." They close their footnote by adding a word of caution to the English reader that he should "bear in mind that the root meaning of 'throwing' is more strongly felt in the German than in the translation."⁷⁴ Nevertheless, translators and commentators persist in their use of this word as "project" or "projection," especially in the sense of a projection by a subject.⁷⁵

⁷⁴B & T, p. 185, ftn. 1.

⁷⁵A few examples of this tendency are Thomas Langan, The Meaning of Heidegger (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 32. "Dasein exists by projecting himself toward a future that is not yet (noch nicht)." Richard Schmitt translates Entwurf as "design." Joseph J. Kockelmans, Martin Heidegger: A First Introduction to His Philosophy (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965), p. 70. "In its primordial understanding Dasein projects itself also to a certain significance. . . ." And William A. Luijpen, Existential Phenomenology (Pittsburgh: Duquesne Studies, Philosophical Series, Vol. 12, Duquesne University Press, 1960), p. 40. "Existence is oppositional unity,

Entwurf as an existential characteristic of "primary comprehension" needs to be seen as a throwing open of the lighted realm.⁷⁶ "Lighted realm" refers not only to the openness of Da-sein but what fills this openness as well. So that the openness is "world-openness" and Entwurf is throwing open the lighted realm of the world. As Heidegger states, this throwing open (projection) has nothing to do "with a comporting oneself towards a plan that has been thought out, and in accordance with which Dasein arranges its Being."⁷⁷

Da-sein as primary comprehension is an openness that is throwing open the lighted realms of possibilities within the "world." Da-sein is this throwing open so that as long as any Da-sein is, it is as a throwing open and holding open. Perhaps Heidegger states it best. In "Letter on Humanism," he writes:

If one understands the "project" (Entwurf) alluded to in Sein und Zeit as a representative concept [an idea in the mind of an agent] then one considers it as an

unity in opposition of what de facto is and what can be. As such, man's existence is called project or plan." See also Richardson's Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, pp. 60-61.

⁷⁶This refers to the meaning of the word Lichtung as discussed on p. 129 above. "Throwing open of the lighted realm" is an expression used by Medard Boss in Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis, p. 39, where he says that Heidegger uses the term Welt (world) as synonymous with the term "there" of the "Da" of Da-sein and uses "Weltentwurf", in the sense of Welt-Erwurf (the 'throwing open of the lighted realm of the world'). . . ."

⁷⁷B & T, p. 185; H, 145.

act of subjectivity and does not think of it as one should within the realm of the existential analysis of the "Being-in-the-world" (In-der-Welt-Sein), i.e., as the ecstatic relation to the clearing of Being.⁷⁸

Heidegger notes that primary comprehension in its throwing open (Entwurf) character constitutes what is referred to as "sight" [Sicht]. Da-sein is this sight equiprimordially as its basic ways of Being. These "ways" are: circumspection (Umsicht) of concern, considerateness (Rücksicht) of solicitude and as the sight directed upon Beingness as such (Sicht auf das Sein als Solches). Sight related to existence is called transparency (Durchsichtigkeit).⁷⁹ However, "sight" must be seen in its essential sense as "clearedness" and should not be confused with perceiving.

When Verstehen is seen in the manner just presented, it becomes easier to see the confusion of some philosophers in their attempt to say, despite Heidegger's protestations to the contrary, that the existentials function in a manner analogous to the Kantian categories. For instance, in referring specifically to Verstehen, Schrag states:

It is always in some sense practical and projective, "shaping" its object in the process of knowing it. Hence, it would seem that in spite of his insistence on the rejection of any a priori construction in the knowing process, he remains within a Kantian mold of

⁷⁸"Letter on Humanism," p. 201. Barrett and Aiken.

⁷⁹B & T, p. 186; H, 146.

thought in which the categories of the understanding shape the data given in experience.⁸⁰

(b) Da-sein as Befindlichkeit

Befindlichkeit as the state in which one is to be found has variously been translated as state of mind, disposition, and felt-position.⁸¹ Macquarrie and Robinson again, in a footnote, state the closeness of their translation to what is meant by the German, but reveal its weakness in stressing the important connotation of finding oneself. They also made the important observation that "of mind" is an English idiom and has no literal relationship to the German term itself.⁸² The use of the word Disposition carries with it unfortunately the connotation of "good" or "bad" dispositions, a point which is assuredly antithetical to Heidegger's meaning of the term. "Felt-position" has an overly spatial connotation which reinforces the conception of an encapsulated, immanent subject relating

⁸⁰Calvin O. Schrag, "Phenomenology, Ontology, and History in the Philosophy of Heidegger." As found in Joseph J. Kockelmaus (ed.), Phenomenology (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Anchor Books, 1967), p. 292.

⁸¹In order of appearance, Macquarrie and Robinson, translators of Sein und Zeit; Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought; and Michael Gelvin, "Martin Heidegger's Theory of Fundamental Ontology, (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington University, St. Louis, Mo., 1966).

⁸²B & T, p. 172; ftn. 2. The importance and use of this idiom "in" or "of mind" is discussed later. See section 11 below.

to an objective, external world--a conception antithetical to the description Being-in-the-world. Boss suggests that Befindlichkeit is best understood in the sense of Gestimmtheit in the primordial signification of Being-attuned, or attunement.⁸³

Da-sein as the "luminous" (Lichtung) realm of openness, is always attuned in some way or another so that things which appear through this openness do so in terms of Da-sein's particular attunement or pitch. Just as a physical light reveals objects in greater or lesser degrees of clarity depending on the brightness, so Da-sein relates to the world according to its various manifestations of attunement, i.e., through its various moods. Moods not only manifest how Da-sein relates to things but also how one is, and how one is faring. "In this 'how one is,' having a mood brings Being to the 'there'."⁸⁴

To reveal the "there" to Da-sein is to disclose "that-it-is" and has to be, and this "that-it-is" constitutes its "throwness" (Geworfenheit). Through throwness Da-sein reveals itself to itself; or expressed differently, Da-sein reveals its "there." Yet moods, the ontical manifestation of Dasein's attunement, for the most part reveal

⁸³P & D, p. 40. Although the translator of that work translates Gestimmtheit as "pitch," Boss himself is more likely to use the word attunement.

⁸⁴B & T, p. 173, ftn. 134.

the "there" by turning away from it. In doing so they reveal Being-in-the-world as a whole. Da-sein thus relates to the "world" through--or better, "as"--attunement. Thus only something that is attuned to fearing can discover the "fearful" in the "world" as ready-to-hand.⁸⁵

The ontological characteristic of attunement is that which pervades all passions, feelings, and emotional states.⁸⁶ At any given moment man (Da-sein) is attuned in some way or another. To a certain extent this particular attunement will determine in advance what the individual is open to and conversely that to which he is closed. For example, a person attuned to anxiety will be open to, pre-disposed toward, seeing the world anxiously or fearfully and at the same time will be closed to, with varying degrees, seeing the world as joyful, friendly, or peaceful.

Essential attunement is not to be seen as a property or a particular being but as a basic characteristic, an ontological feature, which pervades all particular moods as their essence. Attunement, in other words, cannot be seen as something over against or other than ontic, existentiell, moods, but is "found" in each particular mood as being the essential characteristic of that mood. Man, ontologically, is attuned, which means he sees, experiences the

⁸⁵B & T, p. 176; H, 132.

⁸⁶This is a paraphrase of Boss' statement as found in Grundriss, p. 291. My translation.

world ontically "in" various moods, emotions, and/or feelings.⁸⁷

(c) Da-sein as Verfallen

The "world" itself belongs to the Being of Da-sein as a particular Being-in-the-world, but for the most part Da-sein is as being alongside the "world" of its concern. In so being, Da-sein tends to lose the ownmost quality of its "there" to an average publicness. This describes the existential, "fallenness of Da-sein." It is a falling away from the ownmostness of one's Da-sein "into" the leveled off, covered-upness of publicness.

In Being and Time, Heidegger goes to considerable lengths in describing what "fallenness" is not. He says, for example, that the term does not express a negative evaluation; it should not be seen as a fall from a pure or higher status. Falling does not refer to a spatial dimension of, say, going from a self (subject) to an object. Also, falling does not have the connotation of a bad or deplorable ontical property which somehow will be overcome by future more enlightened generations.⁸⁸

Fallenness is an ontological characteristic of Da-sein and contributes to its essence as Being-in-the-world. Da-sein falls not into any particular entity in the

⁸⁷Boss, Grundriss, p. 290.

⁸⁸B & T, p. 220; H, 175-176.

world but into (at or against) the "world" itself.⁸⁹ Yet "world" belongs to the Being of Da-sein as Being-in-the world. This is not to say that Da-sein falls out of itself into itself, nor that Da-sein falls away from itself as subject into itself as object.

Da-sein as Da-sein is always "in need" or "dependent" (angewiesen); i.e., Da-sein is only as its relating to that which is encountered so that the encountered is necessary for Da-sein to be as Da-sein; thus, Da-sein is "in need." Yet the encountered and "that which encounters" must not be seen as separable. They are in fact inseparable. "Da-sein and that encountered are inseparable, a unity."⁹⁰ Ontologically, then, Verfallen, fallenness refers to this angewiesen or dependence on that which shines forth "in the openness of the there." Ontically, Verfallen refers to falling prey to things.

"World" refers to "world" which is lighted by Da-sein and upon which Da-sein is "thrown." In falling, Da-sein is falling away from that which is as its "there" to that which is "lighted" by the "there"--the "world" of Being-in-the-world. "In falling, Dasein itself as factual Being-in-the-world, is something from which it has already

⁸⁹ See the translators' footnote regarding "an die Welt" idiomatically expressed in English as "into" the world. From the German, however, it is more appropriate to say at the world or collapsing against it. B & T, p. 220, ftn. 1.

⁹⁰ Medard Boss, personal interview.

fallen away. . . . it has fallen into the world, which itself belongs to its Being."⁹¹

As a luminated (lichtung) realm, Da-sein is dependent upon what is luminated "by" that realm; it is this to which it has fallen. It has fallen prey to the phenomena. Boss gives the example of the cobbler who thinks of himself primarily as a maker of shoes. Yet the cobbler as Da-sein is also, and originally, a luminated realm, ". . . in which world is disclosed, in this case, a 'world' consisting of the whole frame of references belonging to his shoes."⁹²

In falling prey to things, Da-sein's freedom (freiheit) and independence (eigenständigkeit) are reduced. It is not a question of the abolishment of freedom but one of constraint or restriction. Psychologically, freedom and constraint belong together. As Boss says, "A stone cannot develop a compulsory neurosis."⁹³ For a compulsive neurotic, the world occurs compulsively and at a distance. He tries to keep the world at a distance by performing certain ritualistic acts, but he is, in fact, constantly controlled by what he is holding back; i.e., he is in captivity by those things which he is trying to resist. The compulsory

⁹¹B & T, p. 220; H, 176.

⁹²R & D, p. 42.

⁹³Medard Boss, personal interview.

neurotic whose "openness" is openness as compulsory is an extreme ontical example of the ontological characteristic of fallenness.

(d) Da-sein as Rede

The ontological existential Rede refers to a fundamental discourse which cannot be equated with language or speaking but, in fact, grounds, and thereby, makes these phenomena possible. Rede, therefore, refers to fundamental human language or discourse in an essential, i.e., ontological manner.⁹⁴ If Da-sein were not "as" Discourse then Da-sein would not be able to differentiate various phenomena into distinct entities. The Discourse described here is not necessarily a verbal utterance of words but more like a being claimed by phenomena other than a particular Da-sein. It is not surprising therefore, that Heidegger states that Discourse underlies both interpretation and assertion and, as well, is that which gives rise to "meaning."⁹⁵ Yet meaning in this sense does not necessarily entail verbalness or thematic significations. Primordial Discourse is the disclosure of phenomena in their distinct

⁹⁴"Discourse" is usually used to translate the term Rede as used by Heidegger (Macquarrie and Robinson, Thomas Langan, etc.). Some prefer other terms; for example, Richardson uses Logos, Magda King, "speech," and Gelven, "talk."

⁹⁵B & T, p. 204; H, 161.

phenomenality and the laying the ground for this disclosure to become thematically articulated in verbal speech.

Boss offers the example of the small child who may for instance know no other names than "papa" and "mama" but nevertheless is still capable of perceiving and understanding that a table in the room is different from his parents. The child may even be able to point at it, indicate it, without uttering a sound. Yet if the child did not already exist in the realm of Discourse (or "language") he would not be able to indicate a thing as something particular. "For understanding something as something, marking it, spotting it, denoting it, indicating it necessarily presupposes language, even though the perceived characteristic of the thing cannot be named as yet by audibly perceptible names."⁹⁶

9. Boss and "Existentialia"

Being and Time is incomplete not only in that its projected second part was never published but also in itself it is provisional and preparatory. "Our analysis of Dasein, however, is not only incomplete; it is also, in the first instance, provisional."⁹⁷ The analysis of Da-sein does not provide a complete ontology but merely "pieces" of one, albeit essential pieces. Since the "purpose" of Being and

⁹⁶ P & D, p. 215.

⁹⁷ B & T, p. 38; H, 17.

Time is to investigate the "existence" of Da-sein, the characteristics which are disclosed in terms of this existentiality are called "existentialia."⁹⁸ Yet, even the delineation of the various equiprimordial existentialia as given by Heidegger in Being and Time is incomplete in that a full "listing" was not the intent.

Existentialia characterize Da-sein's ways of Being. As such, they characterize the essence of observable, concrete human behavior and hence, as has been demonstrated, cannot be seen apart from their concrete manifestations. With this description and definition of existentialia it would be a mistake to assume that "the existentialia" are all and totally included under the heading "Being-in" and are described as primary comprehension (Verstehen), attunement (Befindlichkeit or Gestimmtheit), falling prey to objects (Verfallenheit) and human language (Rede). Being-in-the-world as well as lumination or disclosedness are also existentialia. But if the fundamental characteristics of man are "found" within observable concrete human behavior, there must be essential characteristics other than those primarily denoted as existentialia. Boss expands this denotation by listing the following as fundamental characteristics of being human (Mensch-seins):

⁹⁸Ibid.

spatiality, temporality, corporeality, being-together, attunement, memory and historicity, and death or being-mortal.⁹⁹

From our perspective, man's Da-sein shows itself as basically a standing openness. This means: it shows itself as an Eksistenz, a standing out in the illumined-free world-openness of a being-able-to-perceive and as well a confirmation of it. Such being-standing open is the unified ground possibility and as well the particular essence of man's being-spatial and being-temporal and also his being-historical, his being-bodily, his being-with with others, his being-attuned and his being-mortal.¹⁰⁰

(a) The spatiality of Da-sein

The equiprimordial characteristics of Da-sein refer to "ways of being," not things that Da-sein "has." Da-sein, as spatial does not, therefore, refer to Da-sein as existing within a spatially determined sphere. This would make Da-sein an extant (vorhanden). Nor does it mean that Da-sein is at a particular location in space along with other "things." This would mean that Da-sein was at hand (zuhanden). Both extantness and at handness refer to modes of being of objects and Da-sein is not an object. Further, the distinction between the spatiality of an extended thing

⁹⁹Attunement has been reviewed in section 8 and being-together will be examined in section 12; both, therefore, will be excluded from the present analysis.

¹⁰⁰Medard Boss, Grundriss, p. 314. In presenting this expansion of the "fundamental characteristics of man," Boss distinguishes between those for Da-sein and those for Mensch-sein; e.g., spatiality, temporality and attunement refer to Da-sein and body; being-together, memory and history and death refer to Mensch-sein. (My translation.)

and that of Da-sein does not rest in Da-sein's knowledge of space. The ability to think or imagine space presupposes a taking up, or being in, space.

Da-sein is spatial because it is "spiritual."
 ". . . because Dasein is 'spiritual,' and only because of this, it can be spatial in a way which remains essentially impossible for any extended corporeal thing."¹⁰¹ The "spirituality" refers to Da-sein's ek-static dimension; i.e., Da-sein is open to and within "world" disclosiveness. The term "Ekstatic" in its original Greek means "standing out into." As ek-static, Da-sein is open to and with relational possibilities, and this is not a mediated existing but an immediate, essential existing. Spatiality, therefore, is a relation and responsiveness; first Da-sein is with something and "understands" this something in the sense "that it is" and then responds as "seeing" it as a house for instance. In other words, "house-ness" could not be known or intended unless Da-sein were already open to and encompassing "house" in its thatness. Intentionality, therefore, presupposes openness.¹⁰²

Da-sein as spatial is "out there" within the "world" of its "concern." As such, the closeness or remoteness of

¹⁰¹B & T, p. 419; H, 368. See also p. 138; H, 104-105.

¹⁰²See p. 68 above. This particular example was provided by Boss. (Personal interview.)

"things" encountered existentially corresponds to the significance these "things" have. For instance, a person existentially may be closer to someone he loves in another continent than to the table which is right in front of him. The existential spatiality of Da-sein is a more "original" spatiality than measurable space for the latter presupposes the former and the former itself can never be derived from the latter.

For Heidegger, the existential spatiality of Da-sein in the sense of the closeness or remoteness of things encountered is governed by de-severance and directionality (Ent-fernung und Ausrichtung).¹⁰³ As Da-sein relates to possibilities encountered in its openness, these possibilities hold relational significance for the particular Da-sein. At this point, Da-sein, as ontological, gives way to man as ontic. A man is more concerned with a particular possibility than with another, it is more worthier or has more value (non-moral). Yet, concern operating on a particular possibility is pervaded by the ontological de-severance as its essence allowing the possibility to come closer. One of Heidegger's examples is of a man walking down the street and seeing a friend walking towards him.

¹⁰³ Ibid., pp. 138-139; H, 105. Note the prefix "ent." Ent-schlossenheit as "resoluteness" and Entwurf as projection need to be seen in the etymological sense of "opening up." See p. 223 below.

At that moment the friend is "closer" to the man--even though in "measured" space he is twenty paces away--than to the pavement beneath the man's feet.¹⁰⁴

Original or existential space is based on man's relationship to things encountered, and the relative significations these relationships have are determinative of their original distance from man. Boss quotes a line from Rilke where the lover says to his beloved "Nur wo du bist, entsteht ein ort." (Only where you are does a place arise.)¹⁰⁵ Original space happens as a result of man's relation to people and things.

In his essay "Bauen Wohnen Denken" (Building Dwelling Thinking) Heidegger reveals how the modern conception of homogeneous space arose out of man's original or existential space.¹⁰⁶ An object reveals to a particular man many things and places having various existential meanings and closeness. Yet, these places can also be considered as mere points between which there is a measurable distance. That which is determined by points is a particular space. This is designated by the Latin word spatium which signifies an

¹⁰⁴Ibid., pp. 141-142; H, 107. See p. 198 below.

¹⁰⁵Boss, Analysis of Dreams, p. 195.

¹⁰⁶Martin Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking" in Poetry, Language, Thought. trans. Albert Hofstadler (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 155-156. This particular section was quoted by Boss in Analysis of Dreams, pp. 195-196.

inter-space. The distance, therefore, between people and objects becomes one of interspatial distances. The object appears as something at a point. But a point can at any time be occupied by something else including a mere mark. But space as spatium can further be isolated into mere extensions of height, breadth, and depth. Thus, what is derived is seen as the multiplicity of the three dimensions. This is no longer distance as spatium but extensio--extension. Even extension can further be abstracted into analytical algebra which can formulate as many dimensions as are desired since these dimensions are mathematical constructions. "We can call this mathematical system 'space,' but 'space' in this sense contains neither room nor places. . . ." ¹⁰⁷ Spatium and extensio create the possibility of calculating the position of objects and points by means of distances and directions.

But the fact that they are universally applicable to everything that has extension can in no case make numerical magnitudes the ground of the nature of spaces and locations that are measurable with the aid of mathematics. ¹⁰⁸

Da-sein is spatial. But space in this sense is not "in" a subject nor is it observed "in" a world as if the world were in space. On the contrary, as Da-sein

¹⁰⁷ Analysis of Dreams, p. 195. This is a translation of Heidegger's statement and differs slightly from that provided by Hofstadler.

¹⁰⁸ Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 156.

is Being-in-the-world so space is in the world. The a priori character of space, as the a priori character of Being-in-the-world, is not to be seen as somehow residing in a worldless subject that imposes space out of itself onto the world. On the contrary, a priori means "the previousness with which space has been encountered (as a region) whenever the ready-to-hand is encountered environmentally."¹⁰⁹

(b) The Temporality of Da-sein

The translation of the Greek term *Εἶναι* as "being" is linguistically correct; however, the word means "to be present" (anwesen). In "being present" there is concealed "a present time and duration--in one word Time. Being as such is thus unconcealed owing to time."¹¹⁰ The word "presence" is derived from praesense which implies an emergence and a sojourn, and both imply a duration or lasting.¹¹¹ The truth of Beingness as such, unconcealedness, is revealed by Time.

Man is a temporal being in that he is present (ein Anwesender) and he lasts or has duration. Yet, this temporality does not consist of a sequence of "nows" which

¹⁰⁹B & T, p. 146; H, 112. Regarding the nature of the a priori, see the next section.

¹¹⁰Heidegger, "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics," Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, III, eds. William Barrett and Henry D. Aiken (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 136.

¹¹¹P & D, p. 45.

refer to a derived sense of Time and hence what Heidegger would call extant-ness (vorhanden).¹¹² As a derived time, the original temporality is "leveled off." Datability is that which is covered up. Datability occurs in what Heidegger distinguishes as the "now that . . .," and "significance." Together these refer to the primordial assigning of and by Da-sein to a "for-the-sake-of-which." This latter reveals an "in-order-to" a "towards-this," an "in-which," and a "with-which." All of these refer to relational possibilities of that which is "present."

The original temporality, based on the ontological character of Da-sein, is always a disclosing of, and a taking care of something. Since Da-sein is defined essentially as Being-in-the-world it is always and already "taking care of something" (in relation with something, the definition of Care [Sorge]) and hence is fundamentally temporal. "Such original temporality is dated at all times by his meaningful interactions with, his relating to, that which he encounters."¹¹³ The primordial or original "now that" is always a "now as the wind blows," a "now when the book is being read," a "now when something needs to be done," in other words, every "now" is relational. "Every 'now' and every 'then' refers to a man's caring for something,

¹¹²See Heidegger, B & T, pp. 473-475; H, 421-423.

¹¹³P & D, p. 45.

and it lasts as long as this caring-for lasts."¹¹⁴ This amounts to saying that man "consumes" time by carrying out his existential possibilities.

Boss states that the view of Time in its "original timeness" as given by Heidegger is of paramount importance for understanding so-called unintelligible or irrational time (and space) phenomena. He is particularly referring to the phenomena associated with dreams, experiences of schizophrenics, drug addicts, and so forth.¹¹⁵ In his dream book, for instance, Boss reports a similarity of dream phenomena related to drug addicts. They consistently dreamed of being bogged down in mud or of being buried for centuries, of not being able to move even though they wanted to. They reported dreaming of a lack of mobility and an inability to respond to stimuli. Temporally speaking, these individuals had brought their own life-histories to a standstill; they had thwarted their own temporal possibilities, living a life of "unhistoric vegetation," a life devoid of past and future.¹¹⁶

It would be difficult indeed to understand these and other dreams involving temporality from a traditionally based conception of Time as a continuous succession of

¹¹⁴Ibid.

¹¹⁵Ibid., p. 46.

¹¹⁶Boss, Analysis of Dreams, pp. 201-202.

momentary points. Time, as manifested in dreams, is based on the quality of the relationships the dreamer has towards the things within his dream world. "The time of the dream event was always referred to the possibility of occurrence or non-occurrence of dream things and to their significance."¹¹⁷ In other words, this statement paraphrases the disclosure that man is fundamentally in relationship with things which constitute his existential possibilities.

What is the essential characteristic inherent in the statement "I have time?" What does "having time" mean? To say that we (man) have time does not entail having time as a possession, nor is it the same as saying, "I have anxiety," or "I have fear." These latter refer to "states which one finds oneself in, or moods; but Time is not a mood. To say "I have time," is to say primordially I am occupied with what calls out and addresses me, with what approaches and is present (gegenwartig) for me. In this being addressed by what is present, I await the future by perceiving the present (Anwesende) and retain what has been given in the past. All of these occur together. "Diese dreifaltige Weise, in der ich bin, ist das 'Haben' der Zeit fur das und das." (These three ways in which I am are the 'having' of time for something.)¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 202.

¹¹⁸ Boss, Grundriss, p. 267. This paragraph represents a paraphrase of Boss' statements as found on this page in Grundriss. (My translation.)

The important point is that, ontologically speaking, man (Da-sein) is in relation to something and this being in relation to something occurs temporally. "The temporality of man is not, it comes about as a result of the carrying-out-performing-of his existence."¹¹⁹ This "carrying out" in terms of temporality is a manifestation of the three dimensions (ecstases) of time, none of which can be denied but any "one" of which can be "covered" (verdeckt).

Da-sein is open and with things not only spatially but also temporally. Thus "space-time" is a pre-spatial, pre-historic openness, light (Gelichtete) which makes the where and the when to appear. Da-sein is a standing open and having the ability to be addressed (Ansprechbarkeit).

Being human is a standing (and holding) open. It is the open-standingness of a Being-able-to-perceive and a Being-addressed by that which is present in its presence and a Being-able-to-respond to that which is present respectively.¹²⁰

(c) The Corporeality of the Human Being

In Section 2 corporeality was revealed as a basic characteristic of Being-in-the-world, i.e., man participates "bodily" in all of his relational possibilities.¹²¹ Just as Da-sein is open to and with relational possibilities so the bodily realm is oriented (open) to that which

¹¹⁹Ibid., p. 269. (My translation.)

¹²⁰Ibid., p. 270. (My translation.)

¹²¹See p. 41 above.

confronts it. Being open this way the bodily aspect of Being-in-the-world is open on all levels, hormonal, cortical, muscular and skeletal.

Should one object that man is incapable of seeing, hearing and so forth unless the organs function properly in a physiological sense, he would be correct. Yet, existentially, not physiologically, these sense organs function only because man's essence is that of a lucid world-openness with which relational possibilities, meanings, make their appearance. "In other words, man cannot see, hear and smell because he has eyes, ears, and a nose; he is able to have eyes, ears, and a nose because his very essence is luminating and world-disclosing."¹²²

Man exists bodily. But does this mean man "has" a body, or "is" a body? This latter question is the same as saying "I am my body." From the Daseinsanalytic perspective both statements are unacceptable. The two expressions "to have" and "to be" refer to "two possible and different mental approaches,"¹²³ to the idea of body. The corporeal is an inseparable characteristic of Being-in-the-world; i.e., man participates bodily with all relational possibilities. Should man be seen exclusively as body--either in the sense of "having" or "being"--then the result is a metaphysical assumption not an ontological disclosure.

¹²²P & D, p. 140.

¹²³Ibid., p. 142.

This inappropriateness can be exemplified by looking at Sartre's statement, "I am my body."¹²⁴ Natanson has restated the Sartrian position by saying, "I am neither 'in' my body nor 'attached to' it; it does not belong to me or go along with me. I am my body."¹²⁵ To make this statement is implicitly to define man, or self, as a "thing" (extant) which is here, and this implies a "there" where he is not. This falls back upon a transcendental subjectivity which is Cartesian in essence since it implies a subject that somehow relates to an object. This is what Being-in-the-world reveals as inappropriate. Boss has said, "Sartre thought primary human being is there where you are with your body. And where you are with your body you are going out with references to things--this distorts Heidegger."¹²⁶

The "here" of corporeality, ontologically understood, is the "here" of the relational possibilities which man as Da-sein meets or which meet him. The "here" at any time is where man is "just staying" (gerade aufhalt) as he "resides" in his relation towards that which meets him.

¹²⁴Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), p. 326.

¹²⁵Maurice Natanson, The Journeying Self: A Study in Philosophy and Social Role (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1970), p. 12.

¹²⁶Boss, Personal interview.

A lifeless body cannot be open to perceive a "there" much less a "here." Man as Da-sein stands open with and alongside relational possibilities and body as a manifestation of Being-in-the-world "stands" in the same manner. Body presupposes Existence ecstatically understood.¹²⁷

Boss offers this example of the bodily sphere as a manifestation of Being-in-the-world. The panic of a sensitive woman who has just seen a mouse reveals itself not only in the attunement of fright or panic but corporeally as well. ". . . the woman's total being contracts into the one world-relation of fleeing from the animal, this relationship also occurs somatically within seconds."¹²⁸

(d) The Memory and Historicity of the Human Being¹²⁹

Memory is associated with thinking. But thinking is not seen Daseinsanalytically as a process which occurs in the brain whereby intrapsychic images are projected and understood. Thinking, on the contrary, is a letting arise or becoming open to all which approaches us--a becoming present--"within" our world-opened possibilities. Memory is that which keeps and lets remain that which has been experienced either through thinking, perceiving, feeling or acting.

¹²⁷ Boss, Grundriss, p. 284.

¹²⁸ Boss, P & D, p. 142.

¹²⁹ The following represents a paraphrase of pages 299-309 in Grundriss.

For the most part, memory operates on two levels. There is basically an unthematic background from which a thematic "bringing to consciousness" of that which has been previously experienced emerges. To a certain extent this requires "remembering." To remember or recall something is to "bring to the present" an actuality that took place in the past. It is not the case that what is remembered has been lost to memory in the sense of not being there, but is merely not "near."

Psychoanalysis assumes the existence of an unconscious intention or purpose (Absicht) as the cause of forgetting. Forgetting, however, is the disappearance or vanishing (Entschwinden) of something from the immediately perceived "present" within the world-openness of man. Every forgetting, therefore, is always a kind of self-forgetting since it entails a losing of relationship; i.e., as something slips out of (entfällt) thematic awareness then I lose my relation to it. And since relation with what appears (presents) within my world-openness constitutes part of my essential nature, then I lose part of that nature.

The unique character of openness which constitutes the fundamental nature of Da-sein is that which makes possible memory and the remembering of what has been in the past. It is an open, being-addressed or claimed by that which shows itself. But that which has shown itself is

never lost; it continues to live in memory although unthematically, and further, the past in terms of memory and the future in terms of projected possibilities "determines" man's behavior at any given time.

Man stands not only in his own past but within tradition and history as well. This standing within the perspective of a particular epoch, history, is that which constitutes man's being-historical. It is this possibility of being-historical which distinguishes being-human from all other presences.¹³⁰

(e) Death and the Being-mortal of Human Being

In Being and Time, Heidegger reveals that Da-sein "flies in the face of death"; i.e., Da-sein falls away from death, and in doing so covers it up. This Being-towards-the-end belongs primordially to Da-sein's Being and hence is exhibited in everydayness.¹³¹ Death is acknowledged in everydayness but in its being covered up it is seen as something actual; death itself as a possibility is concealed. "Dying is levelled off to an occurrence which reaches Dasein, to be sure, but belongs to

¹³⁰ Boss has said, "For 'history' in the analysis of Dasein always means a sequence of meaningful world disclosures as they are sent into being by destiny, engaging, in an equally primordial way, human existence as the lucid world-openness as well as the emerging of particular phenomena shining forth therein." P & D, p. 65.

¹³¹ B & T, pp. 295-296; H, 251-252.

nobody in particular."¹³² Yet, in a state of anxiety, Da-sein faces its death, the extinction of its possibilities, and faces as well death as non-relational and not to be outstripped.

For Boss, death is that inescapable boundary surrounding man's Da-sein. In death Da-sein uncovers the true significance of Being-in-the-world as the final end of its possibilities. Neither plants nor animals have the capacity to die as do men; they simply perish. Man, however, has the capacity to choose the way he will approach his death. Man, in facing and knowing his death has little basic choice. He is forced to face death in some way whether it is fleeing from it or accepting it as the unalterable event which must be fulfilled. For the most part, man attempts to cover-up the certainty of his death with various forms of deceptions such as the well-known American phenomenon, the "funeral home."

When death is faced openly, one is free to relate to the various possibilities he has in anticipating death. Facing death openly also reveals the magnitude and value of each experience of man's existence however small or insignificant they may seem. Facing death in this manner,

¹³²Ibid., p. 297; H, 253.

preparing for a "good" death, brings out to completion
and fulfillment one's Da-sein.¹³³

¹³³ Boss, Grundriss, pp. 309-313 and "Arzt und Tod
Ein daseinsanalytischer Versuch," Psychosomatische Medizin,
IV, No. 1, 1972, pp. 1-11.

CHAPTER IV

BEING-IN-THE-WORLD

Being-in-the-world represents Da-sein in its unity; i.e., the unification and totality of the fundamental and equiprimordial characteristics that constitute Da-sein. This totality is called Care (Sorge). In section 10, Being-in-the-world as Care will be investigated paying special attention to the notion of a priori as used by Heidegger. Section 11 is devoted to revealing what Da-sein as Being-in-the-world is not. Da-sein is described as "non-immanence." Examples are offered by Heidegger and Boss demonstrating the implications in seeing Da-sein as non-immanent. The "Other" is investigated in section 12. As Being-in-the-world, Da-sein meets not only things but other Da-seins, this is called Being-with. Some of the basic criticisms of Heidegger's philosophy center around the notion of Being-with and in this section four individuals critical of Being-with will be investigated.

10. "Care" as Existential a priori

Da-sein as Lichtung is a standing open to and with the shining forth of phenomena. These two inseparable

meanings of the term Lichtung are conveyed by the term "lumination" and expressed in this dissertation with the word "Disclosure."¹ As Being-in-the-world, Da-sein discloses primordially as primary comprehension, attunement, fallenness and human "language," all of which function equiprimordially. This means that Da-sein is primordially a primary comprehending "entity" that is attuned in some way by falling, in the sense of throwing open the lighted realm inhabited by "objects" and articulates the "meaning" of these objects--in their "that they are"--by means of Discourse. Yet, for the most part, this occurs unthematically.

The all encompassing Being-in-the-world characterizing Da-sein's essence is unified as "Care" (Sorge). Heidegger uses the term "care" not in the sense of to worry or be concerned or even to love; but as "essentially being in relationship,"--to be with.² "Care consists of the existentialia in primordial unity and Heidegger warns³ that these existentialia are not to be considered as blocks which when put together form a totality which is then

¹See pp. 223-224 below.

²Medard Boss, Personal interview, 1973.

³B & T, pp. 235-6; H, 191. "These existential characteristics are not pieces belonging to something composite, one of which might sometimes be missing, but there is woven together in them a primordial context which makes up that totality of the structural whole which we are seeking."

called Care. On the contrary, the equiprimordiality of the existentialia is to be seen more as a weaving together of all characteristics so that each is entailed by the other. They "are" and "work" together as a unity but always in relation to something. If Da-sein as "Care" is looked at exclusively in and of itself, i.e., without considering that to which it is in relation, then the phenomenality of Da-sein, the primordiality of Care, has been vitiated.

Da-sein as "Care" is Being-in-the-world. Da-sein is Da-sein because of its "already" Being-in (in the sense of Being-alongside) the world. But Heidegger claims that Care is an "existential a priori."⁴ How are we to understand this term "a priori"? After all, it is a major philosophical term used in logical, metaphysical and epistemological senses. It is a term that is primarily associated with Kant; yet, as we have seen in Section 4, Heidegger sees Kant as perpetuating a substantival subject-oriented metaphysics. Could it be that Heidegger is introducing a new notion or understanding of a priori?

Care is "filled in" by the signification of Da-sein as "ahead of itself, Being already in the world as Being alongside entities encountered within the world."⁵ By

⁴B & T, p. 238; H, 195.

⁵B & T, p. 237; H, 193.

being "ahead of itself," Da-sein is as being "beyond itself" in terms of its relational possibilities. To be "ahead of itself" is to be already in the world; thus Da-sein cannot be seen as a "worldless subject" that somehow goes out to the world; it is already in the world. Da-sein is thus primordially a whole; i.e., it is what it is as being with the world, as being alongside the world. As this primordial structural wholeness, Da-sein as Care can be said to be "before" every factical "Attitude" and situation only in the sense that it is in them.⁶ For Heidegger, this means that "Care" cannot be seen as an "earlier" or a "later."⁷

Da-sein never exists before its basis but only from and as this basis.⁸ It might appear that Da-sein is the basis of its Being; yet, if this were so then Da-sein

⁶Ibid., p. 238; H, 193.

⁷Ibid., p. 375; H, 327. "With this 'before' we do not have in mind 'in advance of something' [das vorher]⁷ in the sense of 'not yet now--but later'; the 'already' is just as far from signifying 'no longer now--but earlier.'" In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (p. 249), Heidegger states, "Can the a priori which in the tradition of ontology is held to be a characteristic of the determination of Being as explained by asserting that the 'earlier' which it implies 'naturally' has nothing to do with 'time'? Certainly, it has nothing to do with the 'time' recognized by the ordinary comprehension of time. But is this 'earlier' positively determined thereby, and is this annoying temporal character pushed aside? Or does it not reappear as a new and more difficult problem?"

⁸Ibid., p. 330; H, 284. "It is never existent before its basis, but only from it and as this basis."

would be before its basis and this would mean that Da-sein is before--i.e., before it is as Being-in-the-world. But Da-sein only is as Being-in-the-world; thus, Da-sein can only be the Being of its basis, i.e., Da-sein lives the that-it-is.

Why would it seem that Da-sein is the basis of its Being? If we see Da-sein as a "what," as a thing, we see it as a thing that relates to the world; hence, stands apart from the world in its relating. This would push Da-sein into the traditional conception of subjectivity in the sense of substance, i.e., as a worldless subject that somehow relates to the world with which it is concerned. But Da-sein is not this. Da-sein, as has been seen, is only as Being-in-the-world. There is no priority here of a worldless subject relating to something other than what it is. Da-sein as "Being-the-there" lives the unfolding of the "there" hence it is the Being of its basis.

But what does this have to do with the a priori and Care as an existential a priori? Care does not stand before, in the sense of "prior to" the world. It does not stand ready to meet the world and somehow alter, mold or pattern the world so that the world can be known or lived within. Care is already "in" the world in the sense of being the essence of the world. Recall the term waltet in Section 8.⁹ Care is "in" the world in this sense. It

⁹See pp. 151-152.

does not pre-condition the world as did Kant's a priori forms and categories. Care, as existential a priori, must be seen as being in relation with. How Da-sein relates, in what manner Da-sein relates, is an ontical, concrete mode of behavior; but within each ontic way of relating is the relating itself which is ontological.¹⁰

In his discussion on spatiality in Being and Time, Heidegger brings into relief, without ever explicitly stating it, the distinction between a priori as seen and used by Kant and a priori as revealed by Da-sein as Care.¹¹ Da-sein is spatial; i.e., Da-sein is as de-severing (bringing-close) and directional (reference to a region). Thus, Da-sein as spatial "gives" space. Space is not in a subject nor is the world in space. "Space is rather 'in' the world insofar as space has been disclosed by that Being-in-the-world which is constitutive for Dasein."¹² The term a priori can be used here if it is seen that it means a previousness of disclosure as "region" since Da-sein is as Being-in-the-world in the sense of "already" and "always" with the world. But, the term a priori, "does not mean anything like previously belonging to a subject which is

¹⁰"Care exists within, not prior or apart. . . . It's like an oak does not exist apart from baum (tree). This essence of human being (Sorge) waltet in every particular behavior." Medard Boss, Personal interview, 1973.

¹¹B & T, p. 146; H, 111.

¹²B & T, p. 146; H, 111.

proximally still worldless and which emits a space out of itself."¹³

In his essay "Heidegger and the Existential A Priori," John Wild states that Heidegger's conception of an existential a priori is of "revolutionary significance."¹⁴ Evidently, for Wild, this significance takes the form of Da-sein as being primordially "familiar" with this world and that it, Da-sein, understands itself within this world although not thematically. In other words, all of man's cognitive, concrete endeavors are based upon this prior existential awareness. Nevertheless, whereas Wild is aware that by existential a priori Heidegger is not talking about subjective factors that are somehow included within a mind-container, he does seem to stick to an implicit conception that somehow the existentials as a priori mold or condition experience. As well, he refers

¹³Ibid., p. 146; H, 111. Heidegger states, referring to Kant specifically, that he (Kant) uses the term "a priori" to signify a "subjective principle, which basically refers to a determinate character restricted beforehand to a worldless subject." Ibid., p. 144; H, 110.

¹⁴John Wild, "Heidegger and the Existential A Priori," found in John Sallis (Ed.), Heidegger and the Path of Thinking (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne University Press, 1970), pp. 221-235. Anyone reading this essay for the first time will be utterly baffled due to a gross oversight in editing. The first three pages have been mixed so that normal turn of pages is out of the question. If one jumps from the bottom of page 221 to the top of 223 then from the bottom of 223 to the top of 222, then from the bottom of p. 222 to the top of p. 224 he will then have succeeded in getting the correct order.

to these existential "patterns" as existing "prior to ontic facts." This is not, as has been seen, what Heidegger means by existential a priori.

In part three of his essay, Wild discusses Heidegger's concept of a priori and how it resembles in four ways the traditional notions of a priori which for Wild justifies the use of the term. First, "these patterns are a priori in the sense that they are found universally in all men and seem to be essentially human."¹⁵ There is no question that Heidegger, in Being and Time, at least, is describing the fundamental characteristics of man; i.e., he is not describing behavior in its concrete manifestation so much as the essence of that behavior, its ontological significance. On this point Wild is quite correct.

The second notion of a priori is, as Wild states it, ". . . these patterns are a priori in that each of them is presupposed by an indefinite range of particular phenomena conditioned by it. The prior condition retains its structural identity and indeterminacy throughout innumerable variations in specific content."¹⁶ This statement reveals that Wild is still in the grasp of a Kantian conception of the a priori. The existentialia as a priori, to repeat, do not condition ontic phenomena in the sense of molding or designing; they merely represent the essence,

¹⁵Ibid., p. 225.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 226.

the meaning of directly observable behavior. Wild states under this second heading, that, "These patterns are 'earlier than' and preconditions for vast ranges of particular phenomena."¹⁷ But, as has been demonstrated, the existentialia do not exist before phenomena but in phenomena as their essence.

A third characteristic of the a priori in relation to traditional theories is that "They all maintain that this prior knowledge of ultimate patterns is hidden from the common understanding of men and requires special procedures to be brought to light."¹⁸ Wild is unclear as to how this relates to the existential a priori of Heidegger. Yes, he does contend that the a priori is hidden as a result of linguistic and conceptual self-conscious development; but how the a priori is to be "brought to light" is not developed. Heidegger would not agree that to bring the existential a priori "to light" requires "special procedures" if by that is meant deducing a design by logical means from observable human behavior. The existentialia, as a priori, are brought to light by jumping out of (the leap) this representational mode of thinking and letting the phenomena themselves reveal their essence.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 227.

The fourth and final characteristic of the a priori refers to the traditional conceptual, linguistic a priori. "That is the logical contradictions, antinomies, and category mistakes which result from their denial or misuse."¹⁹ On this point Wild's position seems to be well taken. The conceptual, cognitive world of logical discourse is tied to and bound with existence. To cut oneself from this "existential" basis is to further cover-up primordial, essential phenomena and thereby perpetuate the mad dash into the categorization of things. To lose the essential characteristics of the existentialia, to "cover them up," and hence constrict them is to incur the possibility of becoming "mentally ill or socially disturbed."

In closing, Wild makes a salient point regarding the existential a priori as expressed by Heidegger and furthered by other phenomenological thinkers. Kant's famous statement that concepts without percepts are empty and percepts without concepts are blind, will have to be amended as a result of this "new" emphasis on existential a priori. It can be accepted that concepts without reference to direct experience are indeed empty, but it can no longer be stated that percepts without concepts are blind. "Percepts without concepts may be vague, incommunicable, and even floating. But they are not totally blind."²⁰

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 229.

Yet, this is only part of what Heidegger's existential a priori signifies.

To summarize: Care as existential a priori lies before phenomena only in the sense of being in them, pervading them as their essence. Care consists of the equi-primordial existentialia, and these existentialia refer to the essence and meaning of observable human behavior. Care means to be in relation with and does not mean molding, conditioning, designing or patterning.

11. Being-in-the-world as Asserting the Non-immanence of Self

In Section 4,²¹ it was seen that transcendence, as a term used by Heidegger, refers to openness and not, as a consciousness, a subjective immanence that somehow climbs out of itself in order to relate to an object. In point of fact, throughout this dissertation the basic theme of non-immanence has been present but not specifically articulated. This is understandable since non-immanence is a consequence of Being-in-the-world.

Da-sein as Being-in-the-world is already "out there" with things by being in relation to them, so that the notion of subjectivity does not arise. This means that Da-sein exists as its relations; Da-sein is angewiesen, in need; i.e., what is encountered and the encounterer are

²¹See p. 68 above.

inseparable. It is never a question of two poles, of an ego transcending itself in the sense of getting out of itself going over to an object, but that Da-sein exists as this openness--an openness of awareness into which things may shine forth and become present.²² Thus, the concept of a solitary, encapsulated ego, or the use of Da-sein as an extant (vorhanden) consciousness, collapses. This is the way both Kant and Descartes--as well as Husserl--saw the "I think" by beginning with an "in me" to get to the "outside of me."²³

In Being and Time, Heidegger explicitly states that Da-sein as Being-in-the-world precludes seeing Da-sein as contained within itself somehow relating to a world over against it.

When Dasein directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its primary kind of Being is such that it is always 'outside' alongside entities which it encounters and which belong to a world already discovered.²⁴ (Emphasis added.)

If Da-sein is seen, and comprehended, in this manner, then it becomes easier to understand the significance of Heidegger's assertion that Da-sein can "never

²²Medard Boss, Personal interview, 1973. "You are always with (by), comparable to light with the table, the table therefore shines forth. You as awareness are with the things that disclose themselves in the light of your understanding."

²³B & T, pp. 247-248; H, 203-204.

²⁴Ibid., p. 89; H, 62.

cross over" its de-severance.²⁵ By de-severance Heidegger means the farness of the ready-to-hand (zuhanden) from Da-sein. Da-sein is as de-severance; i.e., Da-sein is spatially related to "things" in terms of relational "distance" with "things." "So little has Da-sein crossed over its de-severance that it has rather taken it along with it and keeps on doing so constantly. . . ."²⁶

The proximity of Da-sein to objects with which Da-sein is relating is not measured in terms of feet or yards, but in terms of significance, meaning and possibility. My feet may be squarely on the pavement but in terms of de-severance, spatial proximity of Da-sein, I am closer to the friend approaching me than I am to the pavement.²⁷

Yet, it is apparent that we in the Western world, have been "conditioned," via our metaphysical biases, to see ourselves as selves or egos or even "brains" that are here at this place relating to another place and hence

²⁵Ibid., p. 142; H, 108.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Heidegger uses this example in Being and Time where he says, "One feels the touch of it (the street) at every step as one walks; it is seemingly the closest and Realist of all that is ready-to-hand and it slides itself, as it were, along certain portions of one's body--the soles of one's feet. And yet it is farther remote than the acquaintance whom one encounters 'on the street' at a 'remoteness' of twenty paces when one is taking such a walk." pp. 141-142; H, 107. See p. 172 above.

transcending ourselves in the relating. All definitions of the concept "ego," for instance, presuppose immanence; i.e., the "ego" is seen as "a precinct primarily self-contained and delimited over against the external world."²⁸ Yet, immediate experience does not reveal an ego that is self-contained; it reveals that man is already with the "things" with which he is relating. When Heidegger refers to the subjectivism of Western metaphysics, he means this falling back to a posture which either implicitly or explicitly conceives the "object" as being represented by a subjectum.

In Section 44 "a" of Being and Time, Heidegger refers to the traditional conceptions of truth. In this section, truth as "agreement," "adequatio" (likening), "correspondentia" (correspondence), and "conventia" (coming together) is discussed as to "its" ontological significance.²⁹ Generally speaking, truth is equated with knowledge. But knowledge in this sense means judging, where a psychial process of judging is distinguished between what is judged, the content. But this breaks down into a relationship of agreement between an ideal content of judgment and that judged about, the "Real Thing." For Heidegger, apparently, the ontological question concerning the

²⁸Medard Boss, "Ego? Motivation?" Journal of Existential Psychiatry, I, No. 3, p. 278.

²⁹B & T, p. 257; H, 214.

relation between the ideal entity of judging and the "Real" object is crucial. A relation does subsist (besteht), says Heidegger, and not only as a relation between the content, the judgment itself, and that of the "Real Object"; but as well, between the ideal content and the "Real" act of judgment. Heidegger proceeds to ask the question, ". . . does it manifestly subsist 'more inwardly' in this latter case?"³⁰ He wants to know the nature of this relational subsisting and asks if this is not a legitimate question. He then adds this statement: "Is it accidental that no headway has been made with this problem in over two thousand years?"³¹

The preceding paragraph introduces us to one of the most perplexing issues, especially to English readers, in Being and Time; that is, the ontological and epistemic significance of Being-in-the-world. It is especially problematic to the English reader because of what might best be described as the misapplication of an idiomatic expression.

In attempting to interrogate the phenomena of truth and knowledge, Heidegger offers an example. Someone is

³⁰B & T, p. 259; H, 216.

³¹B & T, p. 259; H, 216. It will be pointed out, but without comment, that the nature of this particular question regarding "subsistence" is similar to questions Heidegger poses regarding Descartes "cogito ergo sum"; that is, the nature of the "sum" is that which is to be interrogated.

standing with his back to the wall upon which is hanging a picture and he makes the true assertion that "the picture on the wall is hanging askew." The assertion is demonstrated as to its veracity when the man turns around and perceives the picture hanging askew. But we may entertain this question: "If he who makes the assertion judges without perceiving the picture, but 'merely represents' it to himself, to what is he related?"³² He is not relating to "representations" if by that we mean a psychical process whereby a "picture" of the real thing is somehow placed before us as an image.

The asserting which 'merely represents' is related rather, in that sense which is most its own, to the Real picture on the wall. What one has in mind is the Real picture and nothing else.³³ (Emphasis added.)

Two things are to be noted by this passage: first and most important for understanding Heidegger is that the "relating" is between the man and the "Real" picture, as such. There is no mediary representational image. Secondly, and this is what is confusing for English readers, the idiomatic expression, "has in mind," has no place in this particular passage, even if it is taken figuratively, for it is antithetical to what Heidegger intends by his interrogation of "relating." In the German, where Macquarrie and Robinson

³²B & T, p. 260; H, 217.

³³Ibid.

have used the expression "has in mind" the text reads, "Dieses ist gemeint und nicht anderes."³⁴ This literally translates, "This is what is meant and nothing else."

Heidegger further states that if something else is "slipped in" and by that he is obviously referring to a representational image, then this belies the phenomenal facts. For assertion, in the sense of judgment, is a way of Being towards things themselves. And when it is asked, what does one's perceiving of the thing(s) demonstrate? Heidegger answers, "Nichts anderes als dass es das Seiende selbst ist, das in der Aussage gemeint war."³⁵ Macquarrie and Robinson translate this as, "Nothing else than that this thing is the very entity which one has in mind in one's assertion."³⁶ (Emphasis added.)

³⁴Sein und Zeit, p. 217.

³⁵Ibid., p. 218.

³⁶B & T, pp. 260-261; H, 218. An interesting adjunct to this problem of the idiom "having in mind" can be discerned by Heidegger's own, but meager, reference to it. Toward the end of Section 23 of Being and Time, concerned with the spatiality of Being-in-the-world, Heidegger is discussing Kant's distinction between the feeling of a difference between the two sides of "myself" and he makes this statement: "If I am to orient myself the 'mere feeling of the difference' between my two sides will be of no help at all as long as I fail to apprehend some definite object whose position, as Kant remarks casually, 'I have in mind.'" (B & T, p. 144; H, 109). The German text at this point reads, "dessen Stelle ich im Gedächtnis habe." "Im Gedächtnis" means to "have in memory." But Heidegger goes on to say that this "im Gedächtnis" is basically a way of alluding to the "existentially constitutive state of Being-in-the-world," (Ibid.) and Kant failed to see this. He still wanted to maintain a

Da-sein as Being-in-the-world is already with the "things" of the world so that the question of subjective representational images does not arise. Thus, an assertion for Heidegger, and speaking ontologically, is an uncovering (Entdeckend) of the entity itself; that is, the entity is just as it is in itself as it gets pointed out in the assertion. It gets "uncovered."³⁷ "This uncoveredness is confirmed when that which is put forward in the assertion (namely the entity itself) shows itself as that very same thing."³⁸ Thus, for Heidegger, "truth has by no means the structure of an agreement between knowing and the object in the sense of a likening of one entity (the subject) to another (the object)."³⁹

Is it surprising that in the "later" Heidegger we find the same revealing of Da-sein as non-immanence? It

"subjectivistic principle," which for Heidegger means having to do with a "determinate character restricted beforehand to a worldless subject." (Ibid.; H, 110).

³⁷The term "Entdeckend," uncovering, must be seen in close proximity to "Erschliessen," disclosure. For as Heidegger states regarding Da-sein's disclosedness, "with and through it is uncoveredness; hence only with Da-sein's disclosedness is the most primordial phenomenon of truth attained." (B & T, p. 263; H, 220.)

³⁸B & T, p. 261; H, 218.

³⁹Ibid. It must be stated at this point that Heidegger has altered to a certain extent the idea of truth as developed in Being and Time and in "Plato's Doctrine of Truth." For Heidegger now asserts that aletheia does not mean truth as such but rather unconcealment. "Aletheia, unconcealment thought as the opening of presence, is not yet truth." (On Time and Being, p. 69.)

is for those who contend that the later Heidegger is all together different from the Heidegger of Being and Time.

"Bauen Wohnen Denken" was a lecture given by Heidegger in Darmstadt, Germany, in 1951. He tells his audience in a questioning manner to think of the old bridge in Heidelberg from where they are in Darmstadt. But, where are they? "From this spot right here, we are there at the bridge--we are by no means at some representational content in our consciousness."⁴⁰ For Heidegger, when thinking of things, we are with them, they are not merely "in our mind" as some mental representation. "From right here we may even be much nearer to that bridge and to what it makes room for than someone who uses it daily as an indifferent river crossing."⁴¹ What is this but Da-sein as Being-in-the-world?

In On Time and Being, Heidegger expresses in a roundabout way this non-immanence of Da-sein when he states that the lecture hall is. "The lecture hall is illuminated. We recognize the illuminated lecture hall at once and with no reservation as something that is."⁴² (Emphasis added.) To say that the lecture hall is

⁴⁰ "Building Dwelling Thinking" as found in Poetry, Language, Thought, translated and edited by Richard Hofstadler (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 157.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² On Time and Being, p. 3.

"illuminated" is to say that it is disclosed, but not to an immanent conscious, rather to Da-sein as already there with it. How else could it be "recognized at once" as something that is? Da-sein as Being-in-the-world is sein-verständnis, the immediate "comprehension" of Beingness as such.

In Was Heisst Denken? the full force of Heidegger's revelation of Da-sein as Being-in-the-world is brought to bear using the illustration of a tree and a cathedral. This development will be further aided by Boss' own reference to a tree and a cathedral.⁴³

We are standing on a meadow facing a tree. But where may we ask does the presentation take place? In our heads? Does the tree stand "in our consciousness" or on the meadow? But what we "really" see is not a tree at all but, "in reality a void, thinly sprinkled with electric charges here and there that race hither and yon at enormous speeds."⁴⁴ But we are standing face to face with a tree. Yet, this is in reality only a naive, pre-scientific comprehension of things. However, if we affirm this point we have conceded to something of which, as Heidegger states, "we have hardly considered, and that is: That those

⁴³Regarding Boss the former is found in "The Conception of Man in Natural Science and Daseinsanalysis," Comprehensive Psychiatry, III, 4 and the latter in Grundriss.

⁴⁴What Is Called Thinking?, p. 43.

sciences do in fact decide what of the tree in bloom may or may not be considered valid reality."⁴⁵

For Boss, the tree in the meadow is an apple tree loaded with juicy red apples and since it is early in the morning and we have not eaten, our appetites are aroused. But what is "really" going on here? At the very moment of perception we would not know that what we are seeing is an apple tree. According to traditional biological science, what initially happens is an unknown something emits light rays which then arouse nervous excitation in the retina. These excitations are then transmitted to the upper regions of the brain where they are registered as sensory perceptions. The excitations then eventually reach the cortex where they are assimilated with memory traces of similar, yet earlier, sensory stimuli. We thus, finally, recognize the "apple tree." "It will, however, forever remain beyond comprehension in what way and by what miracle nervous excitations can be changed into perception of meaningful interconnections."⁴⁶

Yet, even much later in the process being described "scientifically" we come across the mystery of a consciousness in a human subject which has the capacity of climbing out of itself and somehow going over to the

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Boss, "The Conception of Man in Natural Science and Daseinsanalysis," p. 203.

object. How would a subject have to be constituted so that it, as possessing a consciousness was able to climb out of itself, "transcend" itself, and go over to an object?

If we describe phenomenologically, Daseinsanalytically, the event of perceiving the apple tree we find an immediate seeing and comprehending of the apple tree as apple tree.

How is such an immediate seeing and understanding of a thing . . . possible at all unless our existence is already a kind of mental brightness in which a thing as the thing it is can make its appearance and reveal itself in accordance with its meaningful contents?"⁴⁷

At the moment of perceiving the apple tree our existence was one strongly attuned to hunger so that we were open to the "seeing" of something edible. But what if we say that upon seeing the apple tree we go over to it and climb up into it using our arms and legs? Have we not introduced the notion of corporeality, body? In our drama what transpires is the unmeditated, concrete hastening to the tree and climbing into it in order to eat the apple. It is only later, upon reflecting that we conjure up the notion of body or organism.

It is only reflection after the fact, putting a construction on the event from the outside, and concretizing the event and introducing artificial divisions that induces us to regard ourselves as equipped with separate appendages and organs.⁴⁸

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 207.

⁴⁸Ibid.

We are never merely some kind of independently existing external carapace on the inside of the body of a biological organism, encapsulated within its epidermis, which organism would then at some time or other extend some kind of antennae or pseudopods to an external world in order to discern it and to grasp it. . . . Any experience at random shows us that we as human beings have always and in an absolutely original sense had our abode 'out there,' i.e., at all times in the total arena of this or that perceiving, thinking, dreaming, feeling, ineluctable relationship to an object confronting us, whether a plant, an animal, a fellow human being, ourselves or to heaven and earth.⁴⁹

The language found in Was Heisst Denken? differs considerably from that of Being and Time; yet, the content in terms of the problematic is essentially the same. We are facing a cathedral, Heidegger says, but besides facing a church or a building we are as well facing something that is present in its presence. "But the presence of what is present is not finally and also something we face, rather it comes before. Prior to all else it stands before us only we do not see it because we stand within it."⁵⁰ What comes "prior" as Heidegger intends it, is the Being, the is, of the cathedral itself, the that-it-is. The priority refers to the immediacy of our "awareness" of its being, a priority which entails the opening (Lichtung) to or with the present; yet the openness is not "seen," the "presencing" itself is not "seen" for the "presencing" is with that which is present and allows (lets) the present

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 208.

⁵⁰ Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, p. 98.

be. We, Da-sein ontologically speaking, are always open and with that which is present since Da-sein is as Being-in-the-world. But metaphysics never sees the openness, the presencing, but only that which is revealed "in" the presencing.

In Grundriss, Boss gives the example of being "conscious" at this moment of the Freiburger Münster (a church in Zürich). But this "consciousness" of the Freiburg is "Not at all to be seen as the awakening of an idea in the sense of soulish image of the Münster inside a 'Psyche'."⁵¹ There is no inner psychic idea or image of the Freiburger Münster, for as Da-sein, as a "perceiving" (vernehmende) world openness, I am there with the Freiburger Münster itself as it is.

For Boss, Da-sein as Being-in-the-world is to be characterized in this manner:

The Da-sein of the human as Being-in-the-world is 'constituted out of the multiplicity and totality of the possibilities for relating to the beings of the world.' As such, it is to be characterized as the bearing, holding open and spanning of a free realm of awareness for that which is encountered.⁵²

There can be no relational possibility for that which is encountered without this primordial realm of openness.

Yet, the primordial realm can only be as a result of its

⁵¹Boss, Grundriss, p. 344. (My translation.)

⁵²Ibid., p. 487. The translation of this passage, which expands the German but without loss of meaning, was supplied by Dr. Brian Kenney.

"Being-with" the encountered. The two are primordially united and thereby constitute the meaning of Lichtung. As Being-in-the-world Da-sein "lets" that which is encountered unfold in its meaningfulness, inclusive of its network of references, to other beings in the world.

12. Being-with

How does one evaluate Heidegger's assertion that he is not "doing" philosophical anthropology? Being and Time is concerned with the Being that asks about the meaning of Beingness and this particular Being (essent) is man. Does it not follow that Heidegger is "doing" anthropology; i.e. inquiring into the nature of man? No, it does not.⁵³

⁵³In Being and Time, Heidegger states that the analysis of Da-sein ". . . cannot attempt to provide a complete ontology of Dasein, which assuredly must be constructed if anything like a 'philosophical' anthropology is to have a philosophically adequate basis." p. 38; H, 17. Further, he says that an existential a priori of philosophical anthropology needs to be "rounded out" in many ways and looked at. "But this is not the aim of our investigation. Its aim is one of fundamental ontology." p. 170; H, 131. And in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. James Churchill (Bloomington, Indiana: University Press, 1962) Heidegger says, "However diverse and important the knowledge which 'philosophical anthropology' may supply concerning man, it can never pretend to be a fundamental discipline of philosophy, solely because it is anthropology. On the contrary, it runs the constant risk of concealing from us the necessity of developing the question of man as a problem and of connecting this problem with a laying of the foundation of metaphysics." p. 225. And in "On the Essence of Truth," Werner Brock's (ed.) Existence and Being (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1968) Heidegger states, "Not only is every sort of 'anthropology' and every sort of subjectivity (of man regarded as a subject) abandoned, as was already the case in 'Sein und Zeit,' and the truth of Being pursued as the 'ground' of a fundamentally new

For Heidegger, metaphysics has defined man as an "animal rationale" and it is from this point that philosophical anthropology goes on its way to further interrogate the questions of man's nature. But metaphysics, as has been stated,⁵⁴ is concerned with the "gift," the that which is present and not with the "it gives" of the gift or the presencing of the present. For Heidegger in Being and Time, as elsewhere, the fundamental questions of ontology and/or thinking revolve around the "it gives," the Lichtung or clearing of Beingness and Er-eignis. This puts Heidegger's thought on a level different from that of metaphysics and hence anthropology as well. In the language of Being and Time philosophical anthropology operates on the concrete ontic level by not delving into the ontological, essential, elements of Da-sein. It operates within metaphysics and does not place itself within the problematic of laying bare the foundation of metaphysics. As he states in "Letter on Humanism," "The essence of man . . . consists of being more than mere man insofar as this mere man is represented as a rational animal."⁵⁵ The "more" here means more original and hence more essential; i.e.,

attitude to history, but an effort is made in the course of this lecture to think in terms of this other 'ground'; i.e., Da-sein." pp. 323-324.

⁵⁴See pp. 141-142 above.

⁵⁵Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," p. 210.

fundamental and this means ontological or concerned with Beingness.

In Grundriss, Boss quotes Heidegger as saying:

Anthropology is that explication of man which basically already knows what man is and therefore can never ask who he might be. With this question it [anthropology] would have to admit to itself being shaken and conquered [overcome]. How could you expect this from anthropology when it has nothing to perform but the assurance of securing for itself its subject?⁵⁶

Heidegger is concerned with attempts to lay bare the ontological features that underlie--and this means to "lie within"--every ontic or concrete case. In other words, he is revealing the "essence" of man; i.e., his Beingness as opposed to his "nature," for "nature" is an assumption as to the concrete, object, orientation of man. The unitary, primordial structure of Da-sein is Being-in-the-world, and Heidegger asserts that the aim of Being and Time is to bring this structure of Da-sein's Being into relief phenomenally, ". . . in terms of which its possibilities and the ways for it 'to be' are ontologically determined."⁵⁷

Anthropology, on the other hand, starts with a preconceived notion of what human existence is and goes

⁵⁶Quoted in Boss' Grundriss, p. 214. (My translation.) The quote comes from Heidegger's, "Die zeit des Weltbildes," as found in Holzwege (Frankfurt: Klosterman, 1950), p. 103. Marjorie Grene's translation of this essay ("The Age of the World View") appears in Measure, II, 1951, pp. 269-284 but does not contain this passage as found in Holzwege.

⁵⁷B & T, p. 169; H, 130.

from there to determine how this existent gets to objects. This problem can only be overcome if instead of asking what human existence primordially is the question begins with Beingness as such from which human existence is seen as a particular being.⁵⁸

Da-sein in its Beingness reveals itself as Being-in-the-world. As Being-in-the-world, Da-sein is as Being-in, with things, equipment, and Others; and is so primordially. This means that Da-sein is not occasionally with things, equipment and Others but is at all times with these as relational possibilities even in those deficient modes when there is no actual "thing" or other present. For, as Heidegger repeatedly asserts, a bare subject without a world, who only relates to objects "out there" is not given in experience; on the contrary, quite the opposite is true.⁵⁹

The aim in this section is to reveal Da-sein in its relation to Others. For this, Heidegger uses the

⁵⁸Medard Boss, Personal interview, 1972. Boss stated within this interview, "Heidegger says anthropologies up till now already know what human existence is and then argue how this being gets--connects itself--to objects. But if you start with Beingness as such then you can look at man in his being." In other words, to assume that the question what is the Da-sein of man constitutes the whole question of beingness will lead you back to an ontologically inappropriate base. This is the trap that Binswanger fell into. See pp. 13-15 above.

⁵⁹See B & T, pp. 142-144; H, 107-110; 249; H. 205-6, and "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics," p. 134.

expression Being-with (mit-sein) and means by it the ontological signification of "other," "with," and "also" (too). "Other men also exist along with us."⁶⁰ The "Other" does not mean everyone else except me or those from whom I am set off. The "Other" understood here, is, in fact, all those of whom I am one, too. The "with" refers to the disclosure that Da-sein as Da-sein exists with others of its own kind; i.e., with those having the same Da-sein characterization. The "also" refers to Being-there-also (Auch-da-sein) where the also is seen as a sameness of Being; i.e., sameness as Being-in-the-world.⁶¹ These three characterizations of mit-sein reveal the "world" as one which I share with others. This shared world is referred to by Heidegger as the with-world (mit-welt) and the characterization of each individual (Da-sein within-the-world) is called Da-sein-with (mit-Dasein).

The with-world (mit-welt) is the world each Da-sein shares with others. The world of Da-sein is essentially mitwelt; i.e., as Being-in-the-world part of that Being-in includes others. We never exist as independent worldless subjects who only secondarily and in some derived sense interrelate with one another.⁶² We are primordially,

⁶⁰ Boss, P & D, p. 55.

⁶¹ B & T, pp. 154-155; H, 118. See also Boss, P & D, p. 55.

⁶² "Man is his social and cultural relations with persons and things. He lives in relations, not external

essentially and fundamentally already with the world inclusive of being with the other. This is the case even when ontically there may be no one present.

If Da-sein were not of the essence of Being-with, then loneliness would not be one of his possibilities. A lifeless thing such as a stone cannot be lonely. Loneliness always points to a being-with-one-another (Mit-einandersein). Being-with-one-another is a function of Being-with and as such is a primordial characteristic of Da-sein.⁶³

The essential and fundamental characteristic of Being-with is the basis for all human relationships whether in the forms of intimacy or indifference, loving or hating. From the Daseinsanalytic point of view, since all men have this fundamental characteristic in common, in whatever concrete manifestations it may exhibit itself, then all men can communicate in one form or another. ". . . there is no reason to doubt that a man who has lost himself in a schizophrenic mode of existing has a chance of recapturing his mature human freedom in the encounter with a

to them." Charles E. Scott, "Heidegger and Consciousness," Southern Journal of Philosophy, VIII (Winter, 1970), 355-372. (p. 359.)

⁶³See Grundriss, p. 295. Also, Heidegger states, "The Other can be missing only in and for a Being-with. Being-alone is a deficient mode of Being-with; its very possibility is the proof of this." B & T, p. 157; H, 120.

therapist."⁶⁴ For Boss, this means that the therapist must meet the patient on his own level even if this means communicating with him as if he were a small child.

In Being and Time, Heidegger distinguishes Being-with and Da-sein-with (mit-dasein). This latter expression reveals the Being-with quality of each individual Da-sein for another Da-sein; i.e., "only so far as one's own Da-sein has the essential structure of Being-with, is it Dasein-with as encounterable for others."⁶⁵

Da-sein comports itself towards entities, equipment, in the world through concern (Besorgen) and towards other Da-seins through solicitude (Fursorgen). But for the most part, Da-sein in its relation with other Da-seins comports itself in deficient modes of solicitude. These take the form of "passing another by, not 'mattering' to one another."⁶⁶ These characterize what Heidegger refers to as "everyday, average Being-with-one-another."

⁶⁴P & D, p. 245.

⁶⁵B & T, p. 157; H, 121.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 158; H, 121. Throughout Being and Time, Heidegger uses the expression "proximally and for the most part" to signify Da-sein's way of Being-in-the-world as everydayness. "Proximally" means for Heidegger, the basic way Da-sein relates to others. This is a relating based on "publicness" which is characterized by distantiality, averageness and leveling down. "For the most part" refers to how Da-sein reveals itself to "Everyman." The expression, therefore, reveals Da-sein basically in its inauthentic mode. See B & T, p. 422; H, 370.

The two extreme positive modes of solicitude, as revealed by Heidegger, are a solicitude which "leaps in" (einspringen) and takes over the Other's "care," and one which "leaps ahead" (vorausspringt) and attempts not to take away "care" but give it back authentically. In the solicitude that leaps in, the Other is thrown out of position and made dependent on the one who leaps in. Heidegger states that this kind of solicitude operates for the most part on the level of "concern" with the ready-to-hand (zuhanden); i.e., the one who leaps in "sees" the Other as a "what" to deal with. On the other hand, solicitude that "leaps ahead" is a relating based on the "existence" of the Other as opposed to a "what" he is.

Boss has taken these "two main ways of man's care-taking for a fellow being" and applied them to a psychotherapeutic framework. He distinguishes "intervening care" and "anticipating care." The former is to be avoided in therapy since it takes ". . . over what is to be done by him (the patient), to do it in his place. The patient is thus thrown out of his place, has to step back and take over what the therapist has taken care of." In anticipating care the therapist "tries to hand back to him (the patient) what has to be cared for so that it becomes an actual concern." This is a concern on the part of the therapist not for a particular item of the patient's world, but for his

existence or as Boss calls it, his "basic" care.⁶⁷

Even though Da-sein as Being-in-the-world is as Being-with, it is in every case its "own" (jemeinigkeit). Entities other than Da-sein are indifferent as to their Being; or more precisely, "their Being can be neither a matter of indifference to them, nor the opposite."⁶⁸ (Recall the stone that cannot be lonely or cannot develop an obsessional neurosis.) Da-sein as being "own" is in each and every case its own possibility. Heidegger warns that this "mineness" of Da-sein should not be taken as an isolated "I," "so that one must seek some way of getting over to the others from this isolated subject. . . ."⁶⁹ To interpret "mineness" in this manner would be to fall back on an immanence conception of consciousness thus perpetuating the idea of a worldless ego, somehow relating to a world "out there."

To ask "Who" this mineness of a Da-sein is would be understood obviously in the ontic sense of "I am that

⁶⁷P & D, p. 73. In Section 4 of Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis, pp. 61-74, Boss examines the basic harmony between the psychoanalysis of Freud and Daseins-analysis as founded on Heidegger's fundamental ontology. The point is that the "intuitive genius" of Freud paralleled to a certain degree the Heideggerian insights, but when these intuitively arrived conclusions were pushed into a theoretical formulation distortion was the result.

⁶⁸B & T, pp. 67-68; H, 42.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 154; H, 118.

who." But, ontologically, the who of Da-sein, even though that Da-sein is its own, would be the who which is not the "I itself" of everyday Da-sein. The "Not I" in this case is not something lacking I-hood but is in point of fact a kind of Being, an "I" that is as having lost itself.⁷⁰ Elsewhere Heidegger states that the qualification "in every case mine" does not mean "posited through me" or apportioned to an individual ego. "Being-there is itself by virtue of its essential relation to being in general."⁷¹

What does it mean to say that the "who" of Da-sein could be the "I" as having lost itself? It must be remembered that Da-sein as Being-in-the-world has "fallenness" as one of its essential characteristics. Da-sein "falls" into entities, objects within the world, in the sense of being enthralled, enticed or seduced by them; i.e., Da-sein is absorbed in the world of its concern. This world consists not only of "things" but "Others" as well. In its relation with Others, Da-sein takes constant care as to how it differs from Others; i.e., how it relates to Others, whether with, for or against. This caring for a difference

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 152; H, 117.

⁷¹ M. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., Anchor Books, 1961), p. 24. In Vol. 3 of Philosophy in the Twentieth Century edited by Barrett and Aiken. This quote is found on p. 158.

between a Da-sein and Others is existentially characterized as "distantiality." But also existentially, this constant maintenance of distance stands for nothing less than a subjection "to the other"; i.e., Da-sein comports itself in the world respondent to the Other and in doing so comports itself "away from" its own self.⁷²

The Others are not definite or distinct but can be represented by any Other. They are the "who" and constitute the "they" (das Man). Da-sein succumbs to the dictates of the "they" by virtue of one of its--Da-sein's--essential characteristics: "leveling down," Da-sein's care for averageness.⁷³

Thus, the "who" of Da-sein is the "they" and as such the self of the particular Da-sein is covered up. The self of everyday Da-sein, therefore, is the they-self. "Proximally, it is not 'I,' in the sense of my own self, that 'am' but rather Others, whose way is that of the

⁷²Heidegger states regarding Da-sein, "It itself is not; its Being has been taken away by the Others. Dasein's everyday possibilities of Being are for the Others to dispose of as they please." B & T, p. 164; H, 126. In a similar statement, but one going to the extreme of subjection, Boss reveals that ". . . the obsessional neurotic's intensive defense against the things he regards as disgusting amounts to his captivity by them." P & D, p. 183. This is also similar to what Carl Jung refers to as the "shadow." See Jolande Jacobi's The Psychology of C. G. Jung (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 106 ff.

⁷³See above p. 76 concerning "leveling down," "distantiality," and "averageness." Also see B & T, p. 165; H, 127.

'they.'" ⁷⁴ Thus, the "they-self" signifies Da-sein existing as inauthentic. ⁷⁵

Da-sein exists mainly in inauthenticity as having abandoned itself to possibilities which have in themselves been "leveled down." But what about the opposite of this tendency of living, existing in and as they-self? Heidegger states that "Dasein exists as a potentiality-for-Being which has in each case already abandoned itself to definite possibilities." ⁷⁶ What can this mean? If by "a potentiality-for-Being" one means gathering oneself in or together, to accept, to resolve, to choose possibilities in an authentic way then what is meant turns out to be this: Da-sein exists as a potentiality for possibilities but has already abandoned itself to possibilities. This does not make sense.

Does Heidegger mean by a potentiality-for-Being a potentiality for realizing possibilities, or existing authentically in possibilities? But, as has been seen, Da-sein has already abandoned itself to possibilities. Does this mean that Da-sein exists as a potentiality for possibilities but as soon as those possibilities become definite Da-sein has abandoned his potentiality-for-Being?

⁷⁴Heidegger, B & T, p. 167; H, 129.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 225; H, 181. "The Self . . . is proximally and for the most part inauthentic, the they-self."

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 315.

This does not make sense either.

But, what if by "potentiality-for-Being" Heidegger meant the disclosure of possibilities, the projection (Entwurf) of possibilities, the opening up and revealing of possibilities? Heidegger states that the issue for Care is: "to be its own thrown basis is that potentiality-for-Being which is the issue. . . ." ⁷⁷ But Da-sein is not the basis of its Being rather it is the Being of its basis. To be the Being of its basis means to be existing as thrown; i.e., Da-sein is called back to its thrownness so as to "understand" this thrownness. ⁷⁸ Thrownness is openness to and with phenomena or "the 'throwing open of the lighted realm of the world.'" ⁷⁹

To exist authentically (Eigentlichkeit) is to be one's "there." And to do this is to exist as thrownness; i.e., opening up that which is closed. Authentically existing Da-sein is a pulling away from the they-self revealing Da-sein in its open-standingness, not enthralled, not enraptured within or seduced by entities within the world. Ontological authenticity is existing as the opened realm which gives the possibility of the ontic disclosures in their particularities. Only in this way can Heidegger

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 330; H, 284.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 333; H, 287.

⁷⁹Boss, P & D, p. 39.

say, "But the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any 'less' Being or any 'lower' degree of Being."⁸⁰ And the converse holds as well.

Ontological authenticity is not to be seen as a willful volitional attempt to make oneself a "better person." Ontological authenticity is not to be seen as a conscious, resolute decision of a person to "live authentically." Authenticity for Heidegger, is grounded in "resoluteness" (Entschlossenheit) and to understand Heidegger's revelation of authenticity, resoluteness must be seen for what it is.

One would completely misunderstand the phenomenon of resoluteness if one should want to suppose that this consists simply in taking up possibilities which have been proposed and recommended, and seizing hold of them. The resolution is precisely the disclosive projection and determination of what is factually possible at the time.⁸¹

"Resolution" is generally understood as a volitional act or decision; but Heidegger uses it, as he does so many of his terms, in an etymological, root sense. The term in German is Entschlossenheit, the Ent means, etymologically, "to open up." Schlossenheit comes from the German verb schliessen "to close." Thus, in the root sense the term means "to open that which is closed." "Resolution" in Being and Time must be seen in the sense of dis-closure. Disclosure in English has the same root foundation, dis

⁸⁰B & T, p. 68; H, 63.

⁸¹B & T, p. 345; H, 298.

meaning not (or in this context "to open") and closure meaning that which is closed down. Resolution seen and understood in this context means "opening up the realm into which the different possibilities of relating to things make their appearance."⁸² Decision comes after the disclosure of possibilities and this is on the ontic level. One can on this level decide to "live authentically" but this decision is made possible, ontologically, by the dis-closing of possibilities of relationships.⁸³

⁸²Medard Boss, Personal interview, 1972. It will be recalled (See p. 157 above) that the term Entwurf generally translated "projection" has a similar root meaning for Heidegger. Ent meaning "open" and wurf meaning "throw," hence "throw open." Macquarrie and Robinson make reference to the etymological similarities between resoluteness and disclosedness by saying: "The etymological connection between 'Entschlossenheit' ('resoluteness') and 'Erschlossenheit' (disclosedness) is not to be overlooked." B & T, ftn p, p. 343. Also see p. 138, ftn. 2 where the prefix "Ent" is discussed in relation to Ent-Fernung and Ausrichtung (de-severance and directionality). Heidegger states in An Introduction to Metaphysics that resolve means to will and he who wills puts his whole existence into it without faltering. But, "Re-solve is no mere decision to act, but the crucial beginning of action that anticipates and reaches through all action." Re-solve is "'Entschlossenheit, unclosedness.' But the essence of resolve lies in the opening, the coming-out-of-cover 'Ent-borgenheit' of human being-there into the clearing of being and not in a storing up of energy for 'action.'" p. 17. Also found in Barrett and Aiken, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, Vol. 3, p. 154. Also see "On the Essence of Truth" in Brock's Existence and Being, p. 314. Discourse on Thinking, p. 81. ". . . one needs to understand 'resolve' as it is understood in Being and Time as the opening of man particularly undertaken by him for openness. . . ."

⁸³In anticipatory resoluteness Da-sein "understands" itself in regards to its potentiality-for-Being; i.e., as a potentiality for possibilities. Yet, when Da-sein acts on these possibilities--Heidegger uses the expression "take

In authenticity, Da-sein is brought, via "resoluteness," to the Being of its "there," and this is as "situation." "The situation is the 'there' which is disclosed in resoluteness--the 'there' as which the existent entity is there."⁸⁴ That which is called "situation" should not be seen as a set of circumstances but as a projection of possibilities. As has been seen, this projection of possibilities means the disclosure or possibilities, the opening up and revealing of possibilities and thus revealing Da-sein as "thrown." "Resoluteness, however, is only that authenticity which, in care, is the object of care (in der Sorge gesorgte), which is possible as care--the authenticity of care itself."⁸⁵ Yet, as has been seen, "To be its own thrown basis is that potentiality-for-Being which is the issue for care."⁸⁶

over one's there factually"--the situation is one that has been "resolved" and this is concrete. Heidegger on this point makes a crucial statement. "In the existential analysis we cannot, in principle, discuss what Dasein factually resolves in any particular case. Our investigation excludes even the existential projection of the factual possibilities of existence." B & T, p. 434; H, 383. Why does Heidegger make this statement? Because Being and Time is a work devoted exclusively to ontology and to render it ontically, any part of it (including that of "authenticity") is to push it into an anthropology or existentialism.

⁸⁴ B & T, p. 346; H, 299.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 348; H, 301.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 330; H, 284. Care is a single basic state but can be seen as a double meaning of "thrown projection." Ibid., p. 243; H, 199.

One of the recurrent themes found in critical commentaries of Heidegger's works, especially Being and Time, has been the suspected lack ("limitation") of a genuine "social theory." The criticisms themselves generally revolve around the mit-sein and its apparent failure to provide for a viable and "authentic" social relatedness of man. What follows is an attempt to look at and answer these criticisms by turning to three sources. Jean T. Wilde and William Kluback have translated Heidegger's essay Zur Seinfrage, The Question of Being, and added to the translation a three part introduction, one part being called "A Heideggerian Limitation." The limitation turns out to be Heidegger's failure to consider man within a "practical framework" to compliment his ontological consideration. A Ph.D. dissertation by Renee O. Weber, entitled "Individual and Social Being in Heidegger's Being and Time" has attacked Heidegger's mit-sein, with its authentic and inauthentic manifestations, as being not only inadequate, but faulty. In this work Weber mentions as well Binswanger and Boss. In Maurice Friedman's The Worlds of Existentialism and in his article "Phenomenology and Existential Analysis" both Heidegger and Boss have been criticized, using Buber's I-thou dichotomy, for not adequately seeing the importance of "encounter."⁸⁷

⁸⁷ Martin Heidegger, The Question of Being, translated with introduction by Jean T. Wilde and William

(a) A Heideggerian Limitation--Wilde and Kluback

For Wilde and Kluback, Heidegger has been too one sided in his questioning of the nature of man. The one sidedness occurs because Heidegger has considered the ontological dimension as constituting the totality of man. This ontological exclusiveness leaves untouched the "practical states of being such as the political, social, and economic."⁸⁸ This practical state constitutes the "Other" which is a descriptive way of revealing what man does. The "Other" is a necessary dialectical compliment which is required in order for each dimension--in this case the

Kluback (New Haven: College and University Press, 1958). Renee Openheimer Weber, "Individual and Social Being in Heidegger's Being and Time" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1966). Maurice Friedman (ed.), The Worlds of Existentialism (New York: Random House Publ., 1964), and Maurice Friedman, "Phenomenology and Existential Analysis," Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, IX, No. 23, 1969, pp. 151-168. For additional sources of criticism along these lines see: Emmanuel Levinas' Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. A. Linges (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969, p. 134 ff; Richard Schmitt, Martin Heidegger on Being Human (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 246 ff.; Thomas Langan, The Meaning of Heidegger (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 230 ff. See also John Wild's comments in "Symposium: Martin Heidegger," The Journal of Philosophy, LX, No. 22, 1963, p. 673. This by no means completes the list of those critical of Heidegger's "social theory."

⁸⁸ Wilde and Kluback, p. 13. A retort to Wilde and Kluback's overly theological interpretation of Heidegger will not be made in this dissertation. "Heidegger is deeply immersed in the Nothing (Satan) as the veiling of Being (Light), in the anxiety, deepened by the shocking realization of demonic possibilities, lying at the root of earthly reality." pp. 9-10. This is a false interpretation of Heidegger.

ontological and the ontic--to be. Heidegger's limitation is that he has failed ". . . to understand that man's external life expressed in his political, economic, and social experience determines and reveals the ontological nature of his existence."⁸⁹

Wilde and Kluback identify the "practical states of being" as adjectival descriptions of how man does things. "They describe man as he does things. These adjectival qualifications belong to man and describe him, not ontologically but historically."⁹⁰

Both ontological and practical function as the "Other" for each. "Being other than the adjective, it (ontological) reveals that it is not the adjective nor can be adjective, but at the same time only through the adjective does it know itself to be 'Other' and itself at the same time."⁹¹ The same dialectical reasoning can be applied to the adjective. The point being that by disregarding the practical or adjectival dimension the full realization of the ontological is hindered. Heidegger's exclusive concern with the ontological question "What does it mean to be?" can reveal only one aspect of man and even this will be faulty.

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 12.

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 13.

⁹¹Ibid.

This exclusive dichotomizing by Wilde and Kluback reveals the weakness of their argument. Whereas Sartre saw the two realms of the ontic and ontological as "incommunicable," Wilde and Kluback at least reveal the internal necessity of both through a dialectical relationship. Nevertheless, all three have based their criticisms on an inadequate understanding of the ontico-ontological relationship.⁹² But an initial point needs to be raised. The question of man's practical nature as revealed in his social, political, and economic manifestations lies within the domain of philosophical anthropology. Heidegger, as has been seen, does not disallow this domain but refrains from getting within it before an adequate ontological basis can be worked out.

Heidegger is aware that man (Da-sein) is what he does. "Dasein finds 'itself' proximally in what it does, uses, expects, avoids--in those things environmentally ready-to-hand with which it is proximally concerned."⁹³ Yet, within what he does and uses is (pervades) that which allows him to do and use. To say that either the ontological or the practical is the "Other"--at least in the context used above--is to separate unnecessarily the two. It is also to overlook Heidegger's own assertion that,

⁹²For Sartre see pp. 149-150.

⁹³B & T, p. 155; H, 119.

". . . the roots of the existential analytic . . . are ultimately existentiell, that is ontical."⁹⁴ The two dimensions cannot be seen as separate, or as "Other," for they are in point of fact, "different dimensions of a unique and profoundly unified phenomenon. . . ."⁹⁵

Wilde and Kluback would be correct in their criticism of Heidegger if he had been following the traditional procedure of metaphysics; i.e., positing an essence, a what, which determines or defines man's basic nature. This would allow for a dialectical separation of the essence into the particular with their mutual interplay. But Heidegger explicitly refrains from this kind of thinking. His question is one of Beingness and one which looks at the ways that Da-sein is as opposed to what it is. It is true that in Being and Time the questions are of an ontological nature, but, even these are revealed by laying bare the ontic, the existentiell. The misunderstanding of Heidegger reveals itself when Wilde and Kluback make this statement: "Existentialism, however, particularly that of Martin Heidegger, seems to have given little consideration to the

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 34; H, 13. Also, "The question of Dasein's totality, which at the beginning we discussed only with regard to ontological method, has its justification, but only because the ground for that justification goes back to an ontical possibility of Dasein." p. 357; H, 309.

⁹⁵Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, p. 50.

problem of state and power."⁹⁶ The equation of Heidegger with existentialism reveals their lack of understanding of fundamental ontology. They want to see fundamental ontology as an extension of metaphysics--as concerning itself with the question of man's nature; i.e. philosophical anthropology. The result is to see man as a what which reduces him to the status of a thing (an extant).

(b) Individual and Social Being--Weber

Weber's thesis is that not only is there a deficiency in Being and Time as far as a positive ethics is concerned but that Heidegger's "theory of man" gives rise to such a condition. For if we follow his thought a positive view of society can not logically be developed or implied.⁹⁷ "We find no hint whatever in Being and Time that society may be founded on positive bases."⁹⁸

For Weber, the "they" represents man's social interaction and as such is based entirely on lies and fears. The "they" exists so as to induce man's fall which means fleeing from "ontological truth into shared ontic lies." This fallen state is necessary to protect man from the anxiety that would result should man see, comprehend, his

⁹⁶Wilde and Kluback, p. 27.

⁹⁷Renee Weber, "Individual and Social Being in Heidegger's Being and Time," p. 1 (in abstract).

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 97.

human condition.⁹⁹ Since the "they" is based on lies and fears, and since all participate in this "shared world," it then becomes a domain whereby all men are necessarily "against-one-another."¹⁰⁰

The inconsistency in Heidegger's "system" revolves around his concept of co-being or mit-sein. The mit-sein represents Heidegger's "a priori posit" that there is a pure co-being status serving as the foundation for all beings who dwell together.¹⁰¹ Yet, men serve mainly as obstacles to each other's development as each one pursues Being. To reach this truth of Being absolute silence is required and this necessitates a withdrawal from all shared interaction.¹⁰²

But what of solicitude in its positive modes? The "leaping-in" and "leaping-ahead" of positive solicitude fail when they are most needed; i.e., when one faces "his most crucial hour." They fail because one can find himself only through himself. "All being-in-the-world of care and

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 72.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. 78.

¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 146, ftn. 10. The inconsistency, as Weber sees it, revolves around the fact that Heidegger, "deals only with an empty, uninterpretable system from which no empirical value-system whatever can be derived." p. 144. On the next page (145) Weber mentions Boss as merely reiterating Heidegger's assertion regarding co-being but she does not offer any analysis of this reiteration.

¹⁰²Ibid., p. 147. "Either man functions as singular, authentic being or as mass inauthentic being."

all co-being with others fails to work when it becomes a question of one's own possibility to be."¹⁰³ There can, therefore, be no real genuine communication based on the so-called "positive" modes of solicitude. If it were true that I could share the burden of my own death with others, mitigate the anxiety of death by sharing with others, then Heidegger would have to give up part of his system; that of finding my own self through myself.¹⁰⁴ Thus, Heidegger is committed to a theory of radical individuality.

Weber concludes that Heidegger's first positive mode of solicitude is either malicious, impossible or meaningless. (She concludes the same about the second mode.) After all, how can you term "positive" that which would destroy the individuality of the other--through "leaping in"? "From all that Heidegger has said about Care, is it not clear that no one can possibly 'take over' its function for anyone else?"¹⁰⁵

In Being and Time (p. 159; H, 122), Heidegger states that between the two positive modes of solicitude there are numerous "mixed forms" and that to classify these

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 155. This is Weber's own translation of a passage from Sein und Zeit. Macquarrie and Robinson render this passage. ". . . all Being alongside the things with which we concern ourselves, and all Being-with Others, will fail us when our own most potentiality-for-Being is the issue." B & T, p. 308; H, 263.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., pp. 155-156.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 170.

individually would take the task of the work beyond its limits of investigation. Weber concludes that this statement "proves" that Heidegger not only lacks a social theory but that he is not even interested in supplying one.¹⁰⁶

What does it mean to be authentic? Although Heidegger appears to take it for granted that the road to authenticity--"The highest value in Heidegger's philosophy of man"--must lead through inauthenticity, it can be shown, so Weber states, that this is not the case.¹⁰⁷ Man can become authentic directly. Her argument is bolstered by stating from Heidegger that, "Dasein does not necessarily and constantly have to divert itself into this kind of Being."¹⁰⁸ But, to become authentic means necessarily to isolate oneself from all other Daseins. ". . . authentic Dasein must be a radically individualized Dasein, one that dwells in silent isolation from other Daseins."¹⁰⁹ To be authentic means to be in anxiety and no one can experience this anxiety but the individual himself, ". . . it is I alone who can experience it. Therefore, no one else could

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 173.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 87. Weber also states, ". . . 'authenticity' is a value-judgment, one for which Heidegger fails to provide criteria," pp. 231-232.

¹⁰⁸ B & T, p. 303; H, 259.

¹⁰⁹ Weber, p. 129.

conceivably 'step into' my place."¹¹⁰ In this mood of isolated anxiety man experiences his reason for being. "The Heideggerian man exists in order to know and experience a Being and to make Being and himself (a being) transparent to himself. This is his crowning task, and isolation is one necessary condition that can ensure the realization of this task."¹¹¹

For Weber, Heidegger presents man with a choice between two undesirable extremes. On the one hand there is the fallen world of the herd-like social being who has missed the "true meaning of his existence." On the other, there is the authentic, resolute individual who is true to himself and true to "life's function." But he has "paid the price of utter isolation in exchange for his state." There appears to be no alternative between these two and if there is "Heidegger does not acknowledge it."¹¹²

Weber offers the position of Ludwig Binswanger as demonstrating the inadequacy of Heidegger's social theory. Binswanger had to discard many of Heidegger's views in order to come up with a positive social doctrine, one based on encounter.¹¹³ Yet, Binswanger retained much of the

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 108.

¹¹¹ Ibid., pp. 108-09.

¹¹² Ibid., p. 100.

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 190. "Not only does Binswanger not retain the spirit of Heidegger's views; he must discard

terminology of Heidegger in order to appear Heideggerian.

Heidegger's authentic man achieves his authenticity at the price of utter isolation. "Heidegger's man, notwithstanding Heidegger's pronouncements to the contrary finds the world an obstacle that must be overcome. . . ." ¹¹⁴ "Overcome" in this context means withdrawing from all concrete, empirical manifestations of the world. Binswanger, on the other hand, views the authentic man as being genuinely with the world when he is genuinely himself. For whereas Heidegger's world is a compound of care, tasks, projects, roles, escape, ruled by death, and so forth, Binswanger's world is comprised of love. For Binswanger this is a "transcendence" of care and solicitude. ¹¹⁵

Binswanger finds an alternative between inauthentic fallenness and authentic isolation; it is "encounter." This is a relationship of genuine mutuality. "Encounter entails respect for the other and respect is incompatible with manipulating or using him in any way. Encounter is love." ¹¹⁶ Binswanger, therefore, has had to import various

the most basic ones, modify others and import more foreign implants into Heidegger's thought than he can export from it."

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p. 192.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 193.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 198.

circumlocutions in order to save himself from Heidegger.

For the most part these have been borrowed from Buber.

"It is clear that Binswanger is no Heideggerian at all when the central tenets of his philosophy are at stake."¹¹⁷

Weber further states that love as encounter is that,

". . . abode of Dasein rising above care and transcending even resolution."¹¹⁸

At this point, to evaluate critically each one of the points raised by Weber in her critique of Heidegger would push us into lengthy and unnecessary repetition. Nevertheless, certain key failures of understanding on the part of Weber will be reviewed in order to reveal the problems involved when Heidegger's ontology is seen as an "explanation" of the "nature" of man.

A preliminary step at this point seems appropriate. How would Heidegger himself react to a question concerning his philosophy as being preoccupied with the question of Being-ness to the neglect of the human condition?

How can your philosophy today be effective in regards to a concrete society with its multifaceted tasks and cares, demands and hopes? Or have your critics been correct, those who maintain, that Martin Heidegger has so concentrated on the question of Beingness that he

¹¹⁷Ibid., p. 202.

¹¹⁸Ibid., p. 208. "Heidegger's resolute Dasein always confronts the situation with action in some sense; it is afraid to 'lose' its time. What love experiences in the moment . . . resembles lack of resolve and loss of time to the narrow eyes of care." p. 211.

has ignored the human condition, the being of man in society as well as the individual person?

Heidegger answers:

These criticisms are a great misunderstanding! Because it is just the question of Beingness and the development of this question which anticipates an interpretation of Da-sein; that is, a determination as to the essence of Man. And the basic idea of my thinking is just this, that Beingness needs the openness of the being of man and that vice versa man is only man in as much as he stands in the openness of Beingness as such.

With this point, the question in as much as I am occupied only with Beingness and have forgotten man, should be settled. Man cannot ask the question of Beingness without also asking about the essence of man.¹¹⁹

The basic mistake Weber makes is not to take seriously, as well as not understand, the nature of the ontological "aim" of Being and Time. She has assumed whether knowingly or not, that Heidegger is revealing man's ontic manifestations when in fact he has been disclosing the ontological essence of man; i.e., man in his Beingness. "The whole of Being and Time is an ontology."¹²⁰ And, as has been seen, in this dissertation, Being and Time, "is a work in ontology and to render any part of it ontically is to push it into an anthropology."¹²¹ Weber herself has stated that Heidegger and his audience speak in foreign tongues which can be reduced to the "phenomological ontology" of

¹¹⁹Richard Wisser, Martin Heidegger im Gespräch (Freiburg: Karl Alber Verlag, 1970), pp. 69-70. My translation.

¹²⁰Boss, Personal interview, 1973.

¹²¹See pp. 19-20 and 212-213 above.

Heidegger and the "anthropology" of the audience. Weber evidently intends these two to be seen as synonymous. "For what he terms 'anthropology' the majority of mankind calls 'ethics.'"¹²² It should be manifestly clear by now that Weber has pushed Heidegger into an anthropology.

Da-sein is jemeinigkeit. Does this justify pushing "man" into utter isolation in order to achieve authenticity? Weber has charged Boss with merely reiterating the Heideggerian assertion that man is essentially a Being-with-others and that Da-sein is primarily my Da-sein. She further states that Boss has not offered an analysis of Heidegger but that he, Boss, merely states that critics have made egotistical rather than altruistic inferences from his thought.¹²³ But Da-sein as jemeinigkeit has nothing to do with ontic isolation. It has everything to do with "individual" openness to and revelation of phenomena with their possibilities.

To say that Da-sein exists for its own sake does not refer to some ontic, concrete or egotistical end of factual man. To argue that this proposition can be refuted by bringing to bear examples whereby men have sacrificed themselves for others and/or that men exist

¹²²Weber, p. 183.

¹²³Ibid., p. 145, ftn. 7. She is referring to Boss' objection to "The Egotistical Misconception" as found in P & D, pp. 55-56. The term "altruistic" is not found on either of these pages.

primarily in community, rather than refute the assertion merely discloses it. As Heidegger has stated, "The proposition represents neither a solipsistic isolation nor an egotistical exaltation of Dasein. On the contrary, it states the condition of the possibility of man's behaving either 'egotistically' or 'altruistically.'" (Emphasis other than on "either" and "or" is added.)¹²⁴

Weber has assumed that authenticity for Heidegger functions as the "prime-value."¹²⁵ But Heidegger is not working with values in Being and Time, he is merely laying the foundation whereby values can be imposed. But, this imposition occurs on the ontic level.¹²⁶ In other words, Heidegger is laying bare the way man is in his essence; i.e., as Da-sein. This is not evaluative but descriptive. Authenticity and inauthenticity are revealed as modes of Being--ontological determinations--and not as objects for evaluation.

To evaluate something, to give "it" a value, is to make the "it" an object for a subject which evaluates.

¹²⁴Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Reasons (Vom Wesen des Grundes), p. 87.

¹²⁵Weber, p. 239. ". . . obviously Heidegger's work is replete with values."

¹²⁶In B & T, Heidegger states that value-predicates are "possessions" of extant (vorhanden) Things and hence extants themselves. Although put in the form of a question the affirmative implication is clear, ". . . These value-characters themselves are rather just ontical characteristics of those entities which have the kind of Being possessed by Things?" p. 132; H, 99.

In other words, thinking in terms of value-judgments is simply the adding of a value to an object. Thus, all evaluating becomes a subjectivism. In doing this, things become subject to man's evaluating, and hence can not stand in their own Being. But, as has been seen, the ontological dimension is merely the disclosure, the revelation of possibilities; it is not the evaluation of those possibilities.

For Heidegger, it is through the characterization of something as "value" that the something loses its dignity. By "evaluating" something it becomes an object for the appreciation of, or manipulation by, man. "But what a thing is in its Being is not exhausted by its being an object, much less when the objectivity has the character of value. All valuing, even when it values positively, subjectivises the thing. It does not let Beings be, but makes them valuable as the object of its action." (Emphasis added.)¹²⁷

How could Weber maintain her rendering of authenticity as a case of utter isolation in the face of Heidegger's assertion that the private is impotent? "If man . . . is once again to find himself in the nearness of Being, he must first learn to exist in the nameless. He must recognize the seduction of the public, as well as the impotence

¹²⁷ Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," in Barrett and Aiken, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, III, pp. 214-215.

of the private."¹²⁸ The implication here is that authenticity is "logically" different than either "utter isolation" or "the impotence of the private." Is this so difficult to see? Authenticity is the "own most" disclosure of possibilities; it is not the evaluation of those possibilities. Yet, both the public and the private are modes of living; i.e., they function evaluatively--they are "chosen" possibilities. Thus, authenticity, as understood by Heidegger, is antithetical to both isolation and privacy.¹²⁹

But the above quote (Footnote 128) reveals much more than this. What does it mean "to exist in the nameless?" The nameless refers to the mode of disclosure as opposed to the mode of evaluation. For to judge something as a value is to set it apart, make "it" an object; i.e., to name it. To exist in the nameless is to let Being be. But doesn't this rather restrict us as far as our "philosophical" activity is concerned? If we exist in the nameless, if we refrain from judging, if we let Being be, what can we do? It is not what can we do; it is what we will do and that is, be silent.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 196.

¹²⁹ The question can be raised, "What if I choose to live authentically?" This would be an evaluative act and hence would not fall within the domain of the open disclosiveness of possibilities. It would use those possibilities but in their use a determinative choice would be implemented. Thus, Heidegger says, "Authentic Being-one's-self . . . is rather an existentiell modification of the 'they' . . ." B & T, p. 168; H, 130.

The second part of the above quote reads like this, "Man must, before he speaks, let himself first be claimed again by Being at the risk of having under this claim little or nothing to say."¹³⁰ We have seen that Er-eignis is not an e-vent in the sense of a happening. "It" is of a nature which does not allow speaking about or defining "it" for our languages and grammar are expressly "designed" to make statements about beings or Things. Language cannot touch Er-eignis, it can only be experienced.¹³¹ Perhaps this is what Heidegger means by "existing in the nameless." Perhaps this is also what he means when he says that living the claim of Beingness will leave us with little or nothing to say. And perhaps this is what is meant, in an indirect way, when he says, "Man is the shepherd of Being."¹³²

The "letting Being be" may be for Heidegger what Boss has described as "letting what appears speak to you."¹³³ As Boss has demonstrated in his many publications, this has profound implications for psychotherapeutic technique and theory.¹³⁴

¹³⁰Ibid., p. 196.

¹³¹See p. 138 above.

¹³²Ibid., p. 210.

¹³³Boss, Personal interview, 1973.

¹³⁴See Boss, P & D, p. 64, also pp. 248-251.

(c) Friedman: "All real living is meeting"

The fundamental argument against Heidegger (as well as Boss) is that Being-in-the-world as Being-with (mit-sein) is based on an inadequate comprehension of the significance and importance of encounter or meeting (Begegnung). To bolster the argument Friedman utilizes the "I-thou" philosophy of Buber and the "existential analysis" of Binswanger.

For Binswanger, love is that which grounds disclosedness for our-selves, a selfhood coming about as a result of encounter--the we. Care, on the other hand is "of the world" and of disclosedness of the "there" for myself. "The there of the Dasein as love is--the being-there [Da-sein] of the 'world' of Each-Other."¹³⁵ Love not only transcends care but makes possible the permeation of care by an understanding based on the self disclosed in encounter.

It is through encounter that the "deepest sense" of unique belonging together becomes manifest in the I-thou. "The selfhood of this I and Thou is thus grounded not in the Dasein as mine or thine, but in the Dasein as ours; i.e. in the being of the Dasein as we. Here selfhood issues only from the We."¹³⁶

¹³⁵Quoted in Maurice Friedman's, The World of Existentialism (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 417. This is Friedman's edited translation of Binswanger's Grundformen and Erkenntnis Menschlickens Daseins.

¹³⁶Ibid., p. 419.

Friedman points out that selfhood as arising from encounter--the dual selfhood of love as developed by Binswanger--is in direct opposition to Heidegger's disclosure of the world as "mine." Friedman contends that Heidegger has "posited" this mineness of Da-sein and that Boss has accepted it uncritically. Further, both Boss and Heidegger see mineness as the true avenue to authenticity. For Friedman, this means that Binswanger has separated himself from those "existentialists" identifying the inter-human as merely an extension of the self and thereby joins the existentialists of dialogue.¹³⁷

Whereas Friedman makes this identification for Binswanger, he is, nevertheless, critical of Binswanger remaining with a method of analysis which is Heideggerian. He is also critical of Binswanger's "dual mode" of love as becoming overly sentimentalized; i.e., as not containing within it the possibilities of conflict and opposition as does Buber's philosophy. However, Binswanger has caught, according to Friedman, the essence of Buber's I-Thou philosophy by realizing that existence is understood principally from the We, or I-Thou, not exclusively from the I.¹³⁸

¹³⁷ Maurice Friedman, "Phenomenology and Existential Analysis," Review of Existential Psychiatry and Psychology, IX, Nos. 2 and 3, 1969, p. 165.

¹³⁸ Ibid., p. 167.

It is this identification of self with I-Thou as opposed to "mineness" that, for Friedman, characterizes the fundamental distinction between Buber and Heidegger. Is the reality of the self grounded on "mature resolute existence" or found in the encounter between men? If the second position is adopted, then the self can only be understood via its dialogue with other selves; i.e., in the "between." If Heidegger's "position" is taken, then, for Friedman, "existential categories" can be used to reveal the self from within itself. But this is wrong says Friedman, for the self must be understood as a reciprocal relatedness, of the mutuality between selves, ". . . and never as an ontological entity understandable prior to its interhuman relations." (Emphasis added.)¹³⁹

Friedman succinctly summarizes the position of I-Thou, reflecting both Buber and Binswanger by saying:

. . . people cannot enter an I-thou relationship simply by unburdening their emotions to each other but only by leaving the Dasein as mine or thine for the Dasein as ours, the Dasein as we.¹⁴⁰

How could someone "leave" his Da-sein much less enter into another "type" of Da-sein? The only possibility would be if Da-sein were seen as a something

¹³⁹Ibid. As stated by Friedman, ". . . it is inadvisable to substitute an ontological analysis of dialogue itself. The result could only be to reduce dialogue from an ontological reality to an ontic one, from 'all real living is meeting' to dialogue as a dimension of the self."

¹⁴⁰Ibid., p. 166.

possessed (an extant) and this is not what Heidegger has revealed as Da-sein!

According to Friedman, "all real living is meeting" or, the self can only be understood in its reciprocal relatedness with other selves. But a series of questions can be posed at this point. How does the basic ontological condition of "real living" allow for existing with? This question is not answered by either Buber or Friedman. How can I conceive of myself as an I and a Thou? How can I be so constituted as to be able to experience myself as a mit-sein with you? What is the prerequisite of our condition that allows experiencing ourselves as existing together? These questions all point to a basis, an understanding, as to why and how we can exist as We or as I-Thou. This basis has not been uncovered by Buber, Friedman or Binswanger for they still view Heidegger's ontology as merely perpetuating an ontic description of properties that man has. They, in essence, are still "hanging in the air."

Therefore the descriptions of individual sociological phenomena which are not seen within the background of primary being-with-one-another of man's existence hang in the air.¹⁴¹

The Jemeingkeit of Da-sein is so constituted that Being-with (mit-sein) belongs to it equiprimordially. It is this ontological grounding which allows one to speak of

¹⁴¹ Boss, Grundriss, p. 287. My translation.

an I-thou or a We. "Buber's I-thou and We remains not clear as to its essence; it hangs in the air."¹⁴² In other words, dialogue or what is called "meeting" is only possible and made possible by Being-with which pervades each manifestation of dialogue as its essence.

When the Other is explicitly disclosed in solicitude this disclosure is made possible by being with him primarily in every case. Yet, more than likely it is the disclosure of the Other which becomes the focal point for the problematics involved in understanding the "psychical life of others" not the ontological feature underlying the disclosure--Being-with. "Not only is Being towards Others an autonomous irreducible relationship of Being: This relationship, as Being-with is one which, with Dasein's being, already is."¹⁴³

The Jemeingkeit of Da-sein can be referred to as "selfhood" only if that is understood ontologically. "Selfhood is the presupposition of the possibility of being an 'I' which itself is revealed only in the Thou." Selfhood is a neutral expression describing Da-sein's ontological characteristics and as such it makes possible such

¹⁴² Boss, Personal interview.

¹⁴³ B & T, pp. 161-162; H, 124-125. Heidegger's development of the theme being-with, paraphrased in this paragraph, reveals not only important elements for the topic under discussion, but for the non-immanence characteristic of Being-in-the-world as well.

things as "being an I" and "being a Thou" and even "sexuality." It must be remembered at all times when considering Da-sein that:

All essential propositions of an ontological analytic of Dasein in man treat Dasein in its neutrality. (Emphasis added.)¹⁴⁴

In summary, the three sources constituting the Heideggerian critique have one general theme in common. They have, for the most part, confused the phenomenological method and its ontological revelations with ontic descriptions of properties that man has. This occurs as a direct consequence of investigating the nature of man as opposed to interrogating the Beingness of man. The former is concerned with properties, hence substances; the latter reveals ways that man is.

Wilde and Kluback regard Heidegger as neglecting the ontic dimension seeing it as a necessary "opposite" for the ontological. This vividly puts the ontological in opposition (hence inferring a priority) to the ontic when in point of fact the ontological is already within the ontic as its essence.

Weber sees Heidegger as presenting a "deficient" social theory as a result of a "deficient" theory of man. She contrasts the "they" as representing a social structure based on falsehoods, facades, and trickery, with the utter

¹⁴⁴Heidegger, The Essence of Reasons (Vom Wesen des Grundes), p. 87.

isolation of the authentic man and finds them both lacking. But in the process of her evaluation she has created a chimerical Heidegger. She has not understood that Being and Time is a work in fundamental ontology and as such has given the basis for a social theory but by no means has presented either a "positive" or "negative" concrete social or ethical theory.

Friedman, using Buber and Binswanger, has attempted to push Heidegger and Boss into a kind of idealism revolving around the meaning of the expression "mineness." He has attempted to demonstrate that the "I" can only be known through a "Thou"; i.e., through the encounter. But this is all on a concrete level, its ground, its essence has not been adequately revealed, if at all. This is why it can be said that these ideas "hang in the air." I-thou functions as a result of the ontological disclosure of Da-sein as Being-with.

CHAPTER V

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

A development of fundamental Heideggerian themes and their respective relevance for psychotherapy as seen by Boss has been accomplished. The task now is to show how Heidegger and Boss specifically relate to the philosophy of science. Section 13 centers on a philosophy of science developed from Heidegger's statements on the subject and as interpreted by Boss. In section 14, criticisms of Boss' Daseinsanalysis are reviewed demonstrating that the critics have implicitly endorsed a definition of science which is overly restrictive. In section 15, a general historical and thematic development of the movement known as existential (humanistic) psychology is undertaken and a critique from the Heideggerian perspective is presented.

13. Heidegger and Boss on Science

With the possible exception of the essay "What Is Metaphysics?" Heidegger has not devoted himself directly to a critique of the issues of a philosophy of science. Yet, throughout many of his works, at least a concern for these issues can be discerned. Boss, on the other hand, comes

from an orientation--psychology and/or psychotherapy--which views itself as "scientific." Yet, Boss has based his entire approach to the "scientific" issues of psychotherapy on Heideggerian thinking. Perhaps we can conclude that Heidegger has more to say to science than what might immediately be apparent.

It will be recalled that in Sections 2 and 6¹ a summary was presented of Boss' approach to the issues of a "philosophy of science." This summary focused primarily on his use and understanding of phenomenology. It was revealed that for Boss natural science has given the model, perpetuated by the behavioral sciences, whereby phenomena are explained by appealing to "forces," "dynamics," or "causes" that somehow reside within phenomena and give them their "reality." This tendency, however, merely covers up the phenomena in their phenomenality--they become "leveled." Daseinsanalysis as phenomenology attempts to undercut this leveling tendency by allowing the phenomena to reveal themselves.

In this chapter, an expansion of the summaries previously given will be undertaken. This involves being more specific in regards to the issues of the philosophy of science as seen from the perspective of both Heidegger and Boss. Also in this chapter an attempt will be made to

¹Section 2, specifically pp. 33-45 above.

evaluate some of the criticisms levied against Daseins-analysis as well as to develop a critique of humanistic or existential psychology.

"What is most thought-provoking in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not thinking."² With this phrase Heidegger introduces the critical issues surrounding the nature of thought in Was Heisst Denken? The region of what is most thought-provoking is that of non-thinking and it is from this region that a fog arises. "A fog still surrounds the essence of modern science."³ But what is the fog and what is the essence of science?

If the cardinal rule for reading and understanding Being and Time is followed,⁴ it will become apparent that the sciences, inclusive of the "human" sciences, operate on an ontic level. This being the case, those in the sciences will see the distinctions raised by an ontological analysis as wholly inadequate since their "logic" is based upon extant (vorhanden), object, orientation. Even reforms in this logic will not allow them to see the ontological distinctions which form their ground for their logic as logic is object (vorhanden) based. Scientific structure, therefore, is "thoroughly questionable and needs to be

²Martin Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking? pp. 5-6.

³Ibid., p. 16.

⁴"Being and Time is a work in ontology and to render any part of it ontically is to push it into an anthropology." See p. 4 above.

attacked in new ways which must have their source in ontological problematics."⁵ Perhaps the fog surrounding science is its inability to see itself from its ground, or essence, and its essence is that it is a way to be.⁶

But what is this "way"? Man is that entity among all the entities of the world whose irruption into what-is reveals the as and how of what-is. This is nothing less than that man "pursues" science.⁷ Along with the irruption of man into the what-is are, "world-relationships" and "attitude." The world-relationship, paradigmatic of all sciences, is to reveal the what-is as an object of investigation and thereby give it a definition according to its essence and its modality (method of being). The attitude of science is one of submissiveness toward the what-is as object. Yet science, as defined by the triple process of world-relationship, attitude and irruption, is exclusively concerned with the what-is and nothing else.

⁵B & T, p. 71; H, 45.

⁶"The existential conception understands science as a way of existence and thus as a mode of Being-in-the-world which discovers or discloses either entities or Being." But this is to be distinguished from the "logical" conception of science which "understands science with regard to its results and defines it as 'something established on an interconnection of true propositions--that is, propositions counted as valid.'" B & T, p. 408; H, 357.

⁷Heidegger, "What Is Metaphysics?" in Brock's Existence and Being, p. 327.

But what is the nothing that science not only does not touch but eschews?⁸

The nothing as no-thing is Beingness as such.⁹ Nothingness is neither an object nor any thing that "is." Nothingness allows the what-is to reveal itself and thereby becomes an original essence of what-is. Yet science is not concerned with the no-thing but only with the thing or what-is.¹⁰ To put this in the language of Being and Time it can be said that science is exclusively concerned with extantness, the "thing" as object, not the being of the "thing."

As science turns toward the what-is the more it becomes the captive of what-is and the more it turns away from Nothing.¹¹ Yet, the Nothing is part of the essence of man who "pursues" science. Thus, science can only

⁸Ibid., p. 328.

⁹"Yet this 'Nothing' functions as Being." Ibid., p. 353. Boss has said, "Only because 'being-ness as such' is so fundamentally different from all particular beings does Heidegger occasionally call 'being-ness as such' 'Nothingness.'" This is not nihilism, says Boss, on the contrary, the Nothingness, ". . . to which he refers is of such immeasurable abundance that it alone is capable of releasing into its being all that is going to be." P & D, p. 36.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 341.

¹¹Man, Da-sein, too functions as this turning towards and turning away. "The essence of man . . . depends on the fact that it endures and dwells for a time in either the turning towards or away." Martin Heidegger, "The Question of Being," p. 75. This essay by Heidegger contains an extended analysis of "What Is Metaphysics?" See pp. 93-101.

understand itself when it confronts Nothing instead of abandoning it.

Nothing, which is revealed "in the very basis of our Da-sein," is that which allows for the strangeness of what-is to become apparent to Da-sein. It is this strangeness which awakens wonder and it is through wonder that the "Why?" is asked. It is through asking the "Why?" that man can "seek for reasons and proofs" and thereby become the enquirer.¹²

Although not stated directly by Heidegger in the essay "What Is Metaphysics?" it is nevertheless inferred that with the asking of "Why?" man pulls away from the Nothing that engenders the question and moves toward the what-is of the question. It would appear that this is the "place" of the rising of the fog which surrounds science in its essence. "Modern science neither serves the purpose originally entrusted to it, nor does it seek truth in itself."¹³ It should be noted that the Nothing stands at the very basis of science and is, in point of fact, that which gives science its essential impetus.

In asking the question "Why?" science, as inquiry, becomes a way of seeking for "reasons and proofs." For Heidegger, this means objectivizing the what-is through

¹²Heidegger, "What Is Metaphysics?" pp. 347-348.

¹³Ibid., p. 351.

calculation.¹⁴ Yet, through objectivization as calculation the what-is becomes solidified and safeguarded--safeguarded against falling back into Nothing and safeguarded for further advance into objectivization. This objectivization "gets stuck in what-is and regards this as nothing less than Being (sein)."¹⁵

This is a crucial point in "What Is Metaphysics?" in two, but nevertheless related, senses. It reveals that science is moving away from its ground--Nothing--and heading toward the objectivization of what-is which is then termed Being. Secondly, metaphysics loses the truth or sense of Being.¹⁶ This becomes the question of Being as posed, for example, by Aristotle and later the scholastics: "What is being qua being?" But this translates "What is the essent as essent?" which escapes the question into the "truth," meaning or sense of Beingness.¹⁷

¹⁴"As a method of objectivizing what-is by calculation it is a condition, imposed by the will to will, through which the will to will secures its own sovereignty." Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶"(Metaphysics) tells us what what-is is by conceptualizing the 'is-ness' of what-is." Ibid., p. 351.

¹⁷This point is elaborated in Heidegger's Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, pp. 211-254 and will not be pursued any further in this dissertation except to say that Heidegger attempts to "lay the foundation of metaphysics" by establishing the priority of the question of the meaning of Beingness. Metaphysics has not looked at its ground, but begins with the priority of man; i.e., the anthropological. See pp. 211-213 above.

"Metaphysics moves everywhere in the realm of the truth of Being, which truth remains the unknown and unfathomable ground."¹⁸ Although metaphysics is integral with man, it nevertheless does not know its ground. It remains within the what-is without seeing the Nothing. It is a mistake, therefore, to view Heidegger as perpetuating metaphysics. Heidegger elsewhere has stated that the Question of Beingness (Seinsfrage) . . .

is thus a completely different question than the metaphysical question. It means that when I ask "What is metaphysics? I am not asking a metaphysical question but am asking about the essence of metaphysics."¹⁹

Science makes the what-is objective through calculation, reason and proof. For Heidegger this is not "thought" in its essence; it is the "technical interpretation of thought." "Being as the element of thought has been abandoned in the technical interpretation of thought."²⁰ By technical interpretation Heidegger means a conceptualization which has as its goal the "rationalization" of all that is, the what-is, into a, or the, "reality." This is accomplished through ratio as theoretical and practical. What do we see on the meadow, a tree? But, no, in "reality" we see a void which is sprinkled with electric charges that

¹⁸Heidegger, What Is Metaphysics? p. 351.

¹⁹Martin Heidegger, Martin Heidegger im Gespräch, ed. Richard Wisser (Freiburg: Karl Alker, 1970), pp. 75-76. My translation.

²⁰Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," p. 194.

race about at high speeds.²¹ Thinking, however, in its essence brings itself to its own light, it "keeps clear of persisting in ratiocination about ratio."²²

Heidegger is trying to tell us that there is a thinking more original than the conceptual, that is superior to contemplation and that surpasses doing, producing and/or effectiveness.²³ The conceptual, contemplative and effectual is a thinking that binds the what-is in concepts and classifications; it is a restrictive thinking. Thinking that is the thought of Beingness, on the other hand, is thinking that is elemental, primordial, and as such simple. It is a thinking which unbinds, which lets what-is be.²⁴

²¹Martin Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking? p. 43. "Whence do the sciences--which necessarily are always in the dark about the origin of their own nature--derive the authority to pronounce such verdicts?"

²²Ibid., p. 28.

²³"Letter on Humanism," p. 222. Heidegger maintains that thought has been judged by a measure inadequate to it. It is like ". . . the procedure of trying to evaluate the nature and the capability of a fish by how long it is able to live on dry land." p. 194. The fish analogy can also be found in What Is Called Thinking? p. 71. Here Heidegger adds a statement which will be reviewed later. He says, ". . . we must always seek out thinking, and its burden of thought, in the element of its multiple meanings, else everything will remain closed to us." (Emphasis added.)

²⁴Karlfried Grönder has assessed Heidegger's critique of science with particular reference to "thinking" with these words: "For his critique of science Heidegger appeals to his special concept of thought, which in origin and intention is not genuine philosophy but a religious substitute of romantic origin." The equation of "thought" with religion and romanticism is inherently dubious since both can be seen as manifestations of the same Ge-stell that

The essence of truth for Heidegger is freedom and "Freedom reveals itself as the 'letting be' of what-is."²⁵ But the letting-be of the what-is, is not an abandonment of the what-is. It is not an indifference or neglect but an "active" way of being, a participation in the revealing or "unconcealment" of what-is. Freedom is not understood here in its common definition as the "random ability to do as we please,"²⁶ but a participation in the very nature of Da-sein itself. It is a participation in the "Da" of Da-sein, the openness of that which is open, the clearing itself. It is to participate in the revelation of what-is with the possibilities of the what-is.²⁷

produced "science." To see how science and religion are parallel in their thinking and both are superseded by "thought" would be a highly provocative venture but beyond the special interest of this dissertation. Karlfried Gründer, "Heidegger's Critique of Science in its Historical Background," Philosophy Today, VII, No. 1 (Spring, 1963), 27.

²⁵Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth" in Werner Brock's (ed.) Existence and Being, p. 305.

²⁶Ibid., p. 307.

²⁷The revealment of what-is-as-such is seen as, "The revelation of this is itself guaranteed in that existent participation whereby the overtness of the overt (Die Offenheit des Offenen); i.e., the "there" (Da) of it, is what it is." Ibid. Had Brock translated the overt-ness of the overt" as the openness of the open it would have been clearer and would reveal the importance again of the term Lichtung. Da-sein as Being-in-the-world is already "in" the world, letting be the what-is is revelatory of this Being-in-the-world with its multifarious possibilities. It is the Da-sein, unrestricted, un-leveled, dis-closed.

The freedom of which Heidegger speaks is not something that man possesses but is the very basis of man as Da-sein; i.e., Da-sein as dis-closedness--opening up that which is closed. ". . . freedom, or ex-sistent, revelatory Da-sein possesses man. . . ." ²⁸

Freedom in this sense becomes not only the basis for uncovering, dis-closing, the what-is, but also that directive to turn toward the what-is. But in the directive to turn to the what-is, the original revelatory essence of freedom is forgotten. "Although man is all the time related to what-is, he almost always acquiesces in this or that particular manifestation of it." ²⁹

But this sounds familiar! What of the thinking of the gift, but not that which gives it; what of seeing that which is in the clearing instead of the clearing itself; what of the presencing which gives the present? ³⁰ Does this not sound like mysticism? But we have been speaking of science.

What is the fog that surrounds the essence of modern science? Science does not "think" its ground; it thinks

²⁸Ibid., p. 308.

²⁹Ibid., pp. 314-315. "Understood as the letting-be of what-is, freedom is essentially a relationship of open resolve and not one locked up within itself." Resolve needs to be seen here in its ontological sense as "opening up that which is closed."

³⁰See pp. 208-209 above.

in the sense of ratio about what-is. It attempts to become more effective by its use of a conceptual, calculative reason and in doing so goes ever farther away from its ground. But what is its ground? It is the freedom to reveal in the sense of uncover the what-is. But in its revealing by use of a conceptual reasoning (ratio) it is in fact covering-up. Science uses its essence, the revealing, dis-closing, of the what-is, but "loses" its essence by falling into the what-is, enshrouding the what-is in an interpretative schema. The enigma of science is that it perpetuates the fog by following the "command" of its essence and thereby covers up its own essence.³¹ Yet, science must perpetuate the fog or be caught in a circle. How can science presuppose what it is its task to provide grounds for? Science, in order to follow its own "logic" wants to find a standpoint independent of the observer.³² Science is caught in a dilemma of its own making yet a dilemma that is necessary in order to perpetuate itself as science. In perpetuating the dilemma science necessarily

³¹In Being and Time, Heidegger states that Da-sein is inclined to fall back upon its world and interpret itself in terms of the world. By world here he means the world of things. Also, as Da-sein falls "on" its world Da-sein also falls prey to tradition which blocks access to "primordial sources." "Tradition takes what has come down to us and delivers it over to self-evidence. . . ." B & T, p. 43; H, 21.

³²B & T, p. 194; H, 152.

will always be in the dark as to the origin of its own nature.³³

Da-sein as Being-in-the-world is already "in" the world so that a "world" has already been disclosed to it even if unthematically. Da-sein's ontic involvement in the world is based upon the "prior" ontological disclosure of world. This ontological state of Da-sein gives the basis for the projection of the state of Being of entities to be investigated scientifically. For instance, the significance, ontologically, of mathematical physics lies in its having projected nature mathematically; i.e., nature seen as something quantitatively determinable. A "fact," therefore, can only be "seen" in the context of a Nature which has been projected beforehand. There are no bare facts.³⁴

This "prior projection" of the Nature of world is something that gives science its impetus but at the same time is not determined scientifically. It, in fact, forms the prescientific underpinnings for all scientific operations. "For every science rests on presuppositions which

³³See pp. 253-254 above.

³⁴B & T, pp. 413-414; H, 362-363. Using mathematical natural science as an example, Heidegger states that its basic character, ". . . lies in the fact that the entities which it takes as its theme are discovered in it in the only way in which entities can be discovered--by the prior projection of their state of Being."

can never be established scientifically, though they can be demonstrated philosophically."³⁵

Does man exist in a senseless chaos into which an unbiased scientific observer introduces order? By the very fact of introducing order has not the observer pre-established that order? Before science operates there exists with the scientist a "general notion" as to the nature of things, a background so to speak, which necessarily functions in order for him to behave scientifically. "The prior projection of the state of Being of Nature" refers to the conception of the essence of objects which shapes the objects so that they may be treated methodologically. ". . . all scientific knowledge and achievement are never more than the orderly interpretations and differentiations of a very definite and immediate pre-scientific understanding of the world."³⁶

When considering the essence of objects whether thematically or not the question of ontology is raised. Yet, for the most part, the ontological aspects of science are often taken for granted or assumed as "self-evident." The scientist approaches his subject matter already armed

³⁵ Martin Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking? p. 131.

³⁶ Medard Boss, Analysis of Dreams, p. 36. Heidegger states, "All scientific thought is merely a derived form of philosophical thinking, which proceeded to freeze into its scientific cast." M. Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 21 in Barrett and Aiken, III, pp. 156-157.

with these ontological determinants as well as the methodology to be applied. The subject matter must fit the preconceived ontological and methodological determinants or else be dismissed.³⁷

Boss presents four pre-scientific articles of faith which not only animate the thought of Freud but form the background for all natural sciences:

1. There is an external, 'real' world, existing in itself, independent of man.
2. 'Real' can be only what can be measured, calculated, and thereby established with certainty. Reality is the totality of those objects which constitute the world.
3. The relations between the particles of every object as well as the connections between one entire object to all the other ones are predictable causal connections; thus the chain of these relations of causes and effects is always an unbroken one.
4. Finally, everything that is 'real' fits into the three dimensions of space and into a temporal order derived from the movements of the sun and the other stars.³⁸

³⁷"Only those things which this tool can grasp, or which can be formed to fit it, are ever considered as real. Everything else is either completely overlooked or dismissed as phantasy." Boss, ibid.

³⁸Boss, P & D, pp. 75-76. Boss states that Freud concluded from these four presuppositions that: 1) mental phenomena are products of an object, the psyche. 2) Being an apparatus the psyche needs energy in order to run, this is the "libido." 3) Internal and external stimuli undergo transformations in a causal manner by means of the psyche. 4) The sole aim of all psychic processes is the motor discharge of energy. 5) "Correct" thinking is achieved when there is a correspondence between thought and the external, objective order. "Incorrect" thinking--primary process--is brought about by the internalization of thought within the unconscious. pp. 76-77.

What is immediately recognizable from these four pre-scientific assumptions is that they constitute articles of faith which in themselves are not provable. If an attempt is made to prove them, the logical fallacy of circular reasoning has been committed. Yet, this is not to pre-judge science as false but merely to point out that all sciences must begin by accepting as valid certain pre-scientific biases.

In Grundriss, Boss reveals the logic of the natural scientific approach as assuming five points:

1. It presupposes as necessary the calculability and exact determination of all things;
2. That there is exactly one way to determine and understand things;
3. That without this single way of conceptualization there can be no exact calculation;
4. Without exact calculation there is no natural science;
5. Without natural science in general there can be no science.³⁹

Sciences which base themselves uncritically on presuppositions such as these restrict their range of inquiry by pre-judging which subject matter is not only acceptable but also amenable to "scientific" scrutiny. An extension of this type of thinking concludes that only science will allow us to see the "real" world.⁴⁰ Are the

³⁹Boss, Grundriss, p. 376. My translation.

⁴⁰"There is a widely held belief that the chaos enfolding us in the beginning was truly dispelled only by

botanists' plants more real than the flowers of the hedge-row? Is the 'source' of the river established by the geographer more real than the "springhead in the dale?"⁴¹ Are the electrical charges as a bundle of electromagnetic undulations of measurable frequency and amplitude more real than the rose which they "explain" much less the redness of the rose which is a subjective illusion?⁴²

With these questions one of the basic tendencies of science, both naturalistic and behavioral, is revealed. It is the attempt to "find" forces, energies or mechanisms which somehow reside behind or within phenomena and thereby "give" them their essence. This tendency is expressed by the term "dynamics." Heidegger states that when something is no longer seen by just letting it be, but seen as "harking back to something else to which it points" so that it is seen as something it then acquires the possibility of being covered-up.⁴³ As man scrutinizes the what-is, as he gets more involved in determining and explaining the what-is, the more he "acquiesces in this or that particular

science, which alone, will ultimately let us see the real order of the world." Medard Boss, "Mechanistic and Holistic Thinking in Modern Medicine." American Journal of Psychoanalysis, XIV, No. 1, 1954, p. 48.

⁴¹Heidegger, B & T, p. 100; H, 70.

⁴²Boss, "Anxiety, Guilt and Psychotherapeutic Liberation," Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, II, No. 3, 1962, p. 180.

⁴³Heidegger, B & T, p. 57; H, 34.

manifestation of it."⁴⁴ This means that the fullness of the what-is, as a phenomenon in itself, is cut off from revealing itself and generally one of its manifestations is taken as exclusively identifying and defining it.

Modern science, inclusive of the behavioral sciences, has acquiesced to the idea that the only road to understanding and seeing the "real" world is through physicalistic and/or energetic systems. Since Descartes it has been assumed that the reality of objects can be determined solely through a mathematically based physicalistic explanation of calculation and cause-effect relationship. This is a "prior projection" of nature as causal, dynamic and physicalistic. As a "projection" the object is pre-determined. Following the lead of the natural sciences and wishing to be scientific themselves the behavioral sciences have also "projected" and in so doing ascertained what is and what is not their object(s) of investigation.

In terms of the behavioral sciences, "psychodynamics" attempts to determine the nature of psychological phenomena by "finding" the forces, energies and/or causes that make it move. As Boss points out, the original meaning of the term Dynamis as Kinesis, or motion, has nothing to do with forces or energies that lie behind or within phenomena. Kinesis meant for the ancient Greeks "the turning

⁴⁴Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," p. 314.
See also p. 255 above.

into the gestalt and form of something else." For instance, a table made of wood is produced by the skill of the carpenter who releases from the wood, a disposition already within it. Thus, there is no "force" that produced the table. Dynamis originally means nothing more than the possibility of Kinesis. Concomitant with dynamics is the use of the term "etiology" by psychodynamics. Today, etiology stands for a causal-genetic derivation of something from another object. Originally, however, the term Aitia meant "that which provides the opportunity for the emergence of something."⁴⁵

The opposite of dynamics is what Boss refers to as "statism." Statism refers to the "static" description of symptoms. Both statism and dynamics are intellectually contrived categories which are employed to supposedly help explain phenomena. Daseinsanalysis, on the other hand, focuses on immediately perceivable and experienced phenomena thereby offsetting the desire to find, or construct, hidden causes or forces which make, move, or animate phenomena. Daseinsanalysis regards all phenomena as equally autonomous and genuine. Yet, Daseinsanalysis is also aware that every human phenomenon that manifests itself at any given time must be seen in the context of its past and future. "Life history" inclusive of "life expectations" are integral parts of Daseinsanalysis.

⁴⁵P & D, pp. 106-107.

Causal dynamics operates as one of the cornerstones of natural, and now the behavioral, sciences. How does that which comes earlier "cause" that which comes later? The concept of cause has become increasingly identified in the sciences as the causa efficiens of Aristotle. By definition, "efficient cause" is that which is "able to produce something out of something else by acting on it and by making it change into a different something, a new product or effect."⁴⁶ Using this definition how could "forces," energies or instincts "cause" an observable human phenomena? Is it legitimate, much less demonstrable, that what is prior in time should be the efficient cause of everything that follows? If it is believed that this prior "what" does in fact cause what comes after it, is it legitimate, much less demonstrable, that this "what" be given an exclusive "reality" status?

Aristotle distinguished four causes: material, formal, final and efficient. Yet, the increasingly one-sided approach of Western natural science in general has tended to reduce causality to the single efficient model.⁴⁷ To produce something out of something else by acting on it and making it change into something different would be meaningful if the particular point in time when the cause

⁴⁶P & D, p. 106.

⁴⁷Boss, Analysis of Dreams, p. 50.

actually turned into an effect could be determined. But the effect is entirely different than the cause; it is in point of fact "something different."

Classical models of science have uncritically transformed a temporal sequence into an assumed causal sequence. The assumption is this: that which appears later owes its existence to the earlier and therefore is merely derived and "only a disguising manifestation of an earlier and presumably more real occurrence."⁴⁸ If this is done then that which does appear later loses its autonomy and in so doing the "things themselves" are abandoned.⁴⁹

Psychological theories that reflect this causal hypothesis assume that if the first or initial cause of a pathological mode of behavior is discovered and removed all subsequent pathological effects will disappear. For example, in accordance with this causal principle some psychologists believed that the birth anxiety, which naturally is the "first" anxiety, is that which caused all

⁴⁸ Boss, "What Makes Us Behave at All Socially?" p. 55.

⁴⁹ The expression "things themselves" is an allusion to the phenomenological admonition "to the things themselves." As seen from the Daseinsanalytic perspective: "We can no longer close our eyes to the fact that by reasoning to such an intellectual construction of assumed causes and forces behind the perceived phenomena we forever lose sight of the latter themselves. We thus always fundamentally degrade them at the very outset to something that is merely derived." M. Boss, "Anxiety, Guilt and Psychotherapeutic Liberation," pp. 178-179.

later anxieties. And further, since guilt feelings first arise in the child by the initial commands and prohibitions of his parents, it was believed these feelings were the cause of subsequent feelings of guilt.

But what of the subsequent anxieties and guilt feelings, the ones that occur later? They are by virtue of the causal principle degraded as to their own phenomenality and assumed to be merely derived.

A different orientation regarding a causal hypothesis has been developing within contemporary physics. Physicists today, for the most part, have abandoned a strict causal hypothesis. They refrain from imposing upon their subject matter the idea that causal connections can explain the emergence of one event from another much less prove the reality of something. Neo-empiricists in physics conceive of causality with the logical paradigm of "if-then, always-up-to-now." Yet, they will not admit that future events will always follow this logic. For these physicists the causal model is a hypothesis of statistical probability and has no ability nor legitimacy to reveal the "dynamics" of the inner relatedness of a repeatable series of events.⁵⁰

Daseinsanalysis does not deny causality. By interrogating phenomena it does attempt to see causation in

⁵⁰P & D, pp. 105-106. Boss refers to Reichenbach's The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, Chapter 10. Hans Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951).

proper perspective and this means that for the most part, when dealing with man, the distinction between cause and motive has been overlooked. Boss attempts to demonstrate this distinction by the following observations.⁵¹ It is the Fall of the year, I am standing in my study and suddenly a strong gust of wind comes up and the window slams shut. What happened here? First, there was an open window and then a closed window after the appearance of the wind. This sequence of events allows the conclusion that because the wind blew the window shut; or, a further conclusion "if the wind blows, then. . . ." The slamming shut of the window is interpreted as the effect of a cause. This is the basic understanding of the causality principle--it means merely temporal determination and explains this temporal process by appealing to the "if-then" paradigm. It does not attempt to understand the reason (Grunde) of causality.

Human modes of behavior, however, cannot be understood from the principle of causal connection. Suppose instead of the wind shutting the window, I shut it. I do so because the noise outside is disturbing my work. The reason for shutting the window was a pure motive, namely my wish to have peace and quiet. This wish for quiet was

⁵¹The following is a paraphrase of the distinction made by Boss between cause and motive as found in Grundriss, pp. 367-369.

the "reason for action," the motive (Beweggrund) for my closing of the window. Reason (Grund) here is altogether different from the natural scientific cause (ursache). A gust of wind "knows" nothing of noise and quiet.

A natural cause is not moved by significance; i.e., it is not open. It has no "freedom" of decision. The wind, for instance, can never act in its own sense or meaning. My shutting the window, however, is no blind cause; it is a motive; i.e., there is a ground for action, a ground in significance. A significance is always a claim in which something as something occurs; e.g., "noise as disturbing."

The example of my shutting the window so that I might have quiet reveals the essential nature of man as being-addressed (Angesprochen-werden) by something as something and his responding (Entsprechen) and answering (Antworten). When man is seen as operating via a psychic causal order ("psychische Ursache") he is reduced to the status of a thing, or "lifeless object." Human modes of behavior, therefore, cannot legitimately be understood from the perspective of causal connection but from motives or "reasons for action." The life history of man is a connection of motives, not a connection of causes. The basic difference between the two is that causes are regular sequences in time--hence "determinism"--whereas with

motives the element of human freedom enters.⁵²

The "dynamic" conception of science with its assumed forces and causal connections pushes the interpretation and explanation of its subject matter into a physicalistic frame. This allows for the development of a highly efficient program. "Those who can only understand the world in terms of cause and effect are condemned by their very philosophy to evaluate all objects in terms of their utility and efficiency."⁵³ Yet, efficiency demands of the what-is that it be demonstrable, but does this not block the way to what-is?⁵⁴ In other words, by directing thought towards efficiency is not the "essence" of that which is being interrogated lost? "Being effective is never a proof of conceiving a thing in its essence, and this is the mistake of our technique oriented society."⁵⁵ But further, we find that when nature is interrogated with efficiency as the goal, fulfillment, meaningfulness and individual happiness have been sacrificed.⁵⁶

⁵²Boss, Personal interview, 1973.

⁵³Boss, Analysis of Dreams, p. 118.

⁵⁴Heidegger, On Time and Being, p. 72.

⁵⁵Boss, Personal interview, 1972.

⁵⁶"It is just the complete irrelevance of all our tremendous technological knowledge and power to fulfillment and a happy life which should lead us to suspect that nature only reveals its least essential aspect to the methods of technological investigation." Boss, Analysis of Dreams, p. 121.

"The real 'movement' of the sciences takes place when their basic concepts undergo a more or less radical revision which is transparent to itself."⁵⁷ "Basic concepts" are the pre-scientific assumptions which guide the sciences, demarcate not only the subject-matter but the means of interrogation as well. But the basic concepts are themselves dependent upon "entities" and to become aware of basic concepts, to in fact ground these concepts, is to "interpret" entities with regard to their state of Beingness, or as Boss would say their fundamental characteristics or essence. But this is a "logic" that runs ahead of the sciences, laying the foundation, so to speak, in the sense of a leap. "Laying the foundations, as we have described it, is rather a productive logic--in the sense that it leaps ahead."⁵⁸

The logic that leaps ahead, that which grounds basic concepts, is the laying-bare, uncovering the "things themselves." Daseinsanalysis attempts to stay with the phenomena themselves without appealing to abstractions, derivations, explanations or calculations. Daseinsanalysis is an attempt to let the phenomena themselves reveal their own essence and meanings.

⁵⁷B & T, p. 29; H, 9.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 30; H, 10. Toward the end of Being and Time Heidegger again hits this theme in his reference to Count Yorck's criticisms of Dilthey: "At bottom Yorck is demanding a logic that shall stride ahead of the sciences and guide them. . . ." p. 451; H, 399.

14. Criticisms of Daseinsanalysis

The apparent simplicity of Daseinsanalysis, with its appeal to the autonomy of immediately perceivable phenomena and its subsequent eschewing of pre-conceived standards of interpretation, has engendered from its antagonists criticisms as to its "naiveness" based on its simplicity.⁵⁹ But since when has simplicity become a negative quality in science? After all, the law of parsimony has been one of the major principles undergirding the advancement of science for years. Is the admonition to stay with phenomena rather than meet them with the armor of pre-established criteria for interpretation naiveness? Does its naiveness stem from not following the traditional, time honored, modus operandi of science? Have all "advancements" in science come about by strictly adhering to accepted methods of procedure? Perhaps those orientations which criticize the Daseinsanalytic penchant for simplicity should be warned not to confuse their complicated intricate methodologies and assumptions with a higher degree certitude.

Boss forewarns his readers in Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis, much like Heidegger forewarned in Being and Time, that the dangers of misunderstanding the insights

⁵⁹"We fully realize that the believers in 'psychodynamics' scornfully dispose of the Daseinsanalytic approach by calling it 'naive' because its insights sound so simple." M. Boss, P & D, p. 108.

and discoveries of Daseinsanalysis are manifold. These dangers are inherent in the very thought processes and languages of the Western mind; i.e., the tendency to reify and objectify phenomena. As Heidegger would say, it is the tendency to think exclusively in terms of Vorhanden, extantness or the "present-at-hand." Under this tendency it is difficult to see the Daseinsanalytic revelation of the unobjectifiable nature of man. Man is not this or that thing, but finds his being in the way he is, as Being-in-the-world. To see man in this way, says Boss, is to "break a habit that is two thousand years old."⁶⁰

The "old habit" gives rise to five possible misconceptions as to the insights of Daseinsanalysis. Boss lists these as: the allegorical, idealistic, Platonic, subjectivistic and the egotistical.⁶¹

The allegorical misconception occurs when such expressions as "realm of world-openness," Lichtung as openness or clearedness and light which shines forth, are taken as mere allegorical expressions or poetic abstractions. These terms attempt to best describe man's fundamental nature. They are descriptive of this nature and not objective in the sense of reified entities.

⁶⁰P & D, p. 49.

⁶¹The following represents a summary of these five points as developed by Boss in P & D, pp. 49-56.

The Idealistic misconception occurs when it is believed that the "things" which shine forth within the openness of Da-sein are produced by man's mind and constitute the created content of his thoughts or ideas. This misconception also includes the idea that all meaning of things is created by the individual subject. This idea rests on the assumption that man first of all encounters an object (extant), a factum brutum which only later is seen as something; e.g., an animal, a house and so forth. For Heidegger and Daseinsanalysis, interpretation does not signify imposing on the object (extant) a meaning or a value, for that which is encountered in the world is already within a context however meager or full that may be.⁶²

Does man have access to things, essents, themselves or does he see them only through specific projects or "world designs"; i.e., as if he as a subject throws a network of interrelated meanings over the brute object? For Heidegger and Daseinsanalysis, man has immediate access to an understanding of himself and what he encounters even though that "understanding" may or may not be thematically distinct. Man as Being-in-the-world already is with things and hence with the "comprehension" of things. This is the meaning of the term ek-stasis which refers to Da-sein's "standing out" with and into world-openness. Since man as Da-sein is

⁶²B & T, p. 190; H, p. 150.

as Being-in-the-world, "world" is already "part" of the essence of Da-sein so that what appears in the openness, the light, of Da-sein and Da-sein itself are mutually dependent on each other.

The Platonic misconception attempts to bifurcate the ontological and ontic realms into two completely separate and incommunicable levels.⁶³ All concrete manifestations of man's action in the world are pervaded by man's ontological nature and in fact "give" the ontic dimension its essence. If man were not of the nature of luminated disclosiveness, he would not be able to perform any tasks.

The subjectivistic misconception considers Being-in-the-world as a property or characteristic residing within a subject. Being-in-the-world, seen this way, becomes merely an expansion of the concept of subjectivity and hence completely antithetical to the phenomenological disclosures themselves. Being and Time is basically a work devoted to the careful elucidation of the specific nature of Being-in-the-world. As developed by Heidegger, Being-in-the-world is initially revealed as the "primary awareness of Beingness as such" and then more fully elaborated as being the realm of openness and light in which all things become manifest. This is not subjectivity. But, if

⁶³ This interpretation has been perpetrated by Sartre. See pp. 149-150 above.

Being-in-the-world is taken as a property it can then be pushed into a subjectivity.⁶⁴

The egotistical misconception misconstrues Da-sein's Being-in-the-world as not only subjectivistic but as negating the possibility of interpersonal relationships.⁶⁵ But the "world" of Being-in-the-world is constituted not only with "things" but also other Da-seins so that any individual Da-sein has other Da-seins as part of its very essence. This ontological designation--Being-with--makes possible and is the essence of all man's interpersonal relationships.

In 1962, Boss presented a paper at the Conference on Existential Psychotherapy held under the auspices of the American Association of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry. The paper was "Anxiety, Guilt and Psychotherapeutic Liberation." Comments of a critical nature were presented and both paper and comments have been published in the Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, Vol. II, No. 3.⁶⁶ Since the critical comments were

⁶⁴Boss uses this subjectivistic confusion to reveal as unnecessary Jung's archetype hypothesis. Jung believed he had to postulate archetypal structures that exist in all psyches in order to account for the independent occurrence of similar phenomena throughout man's history. Da-sein as openness to and with phenomena is capable of "seeing" these phenomena in their multiple characteristics. There is no need to postulate subjectivistic structures which are "ontogenetically" stored in the psyche. P & D, p. 54.

⁶⁵This point has been treated in Section 12.

⁶⁶Medard Boss, "Anxiety, Guilt and Psychotherapeutic Liberation," Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, II, No. 3, pp. 173-195. Comments, pp. 197-207.

directed specifically at the contents within the presented paper only a few have been chosen here as representative of a larger misunderstanding of Daseinsanalysis.

Sakert Basescu finds the distinction between existential anxiety and pathological anxiety missing in Boss' paper and further states, ". . . one of the main contributions of Existential therapy has been to clarify the task of psychotherapeutic process in reducing pathological anxiety so that existential anxiety can be directly confronted."⁶⁷ Basescu also doubts Boss' anxiety free level and further contends that in the cases of, for example, lovers who are willing to die for each other, it is an act of courage that overcomes the anxiety of death.

Basescu evidently identifies existential, as opposed to pathological anxiety, as an all pervasive ontological anxiety which is ever present and not to be overcome by therapy or anything else. But what does he mean by "directly confronting existential anxiety?" If the assumption that Basescu equates existential with ontological anxiety is correct, then the error in his criticism can be revealed. Ontological anxiety reveals not another kind of anxiety but the very possibility of anxiety. Each ontic manifestation of anxiety reveals this ontological trait of the possibility of anxiety.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 197.

For Boss, the essence of anxiety reveals an of what of "which" human anxiety is afraid of, and an about what of which human anxiety feels alarmed about.⁶⁸ Fundamentally, the of what is the fear of the destruction of one's capacity to be; i.e., fear of death and the about what is fear about existence; i.e., the continuance of the integrity of one's individual identification. When Boss refers to the overcoming of anxiety, he refers to ontic anxiety, not ontological anxiety of possibility. Anxiety, says Boss, comes from the Latin angustia and the Greek ancho which both mean narrowness, tying off, restricted. "The very word anxiety thus seems to point to the fact that existence attuned to anxiety, can see itself only as something throttled."⁶⁹ As Boss attempts to demonstrate, there are people who, on the ontic level, are so open and independent or who do not conceive of themselves as closed in, restricted, that they are not afraid of being "destroyed" by losing their individuality. What restricts man at this level is an identification with a highly structured ego, subjectivity or personality.⁷⁰

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 179.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 185.

⁷⁰"How then if the lover, the trusting friend, the hero and the saint could become aware of more and richer human possibilities-to-be than the ordinary anxious person who nowadays more than ever frets and worries over the possible continuance of what he understands as his ego, his subjectivity, his personality?" Ibid., p. 184.

When anxiety is freed from this overly restricted identification with subjectivity, it reveals the possibility of something far greater--it reveals a something which is No-thing. ". . . anxiety confronts man with the Great Nothingness, a Nothingness, though, which is the opposite of any nihilistic emptiness, which is rather the cradle of all that is released into being."⁷¹

In particular, that in the face of which one has anxiety, is not encountered as something definite with which one can concern oneself; the threatening does not come from what is ready-to-hand or present-at-hand, but rather from the fact that neither of these 'says' anything any longer.⁷²

And further: "Anxiety is anxious in the face of the 'nothing' of the world. . . ."⁷³

In respect to the criticisms of Basescu, it would appear that he has fallen into the trap suggested by the subjectivistic misconception. He has assumed the existence of an anxiety somehow lying behind pathological anxiety and has equated it with ontological or "existential" anxiety; i.e., as a property or trait which an individual "has."

Basescu's question concerning courage is echoed by Henry Elkins who states that, "Boss advises surrender and

⁷¹Ibid., p. 186.

⁷²B & T, p. 393; H, p. 343.

⁷³Ibid.

acceptance as the only way of overcoming anxiety."⁷⁴ This, for Elkins, devalues courage as a form of resistance.

But Boss does not devalue courage. Courage occurs when there is something for courage to be against as well as for. "Courage exists only wherever anxiety is still powerful, against which the courage can fight."⁷⁵ But when there is no anxiety, when there is no restriction or "narrowness" courage is not necessary. This is not a devaluing of courage; it is merely to identify it on a different level of action.

The anxiety of modern man usually restricts self-awareness so much that he can only perceive himself to be, as it were, an isolated trembling waterdrop suspended in the air, but cannot even suspect any more the existence of the ocean from which the drop comes and of which it is essentially a part.⁷⁶

Surrender does not necessarily mean giving up; it can also mean opening up.

Partially related to Elkins' criticism based on "surrender and acceptance" is his identification of Boss' role as psychotherapist with "a spiritually feminine, maternal image."⁷⁷ Elkins states that the expressions used by Boss only reinforce this identification: "'openness,'

⁷⁴Boss, "Anxiety, Guilt and Psychotherapeutic Liberation," p. 203.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 183.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 185.

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 203.

'responsiveness and responsibility to,' 'allowing the emergence of,' 'being the custodian or guardian of'. . . ."78 For Elkins, the therapist, as depicted by Boss, acquires the aura of "masterful imperturbability" and has the quality of an "ineffable superiority over the tormented and needy patient."79

But how can this be? Boss states that the highest aim of psychotherapy is the opening up of the patient to an "ability-to-love-and-trust" which allows for the surmounting of oppression by anxiety and guilt. He also states that a therapist cannot achieve this by "turning himself into a kind of matron or by seeking to play the maternal role."80 There is a way, however, that the therapist can create an atmosphere whereby his patients can open up to themselves. For Boss, this is a special kind of "loving acceptance" on the part of the therapist. Boss calls it "psychotherapeutic eros" and can only be found and demonstrated within the psychotherapeutic situation. The type of love revealed by the therapist is different from the love of parents for children, the love of a priest or "holy man," the love generated between the sexes, as well as being different from a love demonstrated via kindness,

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 204.

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 191.

considerateness or even compassion. It is difficult, says Boss, to describe this kind of love in textbooks since it can be acquired by growing into it "from the experiences generated by one's own training analysis."⁸¹

Elkins says that Boss' approach via psychotherapeutic eros with its appeal to love rather than reason may be considered a "matriarchal" countermove to Freud's basic patriarchal approach.⁸² Yet, ironically Boss identifies Freud as the one who depicted with "unequalled precision" certain "essential features" of this special kind of relationship. It was Freud who wrote that psychoanalysis has its best success when it occurs "unintentionally," that is, when it is not pushed, when it is, "void of all selfish ambition, of all deliberate aiming at any kind of therapeutic, educational or scientific success."⁸³ Psychotherapeutic eros is unparalleled in its selflessness and

⁸¹Ibid., p. 192. Does this sound like ethical indifference? Herman Tennesen has said, "Medard Boss extends the total ethical indifference of existential analysis both to psychotherapeutic techniques and to practical consequences and aims! This may look most impressive as a phenomenological program (with its 'bracketing' and 'epoche') but is certainly not consistent carried out in practice." "Happiness is for the Pigs: Philosophy versus Psychotherapy," Journal of Existentialism, Vol. VII, No. 26, 1966/67, p. 196. Tennesen implies that Boss is indifferent regarding the status of his patients. How is this criticism justified in light of Boss' psychotherapeutic eros? As far as Tennesen's identification of Daseinsanalysis with Husserlian phenomenology only one comment is necessary: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."

⁸²Ibid., p. 204.

⁸³Ibid., p. 192.

self-restraint. It surpasses even Christian humility since it operates without introducing the therapist's own God.

Elkins' charge regarding the so-called "matriarchal" stance of Daseinsanalysis says more about the one who charges than it does about the charged. Elkins' obvious penchant for symbolization commits him to the allegorical misconception.

As an addendum to the issue concerning the role of the therapist in Daseinsanalysis, a direct reference to Heidegger at this point will be helpful. It has previously been mentioned that Heidegger's positive modes of solicitude as found in Being and Time lend themselves to a therapeutic model.⁸⁴ The "later" Heidegger says something that can support this earlier model specifically as it is seen Daseinsanalytically.

The specific reference occurs in What Is Called Thinking? where Heidegger is talking about the function of the teacher. Teaching is more difficult than learning, says Heidegger, because teaching calls for, demands, that the teacher "let learn." The "real" teacher is one who lets nothing else be learned than learning. This will give the impression that nothing really is learned from the teacher is by learning one means "useful information."

⁸⁴See pp. 217-218 above.

"The teacher is ahead of his apprentices in this alone, that he has still far more to learn than they--he has to learn to let them learn."⁸⁵ If the relationship between the teacher and the apprentice is genuine then there will be no display of authority. In psychotherapy the therapist learns to let his patients learn; i.e., to open up to themselves.⁸⁶

If Boss is correct, the stature of psychotherapeutic eros is not only difficult to attain but thoroughly unique.⁸⁷ Can it be said that this is an exalted view of the role of the therapist? For Maurice Friedman it is not only an exalted view but the therapist "becomes . . . the very image of Heidegger's authentic man."⁸⁸ The issue at stake here is far more complex than a mere rejection based on the idea that the role of therapist becomes "exalted." Psychotherapeutic eros as defined by Boss is unique, so

⁸⁵ Martin Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, p. 15.

⁸⁶ Boss states that the ability to be silent is indispensable to therapy. "The less a physician is capable of being silent . . . the more he is in danger of setting up obstacles to the unfolding of the patient's own potential, of pressing him in pseudo-pedagogic fashion into the physician's own matrix." Medard Boss, P & D, p. 64.

⁸⁷ "Such genuine maturity is difficult to attain. The author himself has more than once been forced to admit that he was not ready to open himself to an analysand sufficiently to be able to live up to the Daseinsanalytic demands made upon him." Ibid., p. 260.

⁸⁸ Maurice Friedman, "Phenomenology and Existential Analysis," Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, II, No. 23, 1969, p. 157.

unique in fact that it can not be learned from books, it needs to be experienced. Does this justify its cavalier dismissal as being too exalted?

Further, Friedman identifies the role of the therapist somewhat derisively as being in the image of Heidegger's authentic man. Heidegger, however, does not give us a definition of an authentic man, he reveals authentic Da-sein.⁸⁹ But perhaps Friedman's criticism should not be dismissed too quickly. Perhaps his "criticism" points to a profound revelation. The uniqueness of psychotherapeutic eros as given by Boss may lie in the fact that it has been able "to come closest" to realizing ontically the meaning of ontological authenticity--to be the "there," i.e., to reveal the "situation" as a projection of possibilities. In this case it is to let the phenomena revealed by the patient to disclose themselves in all their complex multiplicity and interrelatedness without judging, categorizing or manipulating them in any way.

Both Basescu and Elkins criticize Boss for what might be called a romanticized mysticism. Basescu says, "There seems to be a plea in this paper for a return to the Garden of Eden before man ate the fruit of knowledge--a state of unconscious communion with nature in which there

⁸⁹See pp. 223-225 above.

is no self and therefore no anxiety."⁹⁰ Elkins says that, "Boss' outlook thus reflects a snare which perennially endangers the human mind, that of mystical pantheism."⁹¹

These charges are reminiscent of what Heidegger says in "Letter on Humanism." Because he has spoken against "humanism," does this justify criticizing him as affirming an inhumanity; because he has argued against "logic," does this justify denouncing him as an irrationalist; because he argues against values, does this justify the claim that his philosophy is valueless; because he has said that man is a Being-in-the-world does this justify calling his philosophy positivistic; and because he has referred to Nietzsche's expression "God is dead" does this make him an atheist?⁹² Because Boss has questioned the traditional definition and operation of science does this make him unscientific? Because he is concerned with the unfolding of phenomena in their own phenomenality and uses such terms and expressions as openness, being the custodian of, nothingness and responsiveness does this justify classifying him as a mystic?

It would appear that the charges by Basescu and Elkins are not only hasty but reflect their own identification

⁹⁰Boss, "Anxiety, Guilt and Psychotherapeutic Liberation," p. 198.

⁹¹Ibid., p. 206.

⁹²Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism" in Barrett and Aiken, III, p. 213.

of the "proper" function of science. If anyone disagrees with this definition they are automatically banished to that hinterland that is inherently inimical to science--mysticism. Ironically, both Basescu and Elkins, in their preparatory remarks praise Boss for going "to the very depths of the human problem," and then at the close of their remarks dismiss what he has said as mystical.⁹³ This is haste personified.

What is said to be a defect, that Daseinsanalysis is nonscientific is, in point of fact, its very strength. Daseinsanalysis is not a science in the traditional conception of "natural" science. It is a phenomenological proceeding which aims at disclosing all regions of man's existence. The natural scientific orientation, with its appeal to pre-scientific articles of faith, remains blocked and closed to its ground. The claim by the natural sciences that they alone can reveal the "true" or "real" nature of things is a claim that cannot be proven scientifically.⁹⁴

⁹³ Basescu writes, "We have been preoccupied with fitting observations into theories to the point of losing the individual's immediate reality. Dr. Boss' reverence for the phenomena themselves indicates the antidote that enables us to put the person back into the center of our work." Ibid., p. 197. And Elkins writes, "Professor Boss' statement of his approach to psychotherapy especially merits our attention and respect because it goes to the very depths of the human problem, making explicit the philosophic and even religious grounds that underlie his point of view." Ibid., p. 203.

⁹⁴ See section 13, specifically pp. 263-268 above.

Throughout this dissertation, it has been repeatedly emphasized that Daseinsanalysis as phenomenology attempts to "stay with" the phenomena themselves. This methodological procedure eliminates the imposition of a pre-established criterion of explanation thereby letting the phenomena themselves "speak." Can it be said, therefore, that Daseinsanalysis is basically hostile to conceptualization or that it is anti-conceptual?

Daseinsanalysis is by no means anti-conceptual. It does, however, criticize those positions which assume or claim that there is only one way of coming to grips conceptually with phenomena. It is not an exclusive revelation of Daseinsanalysis that phenomena tend to resist being conceptualized in one exclusive way. Indeed, it appears that "particularly important matters"--of importance to man--resist a univocal conceptualization. From where, from what source or authority, does the claim originate that everything which is is determined and must be seen in exactly one way? But repeated observations and phenomenological investigations reveal the opposite, that phenomena do resist singular conceptualization. In other words, what comes to presence, what is and how it is reveals itself in several, if not many, ways. For example, anxiety and fear are not objects which can be measured or "seen" in exactly one way. If one approaches such phenomena through a singularly exact conceptualization the phenomena can be quantified

and the information fed into a computer. But the richness of the phenomena in question has been lost. By opening up to the multiple revelations of all phenomena--their "multiple meanings"⁹⁵--Daseinsanalysis shows itself to be far more conceptual than any approach assuming only one avenue to phenomena ever could be.

That which man brings before himself (Vor-stellen) is already there. Man does not make it by his conceptualization. For example, when a person says the word "tree" something is shining forth to that person, tree, but tree as tree is not a special tree; i.e., an oak, a fir, a juniper and so forth. We believe that we come to the abstraction "tree" by abstracting, taking away, something from many perceived particulars and thereby coming to the conceptualization tree. But the question is, how can you take something away before you have it?

15. A Critique of Humanistic, Existential Psychology

One of the fundamental themes of this dissertation has been that Heidegger is not an "existentialist." What follows will be a critique of the development of existential psychology which gives Heidegger (and Binswanger) much of the credit for its development; i.e., it identifies Heidegger as an existentialist, or at least as introducing existential themes. There is an apparent discrepancy here. Since in

⁹⁵See ftn. 23 above.

this dissertation Heidegger has been identified along non-existential lines and since psychology (specifically existential psychology in America) identifies him primarily as an existentialist could it be that the "non-existential" Heidegger is not discussing themes relevant to psychology? Boss certainly does not think so. The ideas of Heidegger have come to psychology in this country primarily filtered through the works of Ludwig Binswanger. But Binswanger, as has been seen, saw Heidegger as an anthropologist in the existential sense. Could it be that Heidegger, as seen and described by Boss, could have more to say to psychology than what was originally seen; and even the "originally seen" was revolutionary?

The revolution that is taking place in psychology--and has been for more than twenty years--centers around an image of man. Psychologists have conceptualized man as a machine, an organism comparable to rats or monkeys, a communication system, a servo-mechanism, as a computer; but only recently and revolutionarily in psychology in general has man been seen as a person.⁹⁶ Whereas man can be seen,

⁹⁶ See Sidney M. Jourard, Disclosing Man to Himself (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1968), p. 3. Jourard opens his book with what he describes as something most peculiar. "Suppose I were to complain to you that I had no will of my own, that people were influencing me in ways that I could not understand. You would most likely suggest I see a psychotherapist at once. But, suppose I had donned a white laboratory coat and made the assertion that you had no will of your own, that your actions and experiences could be manipulated, controlled, and predicted. I would then be honored and recognized as a scientific psychologist. This is most peculiar." Ibid.

analogically and reductively, as all these things he is also a person and it is this personhood which allows him to be manifested in so many ways. The revolution is geared to seeing man in his "humanness," as a person. And furthermore, this revolution is being conducted under the banner of science.

The humanistic revolution basically represents an eclipse of the reductionistic mechanistic position of behaviorism and the institutionalized dogma of classical (theoretical) psychoanalysis. It is a holistic approach which means it does not attempt to supplant the behaviorist or psychoanalytic models but to draw attention to their respective one-sided narrow perspectives. As such, the humanistic revolution attempts to broaden the perspectives, bring into consideration many aspects of experience which either have been denied by traditional models--"images"--or distorted to fit preconceived criteria of meaning. Thus humanistic psychology is interdisciplinary in that it draws from many sources, including behavioristic and psychoanalytic positions, in order to achieve a more comprehensive image of the nature of man.

The identification of this new orientation within psychology with humanism is not accidental. The central point underlying the long and often turbulent history of humanism has been the worth and dignity of man as species

and as individual.⁹⁷ In the nineteenth century this conviction was stressed primarily within naturalistic and materialistic philosophies and reinforced by the advancements of science. Both were seen as relieving man of stultification and suppression by the church as well as speculative metaphysical systems. Science was seen as opening up new avenues of achievement.

Generally speaking, humanism's endorsement of science resulted from the conviction that nature was subject to the law of causality which made it possible for man to control phenomena. The scientist's goal was the objective explanation of all phenomena with corollary abilities of prediction and control, and the humanist's goal was the use of this information and ability for the betterment of man.⁹⁸ Yet, despite the apparent cohesive identification of humanism with science, in the twentieth century there are several divergent and often opposing systems expressing humanism, e.g., communism, democracy, some forms of religion and some of science itself.

In the twentieth century "existentialism" has become identified with "a" humanism. If humanism is understood as

⁹⁷Erich Fromm, "Humanism and Psychoanalysis," Contemporary Psychoanalysis, I, No. 1 (1964), p. 69.

⁹⁸The names of Auguste Comte and John Dewey in Naturalism; Feuerbach, Marx, Engels within Materialism can be given as examples of this overall approach. See Corliss Lamont, The Philosophy of Humanism (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1949), pp. 30-36.

a doctrine which states that ". . . individual persons are the source of value and intelligibility, then existentialism is itself, humanistic. . . ." ⁹⁹ Existentialism can in some sense be seen as a restatement of the basic tenets of humanism since it sees man as the source and creator of values and that his individual dignity arises out of his realization and operation on that fact.

Although existentialism regards man as free and is often called the "philosophy of freedom," it nevertheless is basically pessimistic in that it regards existence, from an ultimate perspective, as fundamentally meaningless and absurd. The individual sets his own standards and laws without referring to the laws of nature, society, and even God. Although the variations of themes reflective of various existential thinkers is divergent, basic orientations can be discerned. Rolf Muuss has listed six such orientations in an essay entitled "Existentialism and Psychology."

- a) Existence is always human existence. It is the way of being peculiar for man, insofar as existential philosophy is humanistic. The human being is the central issue.
- b) Existence is always individual existence. It is the peculiar way of being for a definite single individual, insofar as existence, philosophy is subjective.
- c) The methods of existence philosophy are phenomenological. Its concern is to directly comprehend beingness.

⁹⁹Robert G. Olson, An Introduction to Existentialism (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1962), p. 47.

- d) Existence philosophy is dynamic. Existence is not an unchanging being, but a being that is bound by its very nature to time and temporality.
- e) Existence philosophy is concerned with particular man. (Not an isolation of the individual.) Human being is being in the world, In-der-Welt-Sein, and it is always being with others, Mit-anderen-Sein.
- f) Existential thinking is always close to concrete situations; therefore, special existential experience takes the main interest. (Guilt, death, anger, suffering, conflict, fighting, etc.)¹⁰⁰

Perhaps it is understandable why psychology in the early stages of its revolution identified with the basic "humanistic" elements within existentialism. Indeed, the identification was so strong that the revolution called itself "existential Psychology." By identifying with the existing, living, experiencing human being--the person--psychology came in conflict with a science that relegated the "person" to constructs, forces or abstract drives. It is ironic, in a way, that early humanism (roughly 18th century and on) which looked toward science as the liberator from the shackles of religion and "metaphysics" would now see science as evolving into a perpetuation of an "inhuman" image of man. It is equally ironic that this new humanism was beginning to see the implicit metaphysics inherent within the bastion of science itself, a bastion which had prided itself on excising the scepter of subjectivism--metaphysical speculation.

¹⁰⁰Rolf Muuss, "Existentialism and Psychology," Educational Theory, VI, No. 3 (1956), p. 138.

For existential psychology, the fundamental issue is man's existence. This means that it is basically concerned with the question as to the nature of man. As Rollo May, one of the chief spokesmen for this orientation, has stated,

The existential approach is . . . an endeavor to understand man's behavior and experience in terms of the presuppositions that underlie them--presuppositions that underlie our science and our image of man. It is the endeavor to understand the nature of this man who does the experiencing and to whom the experiences happen.¹⁰¹

Existential psychology characterizes man as a person rather than an organism; i.e., as something more than an additive product of various "part-functions." In assuming this position, the existential psychologist attempts to make explicit the presuppositions inherent within a person-centered or humanistic perspective.

Bugental lists these presuppositions as:

Man, as man, supersedes the sum of his parts.
 Man has his being in a human context.
 Man is aware.
 Man has choice.
 Man is intentional.¹⁰²

One of the ironies involved within this revolution has been its initiation by men in the field as opposed to theoretical academicians. Psychologists involved with daily confrontation with patients found that the theoretical

¹⁰¹Rollo May (ed.), Existential Psychology (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 14.

¹⁰²James F. T. Bugental, The Search for Authenticity (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1965), pp. 11-12.

structures given to them by academicians were not meeting the needs of actual therapeutic situations. Doubly ironic is that, for the most part, academic psychology has not fully heard the cry of the practitioners and is still pursuing a theoretical structure that is pulling away from the problems and issues raised by practitioners.

The historical development of this revolution is relevant at this point; however, a full comprehensive review will not be attempted. Certain basic historical events, nevertheless, can yield information important to the subsequent critique of the movement.¹⁰³

In 1958, Rollo May, as chief editor, introduced the book Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology.¹⁰⁴ This book represented the culmination of sporadic attempts to introduce the themes of the revolution¹⁰⁵ and after its publication the interest began to

¹⁰³For a well developed historical introduction into the issues under discussion see Amedeo Giorgi's Psychology as a Human Science: A Phenomenologically Based Approach (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).

¹⁰⁴Rollo May, Ernest Hugel, Henri F. Ellenberger (eds.), Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1958). Later published in paperback by Clarion Books, Simon and Schuster.

¹⁰⁵Giorgi states that early humanistically based psychologists evidently felt the need for a new frame of reference since phenomena such as experience, consciousness, meaning, purpose, significance and so forth simply could not be studied with the tools given by the natural sciences. Yet their attempts at a new frame of reference, their "desire" for one, were diametrically opposed to the prevailing Zeitgeist which undoubtedly accounts for the slowness of this movement's advance. Psychology as a Human Science, p. 53.

increase rapidly. It is for this reason that in a historical study of "existential" psychology we can refer to pre and post Existence.¹⁰⁶

The primary focus of pre-Existence centers around Gordon Allport. Allport's book Becoming in 1955 introduced the notion that Psychology had primarily assumed a Lockean posture in emphasizing the external and visible as more fundamental; by identifying the small and molecular as more fundamental than the molar; and by assuming that what is earlier is more fundamental than the later, in development. A counter tradition to this was identified as the Leiknitzian which held that the person was more fundamental and as such an active, molar and purposive approach was emphasized.¹⁰⁷ Whereas there were other pre-Existence documents, Allport's work seemed to clear the way and create an atmosphere which called for more depth into the issues of holism, personalism and humanism. Also of note in Allport's book was his reference to Paul Tillich's The Courage to Be, published in 1953, and which, for Allport, represented a statement from existentialism. From Tillich's work, Allport gleaned that existentialism had something to

¹⁰⁶ See Herbert Spiegelberg, Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry: A Historical Introduction (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), pp. 143-144.

¹⁰⁷ Gordon Allport, Becoming: Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), pp. 9-13.

say to American psychology. Broadly speaking, Allport identified it as explicitly reinforcing the Leibnitzian model.¹⁰⁸

The influence of Tillich, as a spokesman or at least a definer of existential philosophy, can be found in Existence itself. May, who attended Tillich's lectures at Union Theological Seminary and was a personal friend, uses Tillich as a major source in his two introductory essays of Existence. Specifically, May uses The Courage to Be, as well as Tillich's essay "Existential Philosophy" which appeared in 1944.¹⁰⁹ Heidegger, as seen both by Tillich and May is identified with existentialist themes. May is also augmented in his understanding of Heidegger by Binswanger. For instance, May states, regarding the Daseinsanalyse school of thought (Binswanger and Kuhn) that:

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., pp. 79-82. Allport says that existentialism, "admonishes psychology to strengthen itself in those areas where today it is weak." Specifically, this means broadening its perspectives to include an active intellect, becoming, a new view of anxiety, courage and freedom. pp. 79-80. It has already been mentioned (See p. 25 above) that Boss' book The Meaning and Content of Sexual Perversion was published in English in 1949 so that it would be considered pre-Existence. It might also be mentioned that a book by Ulrich Sonnemann, Existence and Therapy (New York: Grune & Stratton, 1954) was one of the first to introduce existential philosophy and European therapists to English speaking readers. But the book has been criticized for being difficult to read. (See Existence, p. 81, ftn. 53.)

¹⁰⁹ Paul Tillich, "Existential Philosophy," Journal of the History of Ideas, V, No. 1 (1944), pp. 44-70.

. . . Dasein indicates that man is the being who is there and implies also that he has a 'there' in the sense that he can know he is there and can take a stand with reference to that fact. The 'there' is moreover not just any place, but the particular 'there' that is mine, the particular point in time as well as space of my existence at this given moment. Man is the being who can be conscious of, and therefore responsible for, his existence.¹¹⁰

Furthermore, May identifies the important term "transcendence," in Heidegger's name, as "this capacity to transcend the immediate situation . . ." and that it is due to this ability to transcend the immediate, concrete situation that allows for the use of symbols.¹¹¹

Not only May succumbs to the identification of Heidegger with existentialism, but Ellenberger does as well. ". . . there is another philosophical trend called 'existentialism,' whose major representatives are Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Heidegger, Sartre."¹¹²

But the importance of Existence for the revolution to which it seemed to give definition was that it pointed to the growing dissatisfaction of many practicing psychologists with traditionally accepted models which seemed to leave serious gaps in an understanding of man. The doubts

¹¹⁰Rollo May (ed.), Existence, p. 41.

¹¹¹Ibid., p. 75. Elsewhere May identifies Heidegger's Care (Sorge) on the ontic level when he says, "When we do not care, we lose our being; and Care is the way back to being. If I care about being, I will shepherd it with some attention paid to its welfare, whereas if I do not care, my being disintegrates." Love and Will (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1969), p. 290.

¹¹²Ibid., p. 92.

and uncertainties of these therapists gave rise to the realization that attention needed to be paid to the underlying assumptions about the nature of man. Existentialism presented a new orientation which seemed to fill those gaps without sacrificing rigor but at the same time returning dignity to the wholeness of the person.

Within the next four years four journals devoted to the themes of existential psychology began publication: The Journal of Existential Psychiatry in 1960, Existential Inquiries in 1959, The Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry in 1961 and The Journal of Humanistic Psychology also in 1961. There were, as well, several books published devoted to the new themes of the revolution, notably: Abraham Maslow's Toward a Psychology of Being; Joseph Lyons, Psychology and the Measure of Man; Carl Roger's On Becoming a Person: A Therapist's View of Psychotherapy; and James F. T. Bugental's The Search for Authenticity.¹¹³

In terms of an immediate post-Existence influence, both Rogers and Maslow play important parts in the

¹¹³ Abraham Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being (New York: Insight Book by Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1962); Joseph Lyons, Psychology and the Measure of Man (London: Free Press, 1963); Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person: A Therapist's View of Psychotherapy (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1961); James F. T. Bugental, The Search for Authenticity: An Existential Analytic Approach to Psychotherapy (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1965). This by no means completes the list. See Amedeo Girogi, "Existential Phenomenology and the Psychology of the Human Person," Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, VIII, No. 2 (1968), p. 103.

furthering of the revolution. Maslow's influence comes primarily from his book Toward a Psychology of Being and with Rogers it is a series of penetrating journal articles, many of which were contained in On Becoming a Person.

For Carl Rogers, the revolution in psychology has meant a broadening of the perspectives of science without loss of scientific identity in the sense of "objectivity" and rigor. Yet, this new emphasis in psychology has reaffirmed the proper identity of science, that it is an activity of people, human beings. For Rogers, science exists only "in" people; i.e., prior to the articulation of any knowledge (scientific or other) are the aims, values, and purposes of the individuals themselves. Knowledge thus becomes that which is accepted, subjectively, by the individual. "Scientific knowledge can be communicated only to those who are subjectively ready to receive its communication."¹¹⁴ Elsewhere Rogers has said, reflecting the views of Michael Polanyi, "All knowledge, including all scientific knowledge, is a vast inverted pyramid resting on this tiny, personal, subjective base."¹¹⁵

Rogers explicitly refers to Kierkegaard and Buber as those among the existentialists most influential on his

¹¹⁴Carl Rogers, "Persons or Science? A Philosophical Question," published in On Becoming a Person, 1961, p. 216.

¹¹⁵Carl Rogers, "Some Thoughts Regarding the Current Philosophy of the Behavioral Sciences," Journal of Humanistic Psychology, V, No. 2 (1965), p. 186.

thought. Yet, Rogers is an independent thinker and to infer that his works have been heavily influenced by particular existentialists would be a mistake.¹¹⁶ Rogers has specifically referred to existentialists, without naming them other than Kierkegaard and Buber, in an apprehensive manner. He is wary of the overly subjective tone of some of the more "far-out" existentialists and does not want to see the new humanistic movement succumb to a dogmatism based on these thinkers.¹¹⁷

Rogers identifies his thinking with a new "third force" which is rising up between the two predominant forces in psychology. He likens these three "emphases" to three ocean currents forming side by side, mingling, but having no clear lines of demarcation. He says there are certain words or phrases that identify these emphases but do not define them:

- 1) Behaviorism, objective, experimental, impersonal, logico-positivistic, operational, laboratory.
- 2) Freudian, neo-Freudian, psychoanalytic, psychology of the unconscious, instructural, ego-psychology, id-psychology, dynamic psychology.

¹¹⁶ See Joseph D. Metarazzo, "Psychotherapeutic Processes," Annual Review of Psychology, XVI, ed. by Paul H. Farnsworth (Palo Alto: Annual Reviews, Inc., 1965), p. 195.

¹¹⁷ Carl Rogers, "Some Thoughts . . .," p. 185. See also John M. Marshall, "The Development, Assumptions, and Implications of Rogerian 'Client-Centered' Psychotherapy," (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Oklahoma, 1968), pp. 56-58.

- 3) Phenomenological, existential, self-theory, self-actualization, health and growth psychology, being and becoming, science of inner experience.¹¹⁸

Abraham Maslow is said to have coined the phrase "third force" to identify the new revolution of a humanistically oriented psychology.¹¹⁹ Maslow disparages the vagueness and pessimism of the "European existentialists," but nevertheless attaches special importance to their "stressing, confirming, sharpening of trends already inherent in "Third Force psychology." For Maslow this existentialism rests upon "phenomenology; i.e., it uses personal, subjective experience as the foundation upon which abstract knowledge is built."¹²⁰ But probably the most important contribution existentialism can make to psychology, according to Maslow, is that it can supply psychology with "the underlying philosophy which it now lacks."¹²¹

¹¹⁸ Carl Rogers, "Toward a Science of the Person," Behaviorism and Phenomenology: Contrasting Bases for Modern Psychology, ed. by W. T. Wann (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 109. This paper was read at a conference on Behaviorism and Phenomenology at Rice University in 1963.

¹¹⁹ Herbert Spiegelberg, Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry, p. 166. Whether coincidental or not Erich Fromm reveals that the historian Frederick Herr referred to Renaissance humanism as Die Dritte Kraft, "Humanism and Psychoanalysis," p. 78.

¹²⁰ Abraham Maslow, Towards a Psychology of Being, p. 9. See his fifteen "conclusions" as to "What Psychology Can Learn from the Existentialists," pp. 9-15.

¹²¹ Ibid., p. 10.

It is difficult to discern just who Maslow is referring to specifically when he mentions "European existentialists." A glance at the bibliography of Toward a Psychology of Being does not reveal any familiar names that would normally be associated with that label. This leads one to believe that Maslow's knowledge of existentialism came from secondary sources. If so, Heidegger was most likely identified with this group. Maslow does mention themes which could be taken as Heideggerian, such as authenticity, dread and anguish; but regarding the last two he says these represent an "exclusive harping . . . for which the only remedy seems to be to keep a stiff upper lip."¹²²

According to Spiegelberg, Bugental's The Search for Authenticity was supposed to be "an attempt to combine a 'humanistic psychology' with existentialism without much explicit transatlantic borrowing."¹²³ Yet, a perusal of the contents reveals such themes as authenticity, existential-analysis, man's "thrown" condition, death, existential anxiety and guilt and dread. Heidegger's name is not mentioned; but, as with Maslow, it can be conjectured that much of what Bugental identifies as themes of existentialism can be associated with an existentialist reading of Heidegger.

¹²²Ibid., p. 15.

¹²³Spiegelberg, Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry, p. 167.

The specific assumptions of a humanistically based psychology are outlined by Bugental in six statements. He says that humanistic psychology cares about man, that it values meaning more than procedure, that it looks for human rather than non human validation, that it accepts the relativism of all knowledge, and that it relies heavily upon the phenomenological operation. By this he means that "The ultimate focus of our concern is the experience of the human being." The sixth point is that humanistic psychology is not a denial of other views but attempts to supplement them and give them a broader conceptual basis within human experience.¹²⁴

Post-Existence, in more contemporary terms, centers around books by Ernest Keen (Three Faces of Being), Sidney M. Jourard (Disclosing Man to Himself) and Amedeo Giorgi (Psychology as a Human Science).¹²⁵ These three do not by any means exhaust the list of books, articles or authors in this post-Existence phase. They were chosen

¹²⁴James F. T. Bugental, The Search for Authenticity, pp. 13-14. The "I-process" as described by Bugental offers interesting parallels with Da-sein as Lichtung. For Bugental the "I-process" is "undifferentiated or contentless" and is to be seen differently from the self which "is an object in the awareness of the I-process." (p. 203) Bugental employs the analogy of a motion picture, with its light source, film and screen, to help understand the I-process. (p. 205).

¹²⁵Both the works by Jourard and Giorgi have been referred to earlier. The full title of Keen's work is Three Faces of Being: Toward an Existential Clinical Psychology (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, The Century Psychology Series, 1970).

primarily as representative spokesmen for the humanistic movement in psychology.

In Three Faces of Being, Keen attempts to develop a viable psychotherapeutic technique based on the insights of "existential philosophy and psychology." The title reflects Keen's observation that Being be seen in three aspects. Being-in-the-world is taken by Keen as describing man as he is; i.e., it entails "an experience of oneself-as-subject. . . ." He experiences himself as being outside of himself; i.e., he sees himself as engaging in activity directed toward externals, I desire a steak; I fear a germ; I think an idea. Further, Keen states that Being-in-the-world, "means approximately the same thing in all existential literature, although it is not usually counterposed to two other aspects of being." These two other aspects are Being-for-myself and Being-for-others. The former refers to the experience of oneself as object and the latter describes the experiencing of oneself among other selves.¹²⁶

For Keen, existential psychology, following the philosophical movement for which it was named, "places consciousness in the center of the definition of man, rather than on the periphery as an epiphenomenon."¹²⁷

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 27.

¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 4.

There are several references to Heidegger in Keen's book but none which are exclusively concerned with Heideggerian themes. Rather, the identification is made by implication from the use of Heideggerian language, similar to that found in Bugental's work. Perhaps, for Keen, this identification by language is fed by considerable attention paid to Binswanger. Boss, on the other hand, is mentioned only once in reference to dream analysis.

Giorgi's book is a detailed and articulate polemic designed to broaden the definition of science to include the human context from a personalistic or holistic perspective. This "human science" would serve as the foundation for psychology not only in its clinical aspects. As Giorgi views it, "psychology has the responsibility to investigate the full range of behavior and experience of man as a person in such a way that the aims of science are fulfilled but that these aims should not be implemented primarily in terms of criteria of the natural sciences."¹²⁸

The human science "approach" rests on three basic presuppositions. There must be a sustained "fidelity to the phenomenon of man as a person." This is designed to counter reductionistic tendencies while at the same time upholding the canons of rigor, consistency and systematic methodological procedure. The second presupposition is a

¹²⁸ Giorgi, Psychology as a Human Science, p. xii.

"special concern for uniquely human phenomena." For Giorgi, this presupposition was introduced by the revelation of human order by Merleau-Ponty, where human order phenomena are irreducible and hence unique. The third presupposition is that of the "primacy of relationships." This refers to the primary relation of man and world, i.e., whatever phenomenon is considered, it must be seen as already involving both man and world.¹²⁹

In his work there is no reference to Heidegger, only one to Boss but several to Binswanger. Unlike Keen and Bugental there is no implicit reference to Heidegger via language. The work itself seems to be more directly influenced by phenomenology (Husserl and Merleau-Ponty) and the themes of existential philosophy seem to appear in a derivative sense with exclusive identification going to "third force" or humanistic psychology.

The reason for citing Jourard's book last, even though, among the three, it was published first, is because it introduces new elements. Specifically, Jourard introduces the notion of "letting be." Man is basically a "concept-maker"; i.e., he forms concepts--abstractions--of the world and himself. But concepts have a way of closing off the disclosures that the objects give; i.e., we "let the object disclose" enough of itself so that it can be

¹²⁹Ibid., pp. 185-186.

"rubricized" into a category. Yet, when concepts are put aside and phenomena are left to "disclose themselves to us" we find that when reforming concepts we have grown.¹³⁰ Further, man compartmentalizes experience and in doing so mutilates it. "He separates his experience of his 'mind' from his experience of his body, and produces the pernicious and perennial dualism that impedes our attainment of harmony with our world. And by conceptualizing the world, man freezes it."¹³¹

Man lives in a capsule of his own making as a result of his compartmentalization, categorization, and conceptualization. Yet man is able to "transcend" the capsule by "letting be." This "letting be" can occur not only in the perceptual realm of experience but in thinking, remembering and learning as well.¹³²

Jourard further contends that modern science seeks to understand nature in order to manipulate and control. But when this scheme is applied to man, his ontological status as a person changes into that of a thing. As Jourard sees it, this transmutation of man into thinghood has been going on for several centuries of Western history but seems to be increasing at an accelerated pace.¹³³

¹³⁰ Jourard, Disclosing Man to Himself, pp. 156-157. See also pp. 218-219.

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 176.

¹³² Ibid., pp. 207-212.

¹³³ Ibid., p. 189.

In one of Jourard's two references to Heidegger he identifies Heidegger as an existentialist when he says, "I agree with existentialist thinkers that every man chooses his way of being in the world."¹³⁴ He further tacitly accepts the existential understandings of Heidegger when he accepts as his model, or "metamodel," a perspective of man "such that in his being, his being is in question." Jourard identifies this as coming from William A. Luijpen.¹³⁵

It is apparent that Jourard, as well as those psychologists previously cited, has seen and presented a Heidegger that is antithetical, for the most part, to what has been disclosed in this dissertation. Does this mean that the Heidegger as presented here has nothing to say to psychology and that any relevance to psychology must be seen through a distortion? To the contrary, what Heidegger has to say to psychology may be more original and/or fundamental than what was originally adduced in his name. What follows is an attempt to disclose this more original relevance.

In Being and Time, Heidegger refers to logic as being founded on an ontology of extantness (Vorhanden) and one which is still "rough." He further states that reforms

¹³⁴Ibid., p. 52.

¹³⁵Ibid., p. 114, and William A. Luijpen, Existential Phenomenology (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1960).

in this logic reforms "oriented towards the 'humane sciences,' . . ." manage only to increase the ontological confusion.¹³⁶

By "humane sciences" it is obvious that Heidegger means those sciences dealing with man. But when he refers to "reforms" in logic, does he mean an attempt to take into consideration man's humaneness; i.e., to see man distinct from things? Can we, at this point, legitimately infer that the reforms that have been evolving in psychology are similar to what Heidegger is referring to? If so, then what he has to say on this matter bears directly on the attempt by some psychologists to re-evaluate their approach to the question of the behavior and nature of man.

Heidegger offers historiology as an example of a "humane science." It is a science which investigates history (history being that which actually happens).¹³⁷ When that which takes place, history, is treated as an object of a science, "the basic phenomenon of history, which is prior to any possible thematizing by historiology and underlies it has been irretrievably put aside."¹³⁸

¹³⁶Heidegger, E & T, p. 167; H, 129.

¹³⁷We are following MacQuarrie and Robinson's translations of Historie as the science of history and Geschichte as the kind of history that "actually happens." Ibid., p. 30, ftn. 1.

¹³⁸Ibid., p. 427; H, 375. In What Is Called Thinking? Heidegger states: "Historical science may thoroughly explore a period . . . in every possible respect, and yet

Science which operates with the logic of extantness can only treat its "object" as object and in so doing history as "living" (being) is "put aside." History, as that which actually happens, happens prior to any thematizing about it, and when thematized it becomes frozen--as object--and loses its phenomenality as "living" (Being).¹³⁹

For Heidegger every science "is constituted primarily by thematizing."¹⁴⁰ To thematize is to project that which is pre-scientifically familiar to Da-sein into the Being which is specific to it. To do so is to "bound off" the projected entities by making them objects. In this manner they are then manageable and "'managed' methodologically, and the conceptual structure for interpreting them is outlined."¹⁴¹ Yet, in so thematizing; i.e., in treating the phenomenon as object, the phenomenon,

never explore what history is. It cannot do so, scientifically. By way of history, a man will never find out what history is. . . ." pp. 32-33. Heidegger is saying that the essence of science--whether it be history, art, poetry, nature, man or even God--remains inaccessible to science. And it is this essence which is the concern of thinking. In the language of Being and Time, thinking is more or less synonymous with phenomenology. "Thinking means: letting-lie-before-us and so taking-to-heart also: beings in being." p. 224. Essence is synonymous with beingness.

¹³⁹The equation of "living" with "being" should not be overly stressed. What is intended is the on-going process, "way of being" of that which is.

¹⁴⁰Ibid., p. 445; H, 393.

¹⁴¹Ibid.

which is prior to this thematizing in its Beingness, is put aside.

But does this necessarily block us from revealing historicality? Not if it is carried out "phenomenologically"; i.e., an interrogation of historicality should capture the Being of historicality despite the tendency of Da-sein to cover it up. "The existential-ontological constitution of historicality has been covered up by the way Dasein's history is ordinarily interpreted. . . ." ¹⁴²

What does it mean to be thematized, to be set off as object? We have seen that for Heidegger to make something an object does not exhaust its Beingness, nor is its Being exhausted when made a value. In seeing the thing as object not only is its Being covered up, when "valued" it becomes the "object" for an evaluating subject, it is subjectivized and thereby loses its own Being. ¹⁴³

Psychology studies, among other things, the behavior of man, which is his own behavior. But by becoming an object his fundamental behavior, which is prior to any thematizing about it, is put aside, primarily so that the object of study can become "manageable." Even when "corrections" are made in the "logic" of this study, it still

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 428; H, 376. "Historicality" refers to the kind of being which belongs to the historical; i.e., history.

¹⁴³ See p. 241 above; also Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," pp. 214-215.

thematizes. Even when its object is valued, the study subjectivizes and thereby covers up the Being of that phenomenon which it started out to study.

Existential humanistic psychology studies, makes an object of, the behavior of man for whom the psychologist values. Man is unique, both as a species and individually, he is a person and each is to be seen in his wholeness. The humanistic approach presupposes not only the human as value but the human as man; i.e., man in his "Nature." The very nature of value and valuing presupposes man in his nature as that which values. But what about value? A value is nothing in itself if it cannot be stated what it actually is. The humanistic approach starts with an object, man--whose "Nature" is predetermined--"which" is valued and then proceeds from there. This approach leaves the Being of its valued object suspended; i.e., it does not interrogate the meaning of value or valuing which it uses. Humanistic psychology, like its adopted philosophy, existentialism, "hangs in the air." By this is meant that the basic characteristics (ontological) of what is being studied have not been allowed to unfold. What is being investigated is thematized.

Whereas the natural sciences base themselves on pre-scientific "articles of faith"--basic presuppositions--the existential psychologists have tried to make their presuppositions explicit; i.e., they have formulated elaborate

descriptions as to the worth, dignity, wholeness and value of man. But to replace the value of articles of faith with the value of human personhood is still a value. The ". . . behavioral sciences have up to now actually left the whole dimension of human values hanging in the air."¹⁴⁴

Existential psychology, in recognizing man's uniqueness and wholeness extended the "progress" of science by attempting to re-humanize the dehumanized apparatus-like conceptions of other psychologies. In doing so the existential psychologists recognized the "evaluative nature" of man and as a consequence explicitly entered the dimension of values. Yet in seeing man in his wholeness, in accepting him as evaluative, in seeing his responsible and full behavioral possibilities, it was (and is) generally believed that these qualities represent a new super-personal psychic layer imposed on an already tacitly accepted bodily, instinctive and emotional ground. But questions as to how these psychic layers of such different qualities can communicate, have intercourse and reveal meaning, are left unanswered.

The values endorsed by existential psychologists, such as uniqueness and wholeness, and are supposed to be dwelling within these psychic layers, are not questioned as

¹⁴⁴Medard Boss, "What Makes Us Behave at all Socially?" p. 61.

to their essence. These values are taken as mere formal definitions of human beingness. But, questions as to the fundamental characteristics as well as origin of these values are left unanswered. This is why Boss can say, "They hang in the air."¹⁴⁵

The humanistic approach in psychology has answered the question as to the nature of man and has by its answer assumed that the uniqueness of its subject-matter lies in its valued wholeness. However worthy this may be, recapturing the dignity of man from harsh reductive methodologies, however proper this may be in respect to man's "total" behavioral possibilities, the Being of man; i.e., his fundamental characteristics (ontological) have not, for the most part, been laid bare. Basically this means that we, the scientists, are still telling the objects of our investigation what they are, what kind of intellectual inferences we have made about them including our estimation of their worth or value to us. This is still paradigmatic of thematizing.

Humanistic existential psychology, even with its talk of human personality, responsibility, and freedom, is basically ungrounded. It has not adequately interpreted the phenomenological-ontological admonition "back to the things themselves." It still perpetuates, but in a more

¹⁴⁵Ibid., p. 61.

subtle way, the operation of the natural sciences which attempt to impose on the objects pre-conceived criteria of meaning, whether that meaning be in the form of a tacitly held pre-scientific attitude towards the world, or an explicitly endorsed set of descriptive values.

Since values and valuation are unclear as to their essence, they cannot function as the fundamental basis or ground for the behavioral sciences. But, just as Heidegger claims that historicity can become transparent phenomenologically so too can the "object" of the behavioral sciences. The phenomenological (Daseinsanalytic) approach, however, is not to be seen as another scientific doctrine supporting a psychological or philosophical theory. By following a phenomenological procedure of disclosiveness the scientist refrains from all artificial theories and conceptually produced distortions.

Daseinsanalytic disclosures reveal that the phenomena of the world come to be by "announcing" themselves "within" the world-openness which man as Da-sein is. These phenomena claim us, as Da-seins, as that which reveals and discloses them, however restricted that disclosure may be. This is what Heidegger means when he refers to man as the guardian or shepherd of Beingness. It is this which becomes the basis, the fundamental characteristic, of man and as

such the basis of ethics and value.¹⁴⁶ It is the "call as claim" to "let be" of phenomena. Freedom, understood fundamentally, becomes that ability to choose either to comply with the call to let phenomena reveal themselves or not to comply. To comply, to let be, is to reveal the phenomenon in all its richness; not to comply is to impose on the phenomenon preconceived criteria of knowing which automatically bind it. It is this "call as claim" to which man is fundamentally responsible.

Existential psychology, in its attempt to re-claim the dignity of man from the reductive methodologies of the natural scientific model is merely substituting one explanatory model for another. Both approaches are essentially ways of relating to the world. But, unless either approach can ground itself on an ontological disclosure of man, it will find itself endorsing a particular set of values as opposed to another set; in other words, it will "hang in the air."

The Daseinsanalytic orientation far from trying to destroy or undermine the natural scientific model or the humanistic model is attempting to reveal these essentially as ways of relating to the world. As such, they are two of

¹⁴⁶ Boss says that the hierarchy of ethics and values, "is determined by the respective degree of each concrete human behavior's potentiality to serve as the disclosing realm into which the encountered phenomena may shine forth and unfold its own meaning content." Ibid., p. 67.

many ways of relating. The important issue for Daseins-analysis is how this relating is possible, what are its characteristics, and how can we better understand it. This understanding constitutes the ground, that which makes possible all kinds of relating. The ground is the Beingness of Da-sein.

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